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THE TRUTH ABOUT EGYPT

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HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEWIVE

THE TRUTH ABOUT EGYPT

BY
J. ALEXANDER

WITH EIGHT FULL-PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS



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PREFACE

IN the course of this brief history of the last five years in Egypt I have had occasion to quote from the columns of the English, French and Egyptian Press. The source of the quotations is acknowledged in the text, and I wish to express my indebtedness to the Editors of the journals referred to for the use I have made of the extracts. My thanks are due also to the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office for permission to reprint passages from certain Parliamentary papers, such as the correspondence between Earl Granville and M. Waddington, the Blue book referring to the Tabah (Turko-Egyptian Frontier) Affair, and the annual Reports of Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst.

J. A.

CAIRO, *April* 5, 1911.

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THE TRUTH ABOUT EGYPT

INTRODUCTION

It was about the year 1875, when the bulk of the Egyptian population still sweated and groaned beneath the intolerable oppression of Ismail Pasha's despotic rule, that there appeared in Cairo a man who, though not an Egyptian by birth, was personally responsible for that renaissance of the Egyptian national spirit which of late has assumed such abnormal and rank proportions.

This man was Jamad el Din, a native of Afghanistan, a philosopher of more than usual enlightenment, and holding peculiarly attractive, though somewhat dangerous, views on the subjects of national progress and the liberties of the individual. He had already been expelled from India on account of his openly expressed dissatisfaction with British rule. Though of no particular religious sentiment, his wonderful attainments and his deep knowledge of philosophy soon found him a place in the ancient Mohammedan university of El Azhar, Cairo, and there he quickly gained the affection and respect of an ever-increasing circle of student disciples of varied races and religious creeds.

There are many still living in Cairo who remember his magnetic and earnest discourses, given in the sunny, open courtyard or under the shelter of the surrounding

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colonnades of this world-famed university. Among those who listened eagerly to his exhortations on the subjects of patriotism and national liberty were many Syrians who, in those days, practically controlled the vernacular Press of Egypt, while among his noted converts was the late Mohammed Abdou, perhaps the most enlightened and single-hearted patriot of modern days.

In Jamad el Din's early teaching it would have been difficult to discover any trace of religious bias—he was perhaps more materialist than anything else—but a realisation of the impetus of the cult of Islam prompted him to make it one of his most powerful weapons. In later years, the Syrians who had seized upon his teachings with avidity had to reconsider their position owing to the fanaticism he had invoked.

Acceptable as were his tenets to his youthful disciples, they were in no way to the liking of the despotic Ismail Pasha, and eventually, by the orders of the latter and the instrumentality of Riaz Pasha, Jamad el Din, the exponent of patriotism and the martyr to national liberty, was once more turned adrift in the world. The remainder of his life was spent wandering through Europe, making converts as he passed from country to country, until at length he died at Constantinople, the very gate of the Orient, where his teachings had gained him many disciples.

Thus the germs of Egyptian Nationalism were of exotic origin; they were fostered in foreign soil, inasmuch as it was through the Syrian Press that they became of public import; and, in spite of the

present cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," it is a well-known fact that the one section of the community which has any real claim to the national designation is the section which has kept most aloof from the modern agitation.

But from the preaching of Jamad el Din the people of modern Egypt learnt that they had national rights and national claims. It was due to his influence that the army first learnt its strength; to his instigation must be attributed that great military demonstration under Latif Selim Bey which resulted in the Arabi revolt of 1881, and, consequently, he is also answerable for no small proportion of the good and evil which has happened since. The political condition of Egypt is now occupying the attention of many responsible and irresponsible people, so that perhaps it is time to trace the distorted growth of that outcome of Jamad el Din's teachings—the so-called Nationalist Party—which has done so much of late to hurry its long-suffering country in the direction of general chaos.

Fostered by a freedom of thought and action never possible before the last half-century; strengthened undoubtedly by religious fanaticism; encouraged by fallacious and ill-judged European sympathy; emboldened of late by a fatal leniency on the part of the home Government, and hoodwinked by the speciousness of its short-sighted leaders, this party of misguided patriots, without cohesion or knowledge of political organisation beyond its insistent cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," has at length drawn the attention of all Europe to its futility, much in the same way that

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the screams of a wayward and pampered infant disturb the tenor of its home and neighbours.

In the old days of its subjection Egypt, though groaning beneath a weight of oppression and corruption, never dreamt of disputing the tyranny of its masters or the possibility of acquiring either individual or political rights for its people. Groan they might, and toil they had to, suffering injustice and oppression as their birthright and acknowledging no law so easily as the lash of their taskmasters.

A semi-Oriental people of diverse extraction, it was only welded into a nation by the consistent oppression of successive conquerors—a nation which history has shown to have grown less and less able to make an individual stand as the centuries have passed, and which, by its constitutional apathy and by reason of its habitat, has ever been the prey of more virile and energetic races.

Such was the country which may be said to have been born anew during the last thirty years; and if ever there was proof of the futility of putting new wine into old bottles it is to be found in the condition of Egypt to-day, after the establishment of a modern system of government, education, and justice among a people totally unprepared by habits, history, and environment to appreciate them. From the day that the yoke of oppression was lifted, from the day when liberty was assured the individual and a conscientious scheme of government instituted in the place of personal despotism—from that day, scarce thirty years ago, may be counted the successive stages of the

so-called Nationalist, and ostensibly patriotic, feeling which has of late assumed such monstrous, hydra-headed proportions.

For the first utterance of the now familiar cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," however, we must hark back to the days before the present British Occupation, when France and Britain exercised a condominium over the country and its finances, leaving but limited power in the feeble hands of the late Khedive, Tewfik Pasha. Then it was that Arabi Pasha rebelled against the ruler of his native land and the yoke of the foreigner, and demanded certain concessions in the self-government of the country and the practical control of the army.

Emboldened by his first success, and encouraged by the instigations of European sympathisers, Arabi persisted in his mischievous policy till England was forced to intervene, with results which are too well known to need recapitulation. But though the rebellion was crushed, the seeds of discontent then sown have never been eradicated, and the cry for self-government has been steadily increasing in volume ever since.

It was not disregarded by Lord Dufferin when, in 1882, he was dispatched by Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues to formulate a report upon the country and to propose specific measures whereby the work of internal reorganisation might best be carried out. His famous report, "A Synopsis of Proposed Egyptian Institutions," was a valuable and comprehensive summing up of the situation, though his Utopian utterances with regard to a representative form of self-government were, as he himself conceded, far more bold and generous

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than anything the most revolutionary English statesman has dared to suggest for Great Britain.

These proposals, in addition to those of the English Government at the time with regard to the probable term of the British occupation, have been the most powerful weapons in the hands of the present-day Nationalists; and, in order to show that they have some semblance of a grievance to excuse their actions, it may be as well here to quote extracts from the correspondence of Earl Granville and M. Waddington, dated June, 1884, when France had formally renounced any intention of interfering with the temporary English occupation of Egypt :

M. WADDINGTON TO EARL GRANVILLE

(Extract from Translation)

London, June 15, 1884.

The other misunderstanding which it was expedient to remove had reference to the intention, which English opinion has often attributed to us, to substitute a French occupation for the English occupation at the date of the recall of their troops by the Government of Her Majesty. I declared to you that the Government of the Republic was ready to give the most formal engagements on this point. This determination was inspired by the confidence we have that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate on their side to confirm distinctly the solemn declarations made by them on repeated occasions that they would do nothing to prejudice in any other way the international situation in Egypt secured by the treaties and firmans, and would evacuate the country when order should be re-established. There would thus be, as it were, between the two Governments, a synallagmatic engagement, embracing on the part

of England a provision for evacuation at a fixed period which could not be prolonged without a fresh consultation of the Powers, and, on the part of France, a formal engagement not to proceed in any case to an armed intervention in the Delta of the Nile without a previous understanding with England. . . .

I now beg you, therefore, to be good enough to draw up, in their definitive shape, the proposals which you addressed to me in the name of your Government.

EARL GRANVILLE TO M. WADDINGTON

(*Extract*)

Foreign Office, June 16, 1884.

M. L'AMBASSADEUR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th instant, relative to the preliminary understanding desired by your Government before accepting the proposal of a conference to discuss the financial position of Egypt. Your Excellency states in that note the assurances and explanations which your Government are ready to give with regard to Egypt, and you request to be informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the questions thus raised.

Her Majesty's Government appreciate the importance of the declarations made by your Excellency on behalf of the French Government. The formal abandonment of any idea of re-establishing the condominium, and the assurance for the future that French troops would not enter Egypt without the consent of this country, have rendered practicable and greatly facilitated a full and frank exchange of views.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to find that the two Governments are agreed as to the interests which Europe has in the good government and prosperity of Egypt. Nothing shows more clearly the views of Her Majesty's Government on that point than the Circular which I addressed to Her Majesty's representatives at the Courts of the Great Powers on the 3rd January, 1883.

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That despatch was written three months after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had enabled the British forces to enter into occupation of Egypt. It was submitted to the Parliament in this country, and was communicated to the Powers and to the Sublime Porte. It met with general acquiescence. In it the statement was made that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of withdrawing the British forces as soon as the state of the country and the organisation of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority would admit of it.

To that declaration Her Majesty's Government have adhered and still adhere. It was with regret that they found that circumstances interfered with the progress of the measures taken with a view to that withdrawal, and it is equally matter of regret to feel that the time is not yet come when, with regard to peace and order in Egypt, the English force could be taken away.

There is some difficulty in stating a fixed date for such withdrawal, inasmuch as any period so stated may prove in the event to be too long or too short. But Her Majesty's Government, in order to remove any doubt of their policy in this matter, and in view of the declarations made by France, are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk to peace and order.

They believe that there ought to be a reasonable hope of establishing during a period of three years and a half the necessary guarantees for an order of things in Egypt which shall be satisfactory. But if this unfortunately should not be the case, and if the British Government were then of opinion that some prolongation of the occupation would be necessary, it is not to be supposed that the European Powers would join in objecting to a measure required by the safety of Egypt, an interest which is common in different degrees to all.

That these intentions of an early evacuation were based on a far too sanguine view of the situation, and with but little conception of its difficulties, is clearly shown by Traill in "England, Egypt and the Sudan" :

If Mr. Gladstone, in 1883, had faced the responsibility, the expense, and the effort necessary for the reconquest of the Sudan, he would beyond question have taken a course by many degrees more likely to have rendered an early evacuation of Egypt possible to us than that which he actually pursued. For undoubtedly it was the perpetual pressure of that flood of Dervish barbarism upon the inadequate breakwater of Egyptian civilisation at Wadi Halfa, which for years after the formal restoration of order in Egypt forbade all idea of withdrawing from her our supporting arm. It revealed and kept ever before our eyes the utter impossibility of leaving the country until it was provided with an efficient army ; and efficient armies are not easily made, especially out of such material as alone was accessible to us. The safety of Egypt and its self-defensive power had to be assured ; and it was of little avail to have rescued the country from its financial difficulties, and to have reformed and purified its administrative system if we had left her without the strength to protect her civilisation against the assault of savagery from without. . . .

Nor is it on these accounts alone that we must recognise the change which has taken place in the situation since the morrow of Tel-el-Kebir. There is another consideration, the weight of which it is useless to ignore, though the recognition of it is almost certain to revive those charges of duplicity which have been dealt with above, and which came so readily to the lips of certain of our foreign critics. It is that the work which we have accomplished in Egypt is almost yearly making it more and more clear to every intelligent observer that its very efficacy and success must render it impossible

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for us to lay it aside. In the days when we talked lightly of restoring order in Egypt, we had but a vague notion of the kind of regime which we were setting to work to establish. As long, however, as we mentally figured it to ourselves in the light of an only half-Europeanised sphere of administration, possessing but just enough of purity to be slightly superior to the average Oriental satrapy, and just enough stability to enable us to leave it, without too grave qualms of conscience, to take its chance of enduring, all was well enough. Had we been content with that, there would have been little or no difficulty in our fulfilling our promise of withdrawal. But *le mieux est l'ennemi du bien*. Our reconstructive work has gone far beyond that: it has ended by setting up in Egypt a system of government little, if at all, inferior to that which we have established in India, and requiring, consequently, a good deal more than the native abilities of Egypt to work it. We should not for a moment entertain the idea of handing over the duties discharged by us towards the population of our great Eastern dependency to exclusively native hands; and it would be a no less rash experiment to surrender the conduct of the Egyptian administrative machine to the Egyptian people. Had we had the least suspicion in 1882 that we should finish our work of reform by giving Egypt a government which is practically up to the Anglo-Indian standard, we should certainly never have talked so glibly as we did of retiring from the country "as soon as our work was accomplished," for we should have known that in that case our work was never likely to be accomplished at all.

Such reasons, clearly as they appeal to us and justify the continuance of our policy of occupation, can hardly be expected to be popular with the nation whom we are guarding against their will; and these specific, but too sanguine, promises of our statesmen of the

Introduction

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last generation are the roots of all the troubles with which we have had to contend to-day. The memory of these unfulfilled promises, fostered and protected by modern civilisation, individual freedom, and national prosperity, has, little by little, obliterated that of past oppression, well nigh strangled the sense of gratitude (never a strong feeling in an Oriental people), and developed a spirit of spurious patriotism which bids fair to plunge the country into chaos far more dangerous than the slavery from which it has lately emerged. In addition to actual grievances, one must also make allowance for the nature of the people to whom they served as a ground of complaint. Though quick to resent injustice against themselves, they are rarely capable of displaying sympathy for others who may be treated unjustly; the truth, as we know it, is not in them, while mercy and forbearance, as a rule, mean to them only weakness, if not folly. Gratitude they read mostly as the hope for future favours; and though they respect courage and understand tenacity to religious principles—fanaticism being incorporate with their very existence—they have no conception of Western ideas of honour or integrity, especially where monetary obligations are concerned. With plenty of superficial ability, they have but little real character to guide them, nor have they ever shown themselves able to submit their actions to the dictates of cool and un-biassed reason.

As each successive year of the British Occupation passes by, two facts acquire an ever-increasing degree of prominence. The first is that the present regime, which has now lasted

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fifteen years, has conferred, and is still conferring, the utmost benefit on the Egyptians and on all who are concerned in the welfare of Egypt. The second is, that whatever be the defects of that regime—and it cannot be doubted that, whether the matter be regarded from the English or Egyptian point of view, it possesses certain defects—the circumstances are such as to render it impossible to substitute any preferable system of government in its place. A satisfactory solution is certainly not to be found in any preventative movement in the direction of more effective Egyptian autonomy, or in internationalising the Egyptian Government, or lastly, in any combination of either of these two spheres.

For the present what Egypt most requires, and for many years to come will require, is an honest, just, and orderly administration, and the establishment of the supremacy of the law in the widest sense of the term on so firm a footing as to render practically impossible any return to that personal system of government which, ten years ago, was well-nigh the ruin of the country, as it has been of so many Oriental states. It is conceivable that at some future time the Egyptian Government may pass from the administrative to the political stage, and that a moment will arrive when the method of government may be discussed with advantage to all the interests, whether foreign or native, which are concerned. For the present, however, that moment would appear to be distant.

Though Lord Cromer had thus declared, in 1898, the possibility of a change of government in the distant future, he saw no reason for relaxing his own firm hold throughout the length of his regime; and indeed, as the years passed by, there was every reason for his reign being entitled a benevolent despotism. Like many strong men in a responsible and isolated position, he

developed the powers of an autocrat as he approached old age. Firmly convinced of the limitations of the Oriental mind, and conscious of the unswerving support of the home authorities, he continued in his uncompromising course seemingly oblivious of the changes taking place around him. All the Orient was slowly awakening from its apathy; the spirit of Nationalism was in the air; and in Egypt the effects of modern education and association with European influences were acting like madness on the brain. Many of the younger generation had supplemented their education under the Government by a course of further studies abroad—especially in France, which country, at that time, was strongly biassed by Anglophobe ideas. With their smattering of Western education—acquired chiefly in the hope of material self-advancement—and with an aping of Western manners and morals entirely foreign and mischievous to their temperaments, it is easy to realise the influence wielded by them on returning to the land of their fathers. Whether they were found worthy or not of the official positions they coveted, they were mostly discontented with their lot, and the fact of the foreign Occupation grew ever more irksome to their souls. The freedom accorded to the vernacular Press gave them unlimited opportunities for airing their grievances and exploiting their patriotism; and though the bulk of the population, to whom the advantages of education had not yet penetrated, went their placid way unmoved, and the elders, who could yet remember the evils that beset their path under the old regime, were for the most part disaffected, yet the emotions of the

younger generation were an easy prey to the specious arguments of the malcontents. Even so, and in spite of the aspirations of the young Egyptians to prove their worth, it was not until the year 1906 that the party of Egyptian Nationalists in any way represented popular feeling.

PART I.—1906

CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH OF DISCONTENT

Lord Cromer on British Public Opinion—The Anti-Christian Movement in Mohammedan Countries—"The Emancipation of Egypt"—Opening of the Port Sudan Railway—The "Day of Egypt's Funeral"—Visit of the Prince of Wales—Petition of Egyptian Notables—Lord Milner's Criticisms of Lord Dufferin's Proposals—Turkish Aggression in Sinai—British Ultimatum to the Porte—Anonymous Letter to Lord Cromer.

THE attitude of certain politicians at home unfortunately gave direction and impetus to the discontent of the Egyptian Nationalists, and in the Liberal Cabinet of 1906 there was a tendency—on the part of some, at least, of its members—to busy themselves in the affairs of Egypt, which heretofore had been theoretically untrammelled. Lord Cromer refers to this tendency in his Report of that year :

The possible danger in the future for Egypt lies, as it would appear to me, not so much in any serious risk of abuse of power by any individual on the spot, as in the occurrence of some incident which may lead to the active exercise of the dormant powers vested in authorities at a distance. British public opinion is not always very well informed on the affairs and precise conditions of foreign countries. It is conceivable that at some future time well-intentioned efforts to foster somewhat too rapidly the growth of self-governing institutions might result in the re-establishment

in another form, of personal power of the kind which, at no very remote date, did so much harm to the country, and which has left behind it habits and traditions as yet far from being extinct. This contingency, however paradoxical it may appear to many of my own countrymen, will scarcely be considered altogether fanciful by those who have lived in the East, and who have made a special study of Egyptian character. To these latter there would indeed be nothing astonishing in the fact that, in the country which has been aptly termed the "Land of Paradox," a return to the exercise of personal power of an Oriental type should assume, in the first instance, the attractive garb of a movement in the direction of self-government. Indeed, the one will almost be the accompaniment of the other until a generation of Egyptians has come to maturity who will have the courage to express their true opinions—not merely to the alien on whose justice and toleration of contradiction they can confidently rely, but also to their own indigenous magnates, who may possibly be somewhat less tolerant of freedom of speech.

This warning, voiced only four years ago, and based on the historical precedent of the incorporation of Egypt in the Roman Empire, has peculiar significance to-day when the authorities at home are exercising powers to the detriment of personal authority on the spot, and when the well-intentioned efforts to foster growth of self-governing institutions are already proving to be premature. Although the remainder of the Report aroused violent antagonism in the vernacular Press, this most noteworthy passage passed almost unnoticed.

The Egyptian Gazette, however, on May 8th, 1906, remarked: "Some years hence these words of Lord

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Cromer will be recalled, perhaps when it is too late to repair the fatal damage entailed by a change of policy."

That same year—1906—was also noticeable for various riots and the growth of a strong Anti-Christian movement, which, though declared by the native newspapers to have no connection with the political outlook, had a decided bias in that direction. Troubles in Macedonia, troubles in Morocco, troubles wherein Mohammedans and Christians were at variance, naturally called for the sympathy of co-religionists; and so closely have the religion and lives of the Mohammedans always been allied that an antagonism against the Christians in Egypt followed as a matter of course. Even the fellaheen, who for the most part were untouched by political considerations, were moved by the feeling of religious unrest. Writing from the provinces, and of the uneducated tillers of the soil, a correspondent remarked:

I find that the "harb el deen" is the one topic of conversation among them. The younger men are saying: "Why should we wait for the order. Let us begin." The older men, who look to the Sultan, say: "Wait; he will give the word when all is ready." They know all about the trouble in Morocco, and they believe the faith is in danger in Morocco and that the time is come to make one last decisive stand against Christianity.

They reason thus: "Against Alexandria we cannot do much, as there are English ships which we cannot touch, and they can land many men; but at Cairo, where there are many Christians and few soldiers, we can do much, and even if we go to extremes we shall be able eventually to make them give in, and so compel them to leave the country; and in the provinces we can do what we like. When all the

Mohammedan world is fighting the last great fight for the faith, how shall the Christians overcome us? Will not God and the Prophet give us the victory?"

Thus the Panislamic and Anti-British feeling grew side by side, both accentuated by the moral victory of the Sultan over the Powers on the Macedonian question, although the cause of the Macedonians was strengthened perhaps by the formation of the new Liberal Government at home. The publication of "The Emancipation of Egypt," attributed to a well-known European diplomat, and its extensive circulation helped to fire the native imagination, while the vernacular Press, glorying in its liberty, spread discontent and agitation broadcast among the credulous and ignorant. With eyes turned only in the direction of their grievances, more assumed than real, they steadfastly ignored the fact that the turning tide of their prosperity was entirely due to English protection and English credit. In the opening up of the Sudan and the inauguration of the new railway between Khartoum and the Red Sea, they complain that here again the English hand is against them:

We must entitle that day the day of Egypt's funeral, and we are right in so characterising it. Thereby Egypt's commercial relations with the Sudan have been severed, and we have been deprived of that country. The little hope we entertained has now been dissipated, while on the other hand England exults in triumph. The Sudan gives life to Egypt, and when the former falls into the hands of a powerful government, the only alternative for Egypt is a miserable submission. Egypt will be afflicted, for a great deal of the waters of the Nile will be taken to feed the canals of the

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Sudan, and Egypt thereby will suffer from lack of water. It was with Egypt's blood and Egypt's wealth that the Sudan was conquered, and now England has come to reap the fruits of our victories. In the hands of the English the Sudan will be like a dagger held at the heart of Egypt. Now that the new railway has been opened, a new route will be created for the Sudan, and if one day Egypt becomes strong enough to demand back its rights, this route will enable England to invade our country and put an end to all attempts to recover our liberties. Therefore we denominate the 27th January, 1906, as the day of Egypt's funeral.

So puerile are the laments and reasonings of these poor despoiled Egyptians that one wonders where they would have been in 1906, or any other year, had we suddenly granted them the emancipation they so ardently desired and withdrawn the strong protective arm of Britain. How could they, on their own initiative, cope with internal disorder or check external attack? Where was their fleet to protect their coast; where their army and its leaders? How could either of these be organised without a burden of taxation, which would reduce them again to the verge of bankruptcy? And how, during the interval, were they to resist the encroachments of other Powers? Where could they find among them Ministers and officials whose integrity they could absolutely trust? How were they going to co-operate, when from the days of Isaiah's prophecy the Egyptians have been always set against the Egyptians, and have fought everyone against his brother and everyone against his neighbour?

The present King, then Prince of Wales, visited Egypt in the spring of 1906, and while in Cairo was

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presented with a petition by a certain number of Egyptian notables, who still clung blindly to the half-promise of an independent constitution granted them by Lord Dufferin. This petition, signed and presented by Sheikh Tewfik el Bakri, the official head of the native aristocracy, explained the hopes that had been encouraged by the granting of independent constitutions to certain of our English possessions, and quite ignored the fact that so far as Egypt was concerned England was fulfilling the duties of trustee rather than parent, and that she was answerable to the whole of Europe for her charge. However, this petition is worthy of notice, inasmuch as it shows the lasting influence made by the over-sanguine hopes of the English statesman twenty-five years previously. It reads as follows :

The Egyptians are exceedingly glad at the visit of the Crown Prince of the most powerful kingdom of the world, a kingdom firmly established on a constitutional basis, on the liberty of the subject and the rights of the people. This Power has held our land for twenty-three years, in order to advance it by all possible means in the way of progress, and afterwards to hand back Egypt to her own people to be governed by them.

The Egyptians were greatly pleased when your Royal Highness deigned to grant an audience to the members of the Legislative Council, whom you graciously called the representatives of the nation. The people of Egypt are delighted, and hope that the interview will be remembered when the day comes for that Council to be the real representatives of the nation. The Egyptians, Sire, are most grateful, and both in private and in public acknowledge the great and substantial progress that has been made by the help of the clever English engineers and some of the officials

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of the Occupation. But before the days of the Occupation the nation had a fundamental system of government. A Constitution and a Legislative Council were formed when Egypt was occupied with a view to transforming it into a parliamentary council in accordance with the promise of Lord Dufferin. The Egyptians still bear in mind their old privileges and always remember the words of Lord Dufferin, and hope and trust one day that these words will come true. You, Sire, have called the notables of the Council "representatives of the nation." The need of a Constitution is recalled to our minds by this term, and the Egyptians hope that your visit will, in the near future, result in bringing about the making of a Constitution for Egypt. Two years ago the General Assembly addressed such demand to the Khedivial Government, and the members of the Legislative Council are also members of the Assembly. We shall also remember the speech which your illustrious father made not long ago on the Constitution. In King Edward's Speech to Parliament he declared: "Those countries that have been granted constitutions by the British Government have all become prosperous and contented. This policy has led to friendly ties between these lands and Great Britain." Therefore we beg of your Royal Highness that the outcome of your visit will be to remind the British Government to fulfil the promise that was once made us. Therefore your visit will never be forgotten by the people of the land of Egypt.

In connection with this petition, Lord Milner's criticism of the proposals of Lord Dufferin, which form its basis, are not without interest. Speaking of the proposals and their enunciator, Lord Milner said :

He was right in not despairing of the ultimate independence of Egypt; he was right in the direction which he strove to give to reforming effort. But, on the other hand, he certainly glossed over the deep-rooted obstacles which his scheme of reform was bound to encounter, and above all

the length of time which would be required to accomplish it. His rose-coloured picture of an Egypt "untrammelled by external importunity though aided by sympathetic advice and assistance," of the Egyptians governing themselves on civilized principles "without an irritating and exasperating display of authority" on our part, though "under the uncompromising ægis of our friendship," was exactly suited to hit the prevailing taste both in Egypt and Great Britain. It flattered the self-importance and the shallow Liberalism of the Pashas, always ready to sympathise with reforms, until they began to come home to them in the shape of harder work, diminished licence, and fewer opportunities of self-enrichment. It was no less grateful to the British people in their honest desire to play the part of guide, philosopher and friend to the people of Egypt, but to play it cheap. And at the same time it concealed from both parties the disagreeable side of the business: from the Egyptians the long period of irksome control and training through which they would have to pass on their road to a civilized independence: from the English the corresponding period of close attention to the affairs of Egypt and the effort, anxiety, and risk which such attention involved.

The petition presented by Sheikh Tewfik el Bakri was published in one of the vernacular papers and raised a tumult of discussion, its contemporaries in no way agreeing in their criticism. One argued that it was unpatriotic to apply to any European Power for the restitution of rights which should have been asked from the Khedive by the voice of the nation; another mooted the advisability of the Sheikh haranguing every capital in Europe to prove that parliamentary government was the earnest desire of the Egyptians; a third suggested that a deputation of notables should proceed to England to lay their demands before British statesmen; and a

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fourth declared it a sacrilegious act to demand such a constitution from Britain as long as the country was ruled by the Khedive and under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

The suzerainty of the Sultan, the sovereign of Egypt and the Commander of the Faithful, was a safe card to play in those days of 1906 when Turkish troops were occupying Egyptian territory in Sinai, and negotiations between the Porte and the British Government were wavering in the balance. It was a fine opportunity for political agitators to fan the flame of Panislamism in the mooted possibility of Egyptian troops being ordered to cross swords with co-religionists, and there seems but little doubt but that there were wheels within wheels, and other Powers behind Turkey who would willingly have seen British troops between two fires. There were talks of mysterious visits and German agents; and the title of Pasha, conferred at the time upon Mustapha Kamel, the leader of the Nationalists, and the most violent Anglophobe of that year, was of Turkish, not Egyptian, origin. In the anxious times that followed the Egyptian Moslem papers, however actuated, made the most of a policy of supporting the Sultan's claims on their allegiance, Mustapha Kamel defending the Porte's contentions with the greatest vigour; and as the tension between the two contending Powers grew daily more serious, the importance of the issue impressed itself more firmly on the native mind as a final struggle between the Suzerain and the Occupying Powers. The Turkish aggressions in Sinai became a menace which called for an increase of the British

garrison in Egypt and the presentation of an ultimatum to Turkey from the Home Government, which was followed by the appearance of the British fleet in Turkish waters. Meanwhile hopes were publicly expressed of a triumphal entry of the Turks into Cairo.

Summing up the situation, a native notable pithily remarked :

We Egyptians acknowledge that English rule has done a great deal of good to our country, but like all Orientals we are not a grateful nation. We fear the English power and do not love the English, and prefer Turkish rule any way. Of course, I am speaking of Egyptian Mohammedans, because the Copts, although they do not like the English, being Christian they prefer them to the Turks. You see, religion has a great deal to do with the case, and the more so, since a fanatical people such as the Egyptians cannot appreciate the good rule of a Christian Power. I have lived in England and admire their institutions, but nevertheless I crave to see Turkey in power in Egypt again, and, Inshallah' it will be so.

However, the dreams of the faithful were not to be realised then at any rate ; and at the last moment of the expiration of the ultimatum, when the dogs of war were straining at the leash and all Europe looked on breathless, the Porte submitted to the inevitable and agreed to consent to the conditions of the British Government and the definite limitation of the frontiers as decided by the Boundary Commission.

Considering the difficulties of the situation and the religious questions involved, there was every reason for congratulation that the expectations of demonstrations were not fulfilled by dangerous outbreaks

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of violence. Unrest and anxiety there certainly was. There were riots in Alexandria, and a subsequent parade of British troops throughout the port, but the firm stand taken and held by England had a most salutary influence upon the native mind; and the effect of the affair on the prestige of Abdul Hamid Khan, the holy Caliph of all good Mohammedans, was a severe setback to the Panislamic cause.

Many were the letters received by Lord Cromer during the Tabah (Turko-Egyptian Frontier) affair, either containing prayers from Christians to be protected against Moslem violence or menaces of a more or less fierce nature from Moslems as to the probable consequences of a continuance of a policy hostile to the Sultan. Among them, however, was one which he considered worthy of note, and which to that end was included in the Blue Book compiled with reference to the affair (May, 1906).

Dedicated "In the name of God . . . to Lord Cromer, His Britannic Majesty's Agent, the Reformer of Egypt," the translation of this unsigned letter runs as follows:

It is well known to you that the telegrams and newspapers appear each day, bringing nearer to us, as it seems, the likelihood of grave differences between England and Empire on matters relating to our land of Egypt. But as the hopes of men for things desired are often disappointed, so also—for God is merciful to His creatures—do their fears of evil come to nought. We pray the Almighty that it may be so now. I who write these lines in the name of "All the people of Egypt," am not a statesman or a man of great name; my person and my dwelling are alike unknown to

you, but I feel constrained, inasmuch as I see many foolish acts committed, and hear many foolish words spoken, to stand on my feet and say the truth, as I think God has put it into my heart.

It is often said by fools, or by those who think thereby to make favour with the great, "The curse of God upon the Christian"; "May hell consume the unbeliever, his household and his possessions." These are unbecoming words, for curses pollute the lips of the curser, and the camel lies in wait for the driver who smites him unjustly. At the head of this letter I call you by the name of "The Reformer of Egypt," and by this name you are known between the seas and the deserts; also many, but not all, of the English who serve you have followed in your footsteps, as wise children carry on the traditions of their father. He must be blind who sees not what the English have wrought in Egypt: the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow through the land and are not stopped at the order of the strong; the poor man is lifted up and the rich man pulled down; the hand of the oppressor and the briber is struck when outstretched to do evil. Our eyes see these things, and we know from whom they come. You will say: "Be thankful, oh men of Egypt, and bless those who benefit you"; and very many of us—those who preserve a free mind and are not ruled by flattery and guile—are thankful. But thanks lie on the surface of the heart, and beneath is a deep well. While peace is in the land the spirit of Islam sleeps. We hear the Imam cry out in the mosque against the unbelievers, but his words pass by like wind and are lost. Children hear them for the first time and do not understand them; old men have heard them from childhood and pay no heed. But it is said: "There is war between England and Abdul Hamid Khan." If that be so, a change must come. The words of the Imam are echoed in every heart, and every Moslem hears only the cry of the Faith. As men we do not love the sons of Osman; the children of the breast

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know their works, and that they have trodden down the Egyptians like dry weeds. But as Moslems they are our brethren; the Caliph holds the sacred places and the noble relics. Though the Caliph were hapless as Bayezid, cruel as Murad, or mad as Ibrahim, he is the shadow of God, and every Moslem must leap to his call as the willing servant to his master, though the wolf may devour his child while he does his master's work. The call of the Sultan is the call of the Faith; it carries with it the command of the Prophet [*blessings, etc.*]. I and many more trust that all may be peace; but if it be war, be sure that he who has a sword will draw it, he who has a club will strike with it. The women will cry from the house-tops: "God give victory to Islam." You will say: "The Egyptian is more ungrateful than a dog which remembers the hand that fed him. He is foolish as the madman who pulls down the roof-tree of his house upon himself." It may be so to worldly eyes, but in the time of danger to Islam the Moslem turns away from the things of this world, and thirsts only for the service of his Faith, even though he looks in the face of death. May God (His name be glorified) avert the evil.

Signed by one in the name of the people of Egypt.

CHAPTER II

MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMEL

His Childhood—Education—Paris and Toulouse—First Inflammatory Speeches—Associates with Pierre Loti, Madame Adam and other Well-known French Writers—He launches *El Lewa*—His Inconsistent Policy—Visit to London—Reception at the Panislamic Society—Return to Egypt—The *Egyptian Standard*—The Khedive and the Nationalists.

THE inauguration of the Port Sudan Railway was one of the most important events of the year 1906; and Lord Cromer's speech made in connection with it was significant in so far as it foreshadowed the possibility of a change of policy in the government when his hand should be removed from the helm. To most thoughtful people his efficient control of the complicated and unwieldy system of government, with its ever-increasing tendency towards centralisation, was the main cause of Egypt's prosperity, and it was with grave doubts that these same people looked to a future when perhaps the helm would be transferred to less capable hands. But it was this very personal control of the destiny of the nation that gave the malcontents one of their chief reasons for grievance, and as the passing years made the iron hand more apparent than the velvet glove, so did these malcontents discover fresh weapons wherewith to inflame the minds of their credulous listeners.

Chief among the agitators was Mustapha Pasha Kamel, a man who, by reason of his abilities no less

than by his defects, came eventually to be considered by the greater part of Europe as the most prominent personality of the Egyptian nation. Born in 1874, he was but a child when the British regime began; and though his memories of the state of affairs before that date could have been of the slightest, he was never so fertile in his comparisons as when dwelling on the iniquities of British rule.

One of a large family, his father had been staff officer to the late Viceroy, Said Pasha, and, during the reign of Ismail Pasha, engineer of Dakahlieh Province. The young Mustapha Kamel spent his early life in Cairo and, when scarcely more than a child, received a small grant from the Ministry of Public Instruction for proficiency in Arabic. Later he attended the Government School of Law, where instruction was given gratis, and it was at that time that he made his first essay in journalism by publishing a small magazine. He made the acquaintance of Deloncle, the French politician and Anglophobe, and it was evidently due greatly to his influence that he became so bitter an opponent of the British control. He was Deloncle's ardent disciple, and their names were henceforth constantly associated. Through the generosity of a relative, he was sent to Paris to continue his law studies, and from thence he went to the Law School at Toulouse, where he signalled himself by various inflammatory speeches against the occupation of Egypt. He found the political atmosphere of France particularly sympathetic and, after his student days were over, he generally managed to go there for the summer. It was

owing to his friendship with Deloncle that the latter presented a petition to the Chamber of Deputies asking for intervention for Egypt. It was Deloncle who introduced him to the literary society of Paris, where he became associated with Madame Adam, the celebrated journalist, and Pierre Loti and various other well-known writers; and it is to his association with this society that we must ascribe much of that courteous, suave, and polished manner that distinguished him from his brethren in later life.

During his early life in Cairo he contributed to various Egyptian papers, among them *El Moayad*—which later became his most bitter enemy—and under its auspices he published a book which contained a most abusive attack on Mr. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, whom he accused of working for the dismemberment of Islam. In 1899 he started on his own initiative his well-known organ *El Lewa*, which for many years was the most powerful of all Egyptian political organs.

With the hot imagination of semi-Oriental youth, fired by fierce patriotism and loathing of the English Occupation, with an Eastern brain seething with a superficial Western education, an undoubted gift of oratory and knowledge of the credulity of his countrymen, an engaging address and the magnetism of a born leader of men, he did more to influence and direct the turbulent passions of his contemporaries than any man of his day. To the young students of the Government schools he appeared as the heaven-sent leader in the struggle for liberty; and his enunciated ideals of Panislamism as advancing in civilisation and material

prosperity blinded the eyes of his worshippers to the æons of time that must elapse before they would be prepared for such a millennium. It is hard to say whether his political rancour was due so much to pure patriotism as to hatred of the foreigner and interloper. The latter feeling was undoubtedly fostered by the years spent in France, where at that time an actively anti-English policy prevailed, and it was exasperated by the almost contemptuous attitude with which Lord Cromer treated his pretensions and those of the party he represented.

Mustapha Kamel's speeches were declamatory in style and vehement in delivery, and they made but little appeal to the intellect. At times his utterances were surcharged with personal venom. Very sensitive to adverse criticism and with no real consistency of action, his violent and unreasoning antagonism to everything British, and most of all to British policy, proved more than anything else the striking lesson of the political inefficiency of the Egyptian mind. He himself claimed that his aim in preaching such revolutionary ideas was to evoke sentiments of patriotism which would not have responded to less violent measures; but in spite of the years he devoted to the cause of his country it is difficult to name one good or practical outcome of all his denunciations. With all his defects and inconsistencies, however, one must confess that he possessed qualities which would have amply repaid encouragement; and had Lord Cromer seen fit to approach him in the right way, and find healthy scope for his energetic and adventurous nature and his passionate love of his country, we might have been able to reverence his

memory as that of a sincere patriot, instead of remembering him as merely a popular demagogue.

As for his policy : beyond his detestation for the foreign yoke and his desire for an independent constitution, it is hard to find any consistent scheme of action throughout his career. At one time he would voice his vehement loyalty to the Khedivate ; at others he would impute the most sordid motives to his sovereign. He would strenuously deny all imputation of fanaticism on the part of his co-religionists, while doing his best to vilify the Copts and Syrians. He would declare the political independence of Egypt from Turkey, when there was but little doubt that he was being influenced by subtle suggestions from the Porte. He laid stress on the intellectual activity of the Egyptians, and at the same time heaped senseless vituperations upon his rival contemporaries ; and he would claim that his countrymen were admirably equipped and prepared for independence even though they could not agree on a single line of action, and when every unaided native commercial undertaking had proved a failure. Demanding always and above all a free Constitution, he failed to realise that, as long as the Capitulations stumbling-block existed, Egypt could never be independent of the European Powers, and that, even if the English yoke were lifted, some other nation or nations would have to undertake the international trust.

During his short lifetime, however, Mustapha Kamel was undoubtedly leader of the Nationalist Party, but it was a party which, even in 1906, was far from being representative of the nation, and its aims were

exceedingly difficult to formulate. It is curious that whereas in England, and indeed throughout Europe, Mustapha posed as the leader of the Nationalist Party of Egypt and the would-be emancipator of a down-trodden policy, his laments in Egypt at the time were at the non-existence of such a party or definite policy. Early in the month of April he wrote :

Local Egyptians should consider the advisability of forming an independent, patriotic, political party to plead for the country's cause and to prepare public opinion in such a way as to make it a living force before which the Government would submit. This is the only way to make a representative body. So long as we remain a nation of different projects we will never succeed though we cry day and night for a representative body. Governments never delegate their powers to the people unless they know that they will greatly suffer by defying public opinion. Let us prove by deeds, and not by words, that we are alive and that to disobey our wishes is an unpardonable offence.

A few days later, in the same organ, appeared the following :

The Government does all things contrary to the interests of the nation, ignoring the fact that the land belongs to the nation, and that it (the Government) is only an administration. Had the Egyptians a political party in their service, that party would have raised its voice in every quarter of the world against these measures, and would have proved the necessity for forming a Constitution, and that to leave the fate of the country to a few Englishmen is to throw it to the bottom of an abyss where the light of life and liberty cannot reach it.

A few months later, Mustapha Pasha Kamel set forth on an apostolic mission to London, his pockets

well lined by his sympathisers and his brain teeming with ready expression of the injustice done to his country, wherewith he was confident of awakening the interest of a certain section of the British public. France, with her own difficulties in her Mohammedan colonies and her *entente cordiale* with Britain, no longer held out arms of welcome to the young Egyptian patriot, whose aims were avowedly against the British Occupation and were believed to be of strongly Panislamic tendency; but in England, the land of liberty, he was assured of a hearing from those who were ever ready to discover flaws in the action of their own Government.

After entertaining a party of his friends at lunch at one of London's premier hotels, and thus, perhaps, disarming them of their more critical faculties, this fervid exponent of Egyptian Nationalism (a cause which Sir Edward Grey denominates to-day "the National agitation against the British Occupation in Egypt") gave vent to a recital of his country's wrongs in a torrent of abuse—all the more effective, perhaps, by reason of its being couched in fluent French. Among his causes for complaint were the withdrawal of the government of the Sudan from Egyptian control, the increase in the number of English officials to the detriment of the native, the extra expenses connected with education under Lord Cromer's regime, and the malpractices of the existing administration of the law. Naturally, the Denishwai affair, still fresh in the memory, was excellent food for vituperation, the special tribunal, with its powers against which there was no appeal, being characterised as a monstrous

abuse, and demand being made, in the name of justice and humanity, that the case might be revived before independent judges. The vexed question of the Capitulations also engaged the attention of the young reformer, and so on, until at last the peroration was brought to its close with a reiteration of the well-known demand for the Constitution promised them by Lord Dufferin, with the right of control over the measures of the Government, not as alms, but as a recognised and incontestable right.

Considering the occasion and the deep sympathy supposed to exist between the host and his guests, it is curious to read that, in answer to this affecting appeal, the spokesman of the latter was very guarded in his reply, contenting himself with advising that the Egyptian Nationalists should be frank and open in their demands, and holding out the hope that if they acted with prudence and patience they might one day secure the blessing of guaranteed independence in Egypt.

The proceedings a few days later, at the Criterion Restaurant, at a reception of the Panislamic Society to welcome the Egyptian patriot, were much more picturesque and soul-inspiring. Among the assembled company were English members of Parliament, Hindus, Parsees, Buddhists, and, of course, a large number of Moslems from various parts; and to read even the translation of their high-flown speeches is sufficient to make one realise how the heart of Pasha Kamel must have thrilled with emotion. Life must indeed have been worth the living to hear himself described, with

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the glowing and not too accurate imagery of the East, as "the well-known Egyptian patriot, who has devoted himself heart and soul to the realisation of the ideal which is also the dream of the founder of the Panislamic Society, viz. to reanimate a sense of brotherhood amongst the Moslems, to ameliorate their moral and intellectual conditions, and to dispel the darkness and prejudice prevalent in the West concerning Islam and the Moslems." How grateful it must have been, after the sordid and practical criticisms of those in Egypt who had given patient years and lives in the understanding of the country and its people, to hear himself proclaimed in England as the hero and deliverer of Egypt, combining in his person the accomplishments of the East and the West and the personification of the poet's words :

"The spirited charger, the darkness of the night and the
solitude of the desert know me,
And also the sword, the lance, the paper and the pen."

He was encouraged to return to his beloved country and continue his struggle for freedom, remembering in moments of dejection and despair that he was no longer alone, but that henceforward the best wishes of the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine, the Danube, the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn, the Ganges, and the Euphrates would accompany the efforts of this son of the Nile, and their eyes be directed in expectation towards the Egyptian horizon to see the break of the dawn of liberty, the signal for the deliverance of the children of Ishmael from the dominion of the Pharaohs and their happy entry into the promised land of freedom.

Small wonder that the object of all this high-flown pageantry of words regarded such an evening as unparalleled in his life, and found little difficulty in explaining the loftiness of his national aims and the pettiness of those who imputed baser motives to them.

Notwithstanding the mutual religious interests of himself and his hosts, and the historic tendency of Mohammedanism in the direction of fanaticism, he reiterated again and again his assertion that in Egypt Moslem fanaticism did not exist; and this in spite of the fact that scarcely a week passes in Egypt without some attack or assault being made by Moslems on Christians; in spite of insults being hurled at the heads of "accursed Nazarenes" as they pass in the streets; and in spite of the warnings of high officials. But the reproach of fanaticism stuck fast in the gullet not only of Mustapha Pasha Kamel, but also of many another of the Young Egyptian party, who, nevertheless, found the call of Islam a most powerful weapon. For abstract virtues, high ideals, and all else that tends to develop character, were of little value if naught was to be gained by preaching them; but an appeal to Islam went straight to the heart of the most ignorant and the most corrupt; and, in a climate where men are mostly governed by emotions rather than by reason, any such appeal was certain to carry weight.

Notwithstanding the widely-published success and notoriety gained by Mustapha Kamel during his mission to London, it is a matter for some wonder that his movements were not provocative of more lasting

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enthusiasm among his fellow-countrymen. When the date of his return to Egypt was first fixed, there was a certain amount of talk in the native papers as to the best and most fitting way of welcoming him home, and a splendid ovation was mooted, with an enormous national banquet whereat the menu should be a masterpiece of Egyptian culinary art, with a camel—note the significance—as the *pièce de résistance*. These ideas, however, did not meet with general approval—some of the other leading luminaries of the Nationalist party were undoubtedly jealous—and in the end the agitator was allowed to follow the dictates of his own modesty and make his reappearance in his native land without any greater show than that accorded to the humblest of his brethren.

No doubt the disillusion he experienced on his return must have been singularly disheartening after the pampering he had received in London ; but the new arrangements for his French and English editions of *El Lewa*, under the title of the *Egyptian Standard*, gave him unlimited opportunities of regaining his peculiar prestige. There being no one on the spot whom he judged suitable to undertake the duties of editor, Mustapha Pasha Kamel had procured the services of an Irish Nationalist journalist, while during his visit to England he had also received promises of contributions from some of his sympathetic friends in the House of Commons. Pierre Loti, Madame Juliette Adam and Commandant Marchand were to be among the contributors to the French edition.

A company with a capital of £20,000 was formed to



Photo : Diltrich, Cairo.

MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMEL

run these papers, with the patriot as editor and manager. Its avowed aims were “to defend the rights of Egypt and the Egyptians; to claim her independence in accordance with the firmans of the Sultan and the treaties of the Powers; to demand a Constitution on the lines of other prosperous and civilised countries; to reveal the corrupt and unworthy acts of those in authority and of the people; to deny any fictional charge brought against the Egyptian people; to uphold the principles of justice and freedom; to eradicate any misunderstanding existing between the natives and foreigners living in this country; to strengthen friendly relations between them; to support the weak and the oppressed of any nationality or religion.”

There was never a paper with more lofty aims, and never did a paper fail so signally in convincing the public of its integrity in regard to any of its stated aims. Curiously enough, very few Egyptians figured among the subscribers, although in the list were many names of Turkish and Circassian origin, as well as those of ex-officials, and others known to be discontented with their lot. It was not long before the *Egyptian Standard* showed its true colours in vehement diatribes, not only against the British, but also against every race not professing Islam.

In regard to the capital of £20,000 for the formation of this new paper, the *Times* of November 27th remarked :

Mustapha Kamel himself is not only once more in full favour at the Palace, but he is also once again in cash. Whether these alleged facts are connected or not we cannot of course affirm, but it is suspected at Cairo that they

are—in other words, that no small part of the money to be devoted to the new enterprise of the most bitterly anti-British organ in Egypt is furnished by the Prince who owes his position to British troops and his prosperity to British administration. At any rate the advanced Nationalists are speaking of the Khedive as the principal supporter of their programme. We cannot of course say to what extent, if at all, his Highness may be privy to the use which is being made of his name. But it is hard to suppose that he is entirely ignorant on the subject, and quite impossible to suppose that, if he is not ignorant, his name is being used against his will.

Through the medium of the paper in question the Khedive expressed much indignation that such a policy should be ascribed to him ; but Mustapha Pasha Kamel went so far as to remark that “ the attack of the *Times* on the Emir of Egypt will not frighten or harm anybody in Egypt. The only result of its publication will be to convince the Egyptian people that their Khedive is in sympathy with them ” ; which statement, by the way, is open to various constructions. In connection with the same statement another paper suggests that, “ at the beginning of his rule, the Khedive used to support the political object financially, but now, as Mustapha Pasha Kamel and Sheikh Ali Youssef have changed their policy, while his Highness is busy improving his estate, we do not imagine he would any longer spend a piastre on them.”

It would indeed be hard at this time or any other to state definitely where the sympathies of the Khedive lay with regard to the party of Nationalists. With Turkey as suzerain Power, and yet holding his position only by virtue of the British Government, he was not

held guiltless in his youth of having pitted his subtlety against both Powers. Although he would not openly have joined the opposition during the strict control of Lord Cromer, there is but little doubt that at one time he dallied furtively with the attractive policy of the Nationalists, and that from time to time his co-operation has figured largely in its programme.

CHAPTER III

THE DENISHWAI AFFAIR

Improvement in the Lot of the Fellaheen—Consequent Increase of Crime—The Denishwai Affair—Death of Captain Bull—Special Tribunal Formed—The Prisoners Sentenced—The Trial criticised by Sentimentalists in England—Sir Edward Grey's Timely Warning—The Native Press and the Executions—Abuse of the Liberty of the Press—Fanaticism—Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P., on the Sentences—Mr. W. S. Blunt's Pamphlet.

BEFORE enlarging on the lamentable Denishwai affair of June, 1906, the effects of which were disastrous enough at the time, and which are likely to be felt for many years, we must turn back to the early days of the British Occupation, and note the changes which had been effected by it in the status of the once over-driven fellaheen of the provinces. The corrupt and cruel practices of the tax collectors had been stopped, the system of *corvée* had been abolished, the use of the koorbash had been prohibited, and a civilised legal system—a cumbersome and unwieldy system, it is true, but infinitely more humane and just than the travesty of law which it displaced—had been instituted. Though enjoying to the full the comparative freedom and immunity from the personal violence which had been the prevailing argument in the hands of the officials, the simple folk of the country were not long in discovering that the novel and somewhat Utopian system of legal redress gave them advantages which were

peculiarly adapted to their primitive disregard of truth and honour. No sooner did they discover that punishment—and that never corporal—was meted out in accordance only with direct evidence than they became past masters in the convenient art of perjury, and from 1884 onwards the reports of the provincial judges showed an amazing increase of crime, which testified clearly to the weakness of the administration.

When both accuser and accused swore falsely, and evidence could be manufactured or suppressed with but little chance of punishment and none of bodily violence; when trumped-up counter-charges could be apparently substantiated, and the judges were Englishmen little accustomed to the inveterate love of deception of the native mind; when ordinary imprisonment with its regime of free board, lodging and medical attendance implied little disgrace and rather luxury than hardship, then crime became robbed of all its terrors, and threatened to become a far greater menace to the State than under the old system of oppression and cruelty. The limitations of the new system and the facilities for evading the penalty of the law being discovered, then murder, assault, poisoning, cattle-lifting, spoliation of crops, train-wrecking, robbery and a hundred other evils became of common occurrence, especially in the country districts, where the “mild and peaceful cultivator of the soil,” steeped in the ignorance of the ages, discovered simple ways of satisfying personal and material emotions and of eluding justice. Cheerfully the fellah went his evil way until the security not only of his neighbours, but also of the Europeans, was threatened.

The unfortunate Denishwai affair came as a climax ; and as it proved a most venomous weapon in the hands of the Nationalists, and gave them yet another solid grievance against the British Occupation, it is necessary to make some mention of it here.

Among the annual duties of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt are certain manœuvres and exercises throughout the country, instituted not only for the maintenance of the efficiency of the troops, but also as a salutary reminder of their presence to the people of the country. Thus a detachment of mounted infantry was on the march through the Delta *en route* from Cairo to Alexandria, and, while encamped some six miles or so from Denishwai, certain of the officers determined to enjoy a morning's pigeon-shooting, as they had done on previous occasions. Now the natives from the earliest ages have regarded their pigeons as among their most valuable assets, treating their individual flocks of semi-domesticated birds with almost superstitious care. But apart from these there are great numbers of wild pigeons, which are freely shot by all who care for that form of sport. It was, of course, the wild pigeons which attracted the British officers to Denishwai. Whether or not the headman of the village was absent by design or accident cannot be said, but it seems evident that the officers were expected, and it was clearly proved at the trial that the subsequent attack was premeditated. So many stories were current after the event that it is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion as to the beginning of the affray. Certainly the officers were surrounded by the villagers and their arms taken

from them. One of these went off accidentally while being wrested from its owner, and a woman and several men were wounded. Then there was a general panic, and the Englishmen, being defenceless, got very badly knocked about and beaten, one having an arm and another his nose broken. One at length managed to get back to camp and raise the alarm, another—Captain Bull—was found unconscious by the road, and succumbed a few hours later from wounds received in his head and sunstroke aggravated by his injuries.

It was not long before the tide of retribution was turned against the offending villagers, and about fifty-two were arrested as being leaders or implicated in the affair. A Special Tribunal (instituted in 1895 to deal with cases of offence against the Army of Occupation) was formed, and within a few days the trial began. This tribunal, though drastic in its methods and summary in its jurisdiction, was composed of men whose characters for integrity and foresight were well established in the land, Boutros Pasha Ghali being President, while among the other judges were W. G. Hayter, representing the Judicial Adviser, Judge Bond, Vice-President of the Native Court of Appeal, Ahmed Fathi Bey, President of the Native Tribunal of First Instance of Caria, while the accused had the advantage of being defended by three of the best-known native advocates, who had full hearing.

Realising the exigencies of the situation and the character of those who were implicated, there was every reason for swift and severe punishment, and the sentences met with the full approval of both Europeans

and natives as being absolutely necessary to check further lawlessness and brutality. Whether the sentences would have been carried out in their full severity had Lord Cromer been still at hand is a moot point, but both the death penalties and flogging were executed while he was on the high seas on his way to England, and in his Report he fully concurred with the sentence of the tribunal.

Four of the ringleaders suffered the extreme penalty of the law, two were sentenced to penal servitude for life, and the others received terms of imprisonment of less duration. In addition, three received fifty lashes apiece, and at the moment many people in Egypt thought that the severity of the sentences and the promptitude with which they were executed were absolutely necessary in the circumstances.

It was not until the sentimentalists at home and a certain number of well-meaning but ill-advised members of the home Government began to question the proceedings of the tribunal, that the malcontents of Egypt discovered in this miserable Denishwai business another splendid opportunity to vent their venom against the British Occupation.

Sir Edward Grey, who has ever evinced a true understanding of the difficulties which hedge round the government of Egypt, summed up the situation in his warning of July 6th, when he said :

We may be on the eve of further measures necessary to the protection of Europeans in Egypt, and if the House at this moment weakens or destroys the authority of the Egyptian Government you will be face to face with a most

serious situation, because if fanaticism in Egypt overcomes the authority of the Egyptian Government, extreme measures may be necessary: we may be forced at any moment to take constitutional measures which we should be bound to take in an emergency.

As was to be expected, the vernacular Press made as much as possible out of this Denishwai affair, distorting the facts and giving its readers garbled and misleading versions, with prophetic and inaccurate descriptions of the execution. It made, too, so much capital out of the sympathetic inquiries of the above-mentioned members of the House of Commons, that its credulous readers were more than half convinced that the entire British public was of the same opinion.

The abuse of the liberty of the Press was indeed becoming a serious matter in those days, when inflammatory tirades lost nothing in the retailing, and when the greater proportion of the native public had to be content with its news second-hand and seasoned with all the ingenuity and embellishments that the interpreter could devise. During the long hours of the evening, when the men collected together in social converse and discussion, it became the custom for one more educated than the rest to read out the news of the day, with generous comments thrown in, so that even far away in distant provinces the tale of the horrid doings of the British was bandied from village to village. Quoting an interview with a native notable, a correspondent to one of the leading Syrian papers wrote:

The English will not be quite justified in punishing ignorant and low-class people for crimes inspired by mis-

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leading newspapers, and leaving their guides unpunished. The former are blind ; the latter, their guides, and the mischievous papers should be suppressed.

It was the same paper which remarked that :

Egypt is the only country in the world where the ignorant and uncultured are allowed to publish rags which they call newspapers, and which they use to acquire money by blackmail. The publishers of such misleading papers, which can produce nothing but ignorance and inaccuracy, are not really to be blamed for their errors, which are natural as long as they are themselves uneducated and unpolished. The British occupants of Egypt are alone responsible for the effects of the misleading and mischievous statements that always appear in those papers.

Subsequent events have more than proved the truth of these statements ; but in 1906 Lord Cromer was no more inclined to curb the Press than he was to allow that there was any danger to the State from the Nationalist party.

The warning voiced by Sir Edward Grey regarding the presence and influence of fanaticism in Egypt seems to have annoyed the agitators ; but seeing that there was a wave of religious unrest throughout the Mohammedan countries of North Africa at this period, it would have been curious indeed had Egypt escaped. Despite their repudiations, there was no doubt that the appeals made to the Egyptian army and country at the time of the Turko-Egyptian frontier question had for their basis the fanaticism which is inherent in Mohammedan countries. Emotion, and more especially religious emotion, lies so close to the surface of Egyptian natures that appeals to it are never made in vain, and fanaticism

has been the trump card used on most occasions, whether in the agitating of riots, or strikes, or even more general movements.

Mustapha Pasha Kamel waxed very indignant on the subject, demanding that the Regent, Fakri Pasha, who represented the Khedive during the latter's stay in Europe, should contradict the suspicions of religious fanaticism directed against the Egyptians in the British Parliament, and declaring a few days later—in a letter published in the *Tribune*—that he believed with his countrymen “that Sir Edward Grey spoke in Parliament of Egyptian fanaticism for no other purpose than to stifle discussion on the horrible facts of Denishwai. But is it worthy of England, the country that professes humanity, justice and civilisation, to approve and adopt the acts of those who gave the world that melancholy and dreadful spectacle of barbarism—the executions of Denishwai?”

There were many other indignant protests to be heard on the same sore subject; and, thanks to them, one of the worst consequences of the Denishwai affair was the strong increase of anti-European sentiments heard in the streets and cafés. Most Christians, of whatever race, were termed openly “cursed infidels,” while after death the epithet of “damned” was also given them, with others of an even more unpleasant character. During the trial of the Denishwai prisoners the health of Captain Bull's murderer was publicly drunk by some of the dissolute young natives who are such a discredit to their country and their education, and in more than one village lists were

found of the Europeans who were selected for death at the first opportunity.

Had any well-known and respected Moslem leader come forward to refute Sir Edward Grey's assertion, his arguments would have carried weight; but little reliance could be placed upon the expressed opinions of those whose predilections were always for the sowing of dissensions and the stirring up of strife, and who found no weapon too poisonous or too paltry wherewith to achieve their object.

The unfortunate Denishwai affair was again dragged to the fore in August by Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P. for Tyneside, friend and supporter of Mustapha Pasha Kamel. In a violent attack in the House of Commons upon the sentences passed by the Special Tribunal, Mr. Robertson employed such reckless phrases as "wholesale slaughter," "methods of barbarism," "cowardly, panic-stricken officials," and "incomplete bureaucrats." He threw doubt upon certain passages contained in Lord Cromer's Report, and stigmatised as "presumptuous censure" the telegram sent to Sir Edward Grey by Mr. M. de C. Findlay, of the British Agency—afterwards incorporated in the Report—in which Mr. Findlay pointed out the probable effect upon Egyptian public opinion of ill-advised Parliamentary discussion. In short, his language, as reported by the *Times*, was of such a mischievous tendency that there were many who feared that fresh outbreaks of violence against Europeans might result. Fortunately, each point of his tirade was met with patient and apt rejoinder from the Foreign Secretary, who signified his approbation of Lord Cromer's memo-

random on the case and the support of the home Government in the modification of certain defects in the working of such Special Tribunals, which had already received Lord Cromer's attention.

That the propaganda of the Egyptian Nationalists in 1906 was being furthered, not only in the vernacular, but also in the European Press, seems proved by the charges brought forward by Mr. Findlay. That such papers were being subsidised by certain individuals or Powers had been suspected for some time, and although evidence in proof could not be obtained in 1906, it has been clearly shown during the last year that such a policy was regarded as justifiable. An interview with a prominent Nationalist, published in the *Daily Express* in the summer of 1910, throws light upon the subject :

It was decided some months ago to regularly grant subventions to certain newspapers in return for their adopting a thoroughly sympathetic attitude towards our policy. Individually the Nationalists are very wealthy, the members of the Party of the People especially, and many of us are quite willing to help on this part of the propaganda from our private fortunes. Newspapers are businesses, and journalism is like any other trade. You pay a journalist for putting your opinions in the best and most popular form just as you pay your tailor for garbing your body in the best and most fashionable dress. What the personal opinions of a journalist are is no more a concern of his customer than are the political opinions of your bootmaker or chauffeur. A journalist is hired to defend his client's opinions, just as the services of an advocate are engaged to defend his client's interests. It is just like any other trade, and to talk about a journalist's conviction is all nonsense. I do not suppose that Mustapha Pasha Kamel would have cared whether the

journalists he employed on the *Egyptian Standard* were Imperialists and Conservatives, so far as concerns their personal and private convictions, so long as they did their best to attack British policy here. A journalist's personal convictions in my opinion have no necessary connection with his public opinions by which he earns his living; and we do not care what may be the private opinions of the European journalists we subvention provided they publicly favour our policy in their newspapers.

If such procedure is publicly approved to-day, there is but small doubt that it was countenanced in 1906, even though Mr. Findlay's charges were met by a storm of vituperation on the part of the vernacular Press and high-minded denials from various European organs in Egypt.

In connection with the Denishwai affair mention must be made of the pamphlet published by Mr. W. S. Blunt the same year. It was entitled "Atrocities of Justice under British Rule in Egypt," and in it he made extraordinarily bitter attacks upon Lord Cromer and the Anglo-Egyptian Government. It was received with enthusiastic appreciation by the Panislamic Press, and translations of it were scattered broadcast in order to arouse popular feeling still further. It is doubtful if even the most radical of the native papers had ever brought a more serious charge against the administration than was here expressed. That it fulfilled its object is shown by the following letter addressed to Mr. Blunt, signed by a number of Young Egyptians, and published in *El Lewa*, the organ of the Extremists :

We have read your pamphlet recently published by the Press, and your other statements translated by *El Lewa*,

and are exceedingly glad to think that justice has such strong supporters and heroes who are not afraid of criticism in speaking the truth. Oh, compassionate man, we greet thee without being acquainted with thee. We greet and shake hands with thee because we find in thee the man who fears none but God and his own conscience. We greet thee because those who scan justice and truth are few, and those who declare their free and moderate opinions are fewer still. We greet and thank thee because we see that thou hast no equal among Europeans. Thou wert just in thy writings and right in thy criticisms: thou art numbered among the best of men.

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CHAPTER IV

AFTER DENISHWAI

Said Bey Zaghloul appointed Minister of Public Instruction—General Satisfaction at the Appointment—Reforms needed in the Department—The Schools fast becoming Hotbeds of Nationalism—Mr. Edward Dicey on Unrest in Egypt—Interview with Dr. Nimr, Proprietor of *El Mokattam*.

THE appointment, in October, of Said Bey Zaghloul as Minister of Public Instruction was one of the most opportune events of the year, and one of the very few which received the approbation of all parties. The appointment of Mr. Dunlop as adviser to the Ministry some months earlier had raised the fury of the Anglo-phobe papers; but the selection of Said Bey Zaghloul—a man of Egyptian origin and tried abilities—emphasised the readiness of the British Agency to support the genuinely progressive element among the Moslem natives of the country. It refuted the arguments so often repeated by Mustapha Pasha Kamel that no Egyptian of independent judgment and progressive views ever received due recognition under the “iron rule of the Occupation”; and it called forth the unanimous hopes of the native papers that it signified the beginning of a much-needed reform, and was in answer to their criticisms of Lord Cromer’s past policy.

A progressive and a true patriot, Said Bey Zaghloul was firmly convinced that Egypt could only become a self-governing country when the Egyptians became

trained up to the European moral and intellectual standard—a theory which had gained for him in certain circles the reputation of an unpractical idealist. However, his conduct at the Bar and on the Bench—he was formerly judge of the Native Court of Appeal—had won general respect for his abilities and admiration for his fairness and courage. The vernacular papers expressed the hope that this new Minister of Public Instruction would take a firm stand with regard to his adviser, refusing to allow the latter to usurp the power of the office. They expressed the further hope that he would devote his talents and energy to the progress of public education in a way that would give satisfaction to the nation, who saw in his appointment a first step towards genuine reforms. Thanks were publicly tendered to H.H. the Khedive and to Lord Cromer for the appointment, which was taken as significant that the latter felt the “necessity for abandoning severity in favour of conciliatory measures towards the nation, and of conferring posts of responsibility upon its most capable members, an attitude which is truly worthy of the honour of Great Britain.”

Reforms were certainly necessary in the department of Public Instruction, but not less in regard to discipline than to the scheme of education. The greater number of the schools were fast becoming hotbeds of Nationalism, and the strike at the School of Law early in the year was engineered not by genuine educational reformers, but by political wire-pullers. The students had yet to learn the fact—and some think they never will realise it—that among the chief aims of education, the develop-

ment of character is as important as the acquisition of knowledge, and obedience to regulations one of the first duties of a good citizen. Besides the strike at the School of Law, meetings frankly in support of the propaganda of the Nationalist Party were held at the Preparatory School on various occasions, when Anglophobe sentiments were freely expressed in the presence of the pupils and others assembled there. Debating societies were formed, whose members were chiefly recruited from the Government schools and similar institutions, and where the pupils were encouraged to speak and the most violent diatribes against the Occupation were applauded. Unfortunately, however able Said Zaghloul, now promoted to the rank of inirmiran and the title of Pasha, was in other respects, his appointment made little or no difference in the matter of discipline, and from this time onwards, as we trace the growth of the Nationalist Party, we have to recognise the ever-increasing display of lawlessness on the part of the irresponsible rising generation.

In concluding this sketch of the political outlook in Egypt during the year 1906, the weighed opinions of two men who have spent years in Egypt, and are thoroughly conversant with its development and national characteristics, may well be given. The first is that of Mr. Edward Dicey, C.B., for many years a regular contributor to the *Daily Telegraph*, from which paper the following article is quoted, and the second is that of Dr. Nimr, the proprietor of the well-known Syrian newspaper, *El Mokattam*.

Mr. Dicey's article—entitled “Unrest in Egypt”—

displays such profound knowledge of the country, its development and characteristics, that no apology is needed for reprinting it here in full :

The one fact in the Egyptian question which is not open to dispute is the extraordinary development of Egypt under our military occupation. As to the causes which have brought a new era of prosperity into the Valley of the Nile there may be any number of opinions, but as to the fact of this prosperity there can be no possible question. Many people opine—I myself amidst the number—that under a somewhat different system of administration the improvement in the material conditions of Egypt might have been greater and more permanent, supposing the Government of Egypt had been less “Anglicised.” This, however, is a point upon which one man’s opinion is as good as another’s. But as to general improvement in the conditions of Egyptian life there are few men living who—I regret to say—are so competent to express an opinion as myself. The Egypt of to-day is utterly different from the Egypt I first learnt to know at the opening of the Suez Canal. The improvement is not confined to any one town or any one province, but is equally conspicuous throughout the whole Khedivial vice-kingdom. The country has been opened up by railway, steam-boat and electric-tramway companies, which could never have been started or worked at a profit but for the security afforded by our military occupation. By far the largest benefits derived from this security have accrued to the fellaheen. These peasant cultivators of the Delta and the Nile Valley, from the Barrage up to the Dam of Assouan, form the great bulk of the population of Egypt. The value of their lands has improved enormously, their wages have increased two-fold, and in many cases three-fold and four-fold ; they are able to lay by money, and are no longer afraid to display their wealth ; they have better homes, better clothes and better food, and look utterly different from the

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ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-housed peasantry whom I remember first seeing thirty odd years ago toiling at *corvée* work under the lash.

This being so, it may well seem incredible to onlookers who have no personal acquaintance with Eastern countries that the Egyptian generally—all the fellaheen even more than the bulk of their fellow-countrymen—should not be well contented with the new order of things; or to say the least, should have any wish to upset the British Administration, to which they owe their unexampled well-being. A conviction of the hold we have obtained in Egypt in return for the material benefits we have conferred upon her population is naturally entertained by the British public, with whom it is an article of faith. I confess myself that I do not share this optimistic opinion. I may, and do, admit that logically the Egyptians have strong grounds for supporting a system which has suppressed the *corvée*, emancipated the peasantry from the tyranny of the wealthy landowners, secured them in the possession of their own plots of ground and their own rills of water, and has substituted law and order as distinguished from *cadi* justice.

But, as a matter of fact, there is constant friction between Egyptian and British ideas of administration. The Oriental, as I have heard the late Nubar Pasha say scores of times, "hates above everything being worried," and however unintentionally the Anglo-Egyptian administration has been introduced throughout Egypt, our military occupation is constantly worrying the natives. The English officials, who have gradually crowded out the native officials from every post of importance, are "strangers in a strange country," who are appointed to carry out reforms, excellent perhaps in themselves, but uncongenial to a conservative race, whose main desire is to be let alone and not to be worried. I may be told that it is our duty to raise the Oriental mind to the intellectual standard of European civilisation. For myself, I am sceptical as to the truth of this theoretical duty. But

I am certain that Orientals will never be grateful to us for undertaking their intellectual education. Thus, until we allow the Egyptian natives—as France does in Tunis and Austria in Bosnia—to lead their own lives under their own laws and their own officials, subject, of course, to the supreme authority of Great Britain, there will always be a latent antagonism between the natives and the English officials, who are endeavouring, with indifferent success, to modify the old happy-go-lucky system of Oriental rule in accordance with British ideas. But this latent antagonism between the administrators and administrated in Egypt is not, in my opinion, likely to become active under present conditions to such an extent as to endanger our tenure of our highway to India.

For some time past there has been a general sense of uneasiness throughout Egypt. In the days of Ismail Pasha his Highness was fond of boasting that a foreigner might walk alone and unarmed from Alexandria to Assouan without the slightest molestation on the part of the native. The statement probably was exaggerated, but it had a basis of truth which it does not possess at the present day. Crimes of violence were then almost unknown. From one end of the country to the other every native knew that any outrage on Europeans would be punished with relentless severity. In those days brigandage was a thing unknown. With the deposition of Ismail, and return to Cairo of Tewfik Pasha under the protection of British troops, the authority of the Khedive amidst his own people received a blow from which it has never recovered. From the date when Egypt passed under our military occupation the object of our policy has been to leave the shadow of authority to the Khedivate, while retaining the substance in our own grasp. I do not deny that this policy had many recommendations in its favour. All I say is that ever since our occupation it has deprived the titular rulers of Egypt of the summary power requisite to maintain order in an Oriental nation.

In 1895 there occurred serious riots at Alexandria, in consequence of which a decree was issued by the reigning Khedive—on the advice, if I am not mistaken, of Lord Cromer—creating a Special Tribunal to deal with offences committed by natives against British officers and soldiers. It is this tribunal, composed of native and English judges, which has dealt out summary and just punishment to the authors of the Denishwai outrage. For some years the creation of this tribunal, armed with full powers of repressing disturbances and of punishing at once and without power of appeal any offenders against the public peace, proved sufficient to prevent any repetition of the Alexandria riots. Very possibly it might have proved permanently effective had it not been for certain incidents in respect of which neither the Khedivial Government nor the British authorities in Cairo can fairly be held responsible. The outbreak of the war between England and the Boer Republics led to a reduction in the numbers of the Army of Occupation in Egypt while the ill-fortune which attended the British arms during the earlier years of the war encouraged all parties hostile from one cause or other to our supremacy in Egypt to stir up the passions of the Egyptian malcontents. A far more potent cause, however, was the signal defeat of Russia by Japan. Throughout the whole of the Dark Continent, from Cairo to the Cape, there had, in the course of the last century, grown up a profound conviction that in any conflict between Europeans and natives the latter were bound to come to grief in the end. This belief received a violent shock throughout the East as it gradually oozed out that Russia, the greatest military power in Europe, had been signally and ignominiously defeated by a native Oriental race.

I do not suppose that one Egyptian native in a thousand or a hundred thousand had any conception where Japan was, who the Japanese were, or to what race and religion they belonged. But all over Africa, north, south, east, and west, the tidings of Russia's defeat at the hands of a coloured race,

who, whatever else they might be, were certainly not Christians or whites, spread with the strange rapidity with which news in the East passes from hand to hand. There is not a village in Egypt in which there is not some Mullah or Maheli or holy man, learned in the Koran, who was only too glad to announce to his adherents that the downfall of the infidel was at hand, and that the day was coming when Islam would once more become supreme. The Egyptians are not fanatical Mohammedans, but they are fervent followers of the Prophet, and they are convinced that the decline of the Cross is certain to lead to the rise of the Crescent. A British Government is necessarily the worst Government in the world to provide against a hypothetical danger, and no British statesman, to whatever party he might belong, seems to have contemplated the possibility that the downfall of Russian military prestige might possibly stir up discontent and dissatisfaction in Egypt. No effort was made to reinforce our garrison there or in the Sudan. On the contrary, the one desire at Westminster seems to have been to effect a reduction of the British Army of Occupation. This desire, not unreasonable in itself, was undoubtedly stimulated by the optimism of British officialdom in Egypt, who kept on, to the very last, assuring everybody that there was no truth in reports of disaffection among the natives, and who pooh-poohed the notion that the Sudanese as well as the fellaheen were not enamoured of British rule. In a letter I wrote you from Khartoum in January last, I expressed to you my disbelief in the official contention that the former adherents of the Mahdi and the Khalifa not only acquiesced in our rule, but were enthusiastic in their appreciation of its excellence.

The course of events has more than justified my foreboding. I am inclined to think that the prompt, stern judgment passed on the ringleaders in the Denishwai outrages will keep things quiet in Egypt for some time to come. In the East half measures are always ineffective. If you have to use force it is the wisest and most humane course

to strike quick and strike hard. Any mitigation of a well-deserved punishment with a view to conciliating popular sentiment is ascribed not to humanity but to fear, and this is especially the case when the offence for which the punishment is inflicted is due to racial hatred and religious fanaticism. It is now admitted, as I contended when the Akaba controversy arose three months ago, that in the event of Turkish armies approaching the Suez Canal the sympathies of the Egyptian Mussulmans—that is, ninety per cent of the population—would be with the Turks rather than with ourselves, and this notwithstanding the great improvements we have introduced during our occupation. To quote the words of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: “All this year a fanatical feeling in Egypt has been on the increase. . . . It was for that reason a little time ago that the garrison had to be increased.” To this statement I, in common with almost all persons intimately acquainted with Egypt during the years which preceded our military occupation, give my most cordial assent. Whether any change in our administrative system might improve our normal relations with the natives is far too wide a question to enter upon here. We have for the moment to deal solely with the outbreak of fanaticism in Egypt: in order to effect our purpose we have largely to increase our force both in the Delta and the Sudan, and to let it be made manifest that any outrage of the kind to which Captain Bull fell a victim will be punished with equal severity.

There are points open to discussion in the above article, which was written four years ago by one whose sympathies were more than once avowed to be with the Nationalists. Thus, in suggesting improvements in the British Administration on the lines of those countenanced by France and Austria in Tunis and Bosnia respectively, he apparently ignores the primary reason

of our presence in Egypt, and the enormous trust we hold there for the rest of Europe, not only with regard to the highway to the farther East, but also in the commerce of the country, which commerce is almost of equal universal importance with the canal itself. Nevertheless Mr. Dicey shows uncommon knowledge of his subject, and with the events of the last few years still fresh in our memory, his remarks as to the futility of half measures and conciliation appear almost prophetic.

The interview with Dr. Nimr, which appeared in the *Daily Chronicle*, is as important a contribution to the Egyptian problem as the article by Mr. Dicey. It was of the unrest chiefly that he spoke :

“ The Egyptians,” he said, “ have no real political grievances. They know that the present regime is by far the best they have had for many centuries back. They never felt as free and as safe from the effects of abuse of power as they do now. The reforms that have been carried out by the British in Egypt have given them the prosperity they are enjoying at the present time. Yet you still hear of discontent in Egypt, and the educated classes who, one would think, would appreciate the benefits and advantages of the present regime more than the rest, are the discontented. This discontent is held out to the world by the opposition in Egypt as the outcome of political grievances. But having heard hundreds of all classes of educated Egyptians, and gone deeper than would appear on the surface, I feel convinced that with most of them the root of this discontent is not political.”

“ Then what is the cause ? ”

“ It is social. The English are the ruling nation, and the best Egyptian natives, highly educated by school and

travel, naturally wish to associate with them. They find the French and other European residents fairly sociable; they drive out with them, they meet them in cafés and in social life. But the English mix mostly with one another. They think, perhaps, it is easier to rule in that way—though the representative of England in Egypt and some of the highest English officials in Egypt do not rule in that way. And so it is up to a point—up to the point where sympathy begins. But the educated Egyptian needs to know more of you, to have more sympathy with you, to feel that neither the French nor other Europeans hold him on a higher level than you do, before he will overcome his prejudice against you as a nation alien in race, creed, language and habits, and express his admiration for your rule and his content with the good work you are doing for him. The case with the masses, especially the fellaheen, who form the bulk of the Egyptian population, is different however. These have been quite content until lately, and will, I am sure, continue to be so if the Panislamic agitators will not kindle the religious feeling in them.”

“ Is that movement serious ? ”

“ Yes, Panislam is a very serious movement. During the last year it has been fanned and fomented from Constantinople, and the Sultan’s entourage and his agents in Egypt have given it every encouragement. Its advocates have spread it into every part of Europe, and many of the prominent amongst them do not hesitate to interpret some of their sacred texts in a sense contrary to what is adopted by Moslem scholars, in order to impress on the illiterate masses the idea that it is their duty to support even an unjust Moslem government against a just non-Moslem one.”

“ Has Panislam gained a strong hold ? ”

“ A hold increasingly strong every day. You see its champions mix with people in their cafés and houses. Then it has a powerful Press, patronised to some extent by Turkey—Mukhtar Pasha would be able to tell you more accurately




Photo: Wade.

SOME OF THE DENISHWAI PRISONERS

to what extent. This Press penetrates into every part of the country, and is read aloud by those who can read to those who cannot.

“ You have no idea how closely events are followed by Egyptians. A question or a speech in the House of Commons on Egypt is reproduced in every paper, with comments. A remark by any member whose remarks are hardly noticed here is put there on a level with a remark by the Prime Minister. Then they say: ‘ If this is what even the English really think, then what is the use of *El Mokattam* or other papers defending them? They condemn themselves.’ ”

“ You must try and explain to them our free Parliamentary system.”

“ I do, and so do some others too—but it is very difficult. Most of the Egyptians know nothing like it. Then they follow events in Turkey very closely, and they have known all about the European action in Macedonia, and have resented it in much the same way as the Irish resented the Pope being deprived of his Papal States. It is not a question of good government. They do not pretend that Turkey governs well—they know better. It is a question of faith.

“ The Sultan is making a last desperate effort, and he is using his position as Caliph to help him. I believe that even India is feeling the movement, and that it is beginning in Tunis. How much more must we feel it—with Turkey on our borders!

“ Lord Cromer is rigidly opposed to interference with the Press. Are not the Egyptians grateful to him for that freedom? They make full use of it, but some are grateful while others do not believe in it, and are rather inclined to regard such concessions as forms of weakness. I admire Lord Cromer for his great Liberalism, but I sometimes doubt whether it is wise to stand by and do nothing against those daily incentives to rebellion which have used the freedom of the Press to gag the public, and thus made that freedom

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defeat its own end. If you checked the writers you might not have to hang and flog their dupes, nor to increase every now and then the charge of expenditure for the British Army of Occupation in the Egyptian Budget. The Denishwai executions were terrible ; but they have had their effect, and we hope that they will bring the dupes of Panislamic agitators to their senses."

" Public executions and floggings are hateful to us, and we should like to have none in our Empire."

" Quite right ; but if you want to make us enjoy the full benefits of your humane reforms you must not go too fast. Egypt has been accustomed to be ruled with the whip and the gallows for centuries, and you cannot cure her all at once. You have abolished the whip, or *koorbash*, entirely in Egypt, even in the prisons. You have made the prisons so comfortable that I have myself heard some Egyptians name criminals who preferred them to their wretched homes. You have endorsed the introduction of the most complex system of European justice—the Code Napoléon—into the native courts. What is the result ? Crime is steadily increasing in Egypt under your rule, and it is the opinion of many competent men that this increase is partly due to the too early introduction of these reforms. I am constantly asked by sensible men to warn the public against the abuse of such privileges for fear that their abuse would lead one day to their withdrawal."

" The complaint is made that we do not give Egypt sufficient self-government. Would it be possible to increase that now ? "

" You have already the Egyptian Legislative Council, consisting about half of appointed members and half of representatives elected by the provincial councils, which are themselves directly elected by the people. That Council has only advisory powers ; but your Government pays increasing attention to its decisions, and I see no reason why it should not gradually and tentatively delegate to it

certain powers. But remember the different other institutions in which the Egyptians are trained in self-government."

"Then the clever young Egyptian has a career?"

"He has a career; he can rise to the highest post in his Government. But the higher he rises the more he feels the effect of the control of the British official. This control is also a cause of discontent with many Egyptians who were, and who still are, in the service of the Egyptian Government."

PART II.—1907

CHAPTER I

LORD CROMER'S ANNUAL REPORT

Local Feelings and Aspirations—Difficulty of arriving at Sound Conclusions—Nationalism and Panislamism—Desires of the Nationalist Party—The Capitulations—Their Effect upon Legislation—Proposed Scheme for their Modification—Scheme Shelved.

LORD CROMER's Report for the year 1906—published in April, 1907—contains an entire chapter devoted to the subjects of Egyptian Nationalism and Panislamism, every sentence of which bears impress of the weighty deliberation and comprehensive experience of this sagacious statesman.

This masterly, unbiased summing-up of the situation by one who had devoted laborious years to unravelling the complexities of the native character is of the greatest value. It should be considered closely, and in comparison with the violent and often hysterical polemics of the Nationalist leaders and the want of judgment too often displayed by their ill-advised sympathisers at home.

The following is the chapter, quoted in its entirety, from the Report :

It is difficult even for those who have an extensive knowledge of Egyptian affairs to differentiate the various currents of thought which, in one form or another, are moving in the direction of creating a local public opinion favourable

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to the entirely novel idea of Egyptian Nationalism. I say that the idea is entirely novel, for it has to be remembered that for centuries past the Egyptians have been a subject race. Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs from Arabia and Bagdad, Circassians, and, finally, Ottoman Turks have successively ruled over Egypt; but we have to go back to the doubtful and obscure precedent of Pharaonic times to find an epoch when, possibly, Egypt was ruled by Egyptians. Even now Egyptian Nationalism is a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth. The idea, in any form which can at all be regarded as serious, is the outcome of that contact with Europe to which Nubar Pasha alluded, through the mouth of the reigning Khedive, when he said that Egypt no longer formed part of Africa. It has been evoked by the benefits which, with a rapidity probably unparalleled in history, have been conferred on the country by the introduction of Western civilisation at the hands of an alien race; and it is surely the irony of political destiny that that race, or the instruments through whom it has principally acted, should be represented as the principal obstacles to the realisation of schemes the conception of which is mainly due to their own action.

I have spoken of the extreme difficulty of differentiating the various opinions current in Egyptian society. In connection with this subject, I venture to utter a note of warning against rapid and sweeping generalisations in dealing with Egyptian affairs. It is too often forgotten that Egyptian society is split up into quite as numerous sections, representing different and often divergent interests and opinions, as the society of any European country. The difficulty of arriving at any sound conclusions as regards local feelings and aspirations is not, indeed, so formidable as in India, where the caste system interposes a great, if not insuperable, bar to social intercourse between Europeans and the greater part of the population. At the same time, differences of race, religion, language, and manners and customs count for

much. I know of many cases of Europeans who have resided for long in Egypt, and who appear to be under the impression that they know something of Egyptian opinion, whereas, generally, all they know is the opinion of some one or more sections of Egyptian society—usually those resident in the principal towns—with whom they happen to have been thrown in contact. I hasten to add that I do not pretend to any very superior degree of knowledge. I have lived too long in the East to dogmatise about the views of the inconsistent Eastern, for whose inconsistency, moreover, I entertain much sympathy, by reason of the fact that the circumstances in which he is placed render consistency very difficult of attainment. All I ask is that the extreme difficulty of the subject should be recognised, and that, when it is recognised, some caution should be exercised lest hasty conclusions should be drawn from incomplete and often incorrect data. I know nothing more true than the following words of Professor Sayce, who is probably as qualified as any European can be to speak on the subject:

“Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle with the native population know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another; but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream and finds himself in the presence of a mind which is as strange to him as would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn.”*

The difficulty of dealing with this subject is, moreover, enormously enhanced by the fact that but few Egyptians have, in political or administrative affairs, a very clear idea of what they themselves want, whilst the practice of advocating two separate programmes, which are mutually destructive of each other, is the rule rather than the exception. The maxim *qui veut la fin veut les moyens* is generally scouted.

* “The Higher Criticism and the Monuments,” p. 558.

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I have frequently had expressed to me by Egyptians—amongst whom I am glad to be able to count many personal friends who speak to me very frankly—a paradoxical desire to secure all the advantages of the British Occupation, which they fully recognise, without the Occupation itself. I have had a leading Egyptian urge me to employ fewer Europeans in the Government service, and, in the same breath, ask me to arrange that a lawsuit in which he was interested should be tried by a British judge. I have known a warm advocate of Egyptian rights plead earnestly for the appointment of a British rather than an Egyptian engineer to superintend the distribution of water in his own province. Over and over again have I had it pointed out to me that the authority of the Egyptian Mudirs, is weakened by the presence in their respective provinces of British Inspectors, whilst at the same time the withdrawal of the Inspectors would lead to disastrous consequences—conclusions in both of which I entirely agree. As to corruption, I need only say that I have known scores of cases in which individuals—often in a very high position—have inveighed bitterly against the blackmail which they have to pay to the subordinates of the Public Works and other Departments, and at the same time have refused to make any formal complaints or to mention names, thus depriving the superior authorities of the only effective arm which might enable such practices to be checked. I could multiply instances of this sort, but I have said enough for my present purpose.

With these preliminary remarks, I propose to describe, to the best of my ability, the present phase of the Egyptian National movement, and to set forth my personal opinion as to the treatment which it should receive.

Whilst it would be altogether incorrect to say that the Egyptian National movement is wholly Panislamic, it is certain that it is deeply tinged with Panislamism. This is a fact of which I have for long been aware, and to which, if I may judge from the utterances of the local Press, many

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Europeans in Egypt have, albeit somewhat tardily, now become alive. It would be easy, were it necessary or desirable to do so, to adduce abundant evidence in support of this statement.* Here I will only say that the events of last summer merely disclosed one new feature in the Egyptian situation. Admitting, what is unquestionably the case, that religion is the main motive power in the East,† and that the theocratic form of government possesses peculiar attraction for Easterns, it might still have been anticipated that the recollections of the past, and the present highly prosperous condition of Egypt as compared to the neighbouring provinces of Turkey, might have acted as a more effectual barrier to the growth of Panislamism than apparently was the case. I use the word "apparently" with intention, for, in spite of all outward appearances, I am by no means convinced that Panislamic sympathies extended very deep down in Egyptian society; and I am quite confident that, had there been any real prospect of effect being given to Panislamic theories, a very strong and rapid revulsion of public opinion would have taken place. However this may be, it is clear that Panislamism is a factor in the Egyptian situation of which account has, to a certain extent, to be taken. It is, therefore, necessary to understand what the term implies.

Panislamism is generally held to mean a combination of all the Moslems throughout the world to defy and to resist the Christian Powers.

* I take this opportunity of alluding to an anonymous letter which I received last spring, and which was published in a Parliamentary Paper ("Egypt No. 2 (1906)," p. 35). Some doubts were thrown on the authenticity of this document. I entertain no doubt whatever that it is genuine. I was somewhat surprised at the attention which it attracted, notably in England. I merely sent it to London as an example, expressed in somewhat more eloquent terms than usual, of ideas with which I have for long been familiar, and the existence of which does not admit of doubt.

† In speaking of the East, I, of course, only allude to those portions of the East with which I am in any degree acquainted—not to China or Japan.

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Viewed in this aspect, the movement certainly requires to be carefully watched by all European nations who have political interests in the East. It may possibly lead to sporadic outbursts of fanaticism in different parts of the world.

We were within a very measurable distance of such an outburst in Egypt last spring. I see it constantly stated that the "unrest" to which allusion was made in the House of Commons last summer was imaginary. I am wholly unable to concur in this view. The temperament of the lower classes of the Egyptian population, and notably of the urban population, is eminently mercurial. They were suddenly lashed into a fury by the inflammatory and mendacious writings in the Panislamic Press, and they subsided into comparative tranquillity with almost equal suddenness when the British garrison was increased, and when the writers in the vernacular Press, under pressure exerted on them by the more intelligent of their own countrymen, moderated their tone. But that for some little while a situation of real danger existed I have not the smallest doubt. Very numerous reports reached me of threats uttered against Christians and Europeans. The vague rumours which, in the East, are the usual precursors of disturbance had been current to a remarkable degree. The European inhabitants were alarmed, and began to flock into the towns. Neither was their alarm at all unreasonable. In my Report for 1905 (pp. 8-10) I described in detail the events which occurred in Alexandria towards the close of 1905. A chance quarrel between two Greeks led to a somewhat serious riot, which at once assumed an anti-Christian form. I have no hesitation in saying that if, as was by no means improbable, some adventitious incident of this sort had occurred during the height of the excitement caused by the Turko-Egyptian frontier incident, the consequences might, and probably would, have been serious. I wish to add that the idea, which I occasionally see advanced, that this "unrest" was in any

degree due to the policy pursued by the British and Egyptian Governments in connection with the internal affairs of Egypt is devoid of the smallest real foundation. It was not partly, but wholly, due to the fact that, under Panislamic influence, a large portion of the population had been led to believe that a wanton attack was being made on the head of the Moslem religion.

To return from this digression, if I am sceptical of Panislamicism producing any more serious results than sporadic outbursts of fanaticism, it is, in the first place, because I greatly doubt the possibility of Moslem co-operation and cohesion when once it becomes a question of passing from words to deeds; and, in the second place, because I am quite confident of the power of Europe, should the necessity arise, to deal effectively with the material, though not with the spiritual, aspects of the movement.

Panislamicism is, moreover, a convenient phrase for conveying a number of other ideas, more or less connected with its primary signification. For the purpose of my present argument, these are of greater practical importance than the wider definition to which I have alluded above.

In the first place, it means, in Egypt, more or less complete subserviency to the Sultan. A somewhat novel element is thus introduced into Egyptian political life. Until recently the Egyptian national movement has been on distinctly anti-Turkish lines. The Arabi revolt was, in its essence, directed against Turkey and the Turks. I understand, however, that the leaders of the National movement now declare that they have no wish to draw closer the bonds between Turkey and Egypt, and that their only desire is to maintain the suzerainty of the Sultan. This language contrasts so remarkably with utterances of a very recent date that it is impossible not to entertain some suspicion that it is an afterthought due to a correct appreciation of the fact that a more extended pro-Turkish programme is calculated to alienate sympathies which it is desirable to maintain and

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to foster. It would, however, be unfair to pin down the Nationalist party, as a body, to the chance utterances of a few irresponsible individuals. Accepting, therefore, this later version of the programme as correct, I have to observe that the suzerainty of the Sultan over Egypt has never, so far as I am aware, been impugned, neither does it appear probable that it will be endangered so long as all parties to the Firman—which, it has to be borne in mind, is a bilateral arrangement—take no action outside the limit of their respective rights. The Sinai Peninsula incident derived its main importance from the fact that there appeared at one time to be some risk that the Firman, and the documents which form part of it, would be violated to the detriment of Egypt.

In the second place, Panislamism almost necessarily connotes a recrudescence of racial and religious animosity. Many of its adherents are, I do not doubt, inspired by genuine religious fervour. Others, again, whether from indifference verging on agnosticism, or from political and opportunist motives, or—as I trust may sometimes be the case—from having really assimilated modern ideas on the subject of religious toleration, would be willing, were such a course possible, to separate the political from the religious, and even possibly from the racial, issues. If such are their wishes and intentions, I entertain very little doubt that they will find them impossible of execution. Unless they can convince the Moslem masses of their militant Islamism, they will fail to arrest their attention or to attract their sympathy. Appeals, either overt or covert, to racial and religious passions are thus a necessity of their existence in order to ensure the furtherance of their political programme.

In the third place, Panislamism almost necessarily connotes an attempt to regenerate Islam on Islamic lines—in other words, to revivify and stereotype in the twentieth century the principles laid down more than a thousand years ago for the guidance of a primitive society. Those

principles involve a recognition of slavery, laws regulating the relations of the sexes which clash with modern ideas, and, which is perhaps more important than all, that crystallisation of the civil, criminal, and canonical law into one immutable whole, which has so largely contributed to arrest the progress of those countries whose populations have embraced the Moslem faith.

It is for these reasons, independent of any political considerations, that all who are interested in the work of Egyptian reform are constrained to condemn Panislamism. More than this, the utmost care has to be exercised lest any natural and very legitimate sympathy for genuine Nationalism may not be unconsciously attracted towards a movement which is, in reality, highly retrograde and deserving of but scant sympathy. It is at times not easy to recognise the Pan-Islamic figure under the Nationalist cloak.

I am, however, fully aware that side by side with the Panislamic movement there exists another which may possibly be entitled to the designation of National. The two movements are, in fact, merged into each other, neither is it easy to state with any degree of precision where the one begins and the other ends. My conviction is that, in reality, Panislamism is the predominant partner. However this may be, I proceed to discuss the position of the National movement independently of any real or imaginary connection it may have with Panislamism.

It is extremely natural that the idea of creating an Egyptian Nationalism should have germinated and brought forth some fruit. The extent to which the so-called National party represents the real wishes and aspirations of the mass of the people is, indeed, more than doubtful. Over and over again have representative Egyptians protested to me strongly against the claims of the leaders of this party to the title which they have arrogated to themselves. Over and over again has it been urged on me that the party consists merely of a few noisy individuals, whose action is often due to no

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very reputable motives, and who in no way represent the real wishes and aspirations of their countrymen. I believe this view of the situation to be substantially correct. In any case, it may be confidently stated that the consequences which would inevitably ensue were the programme of the National party capable of rapid realisation are very imperfectly understood. There can be no doubt that the recollection of past abuses is rapidly fading away. Education, moreover, as was to be anticipated, has awakened ambitions which were formerly dormant. The most humble fellah now knows that, in the eye of the law, he is the equal of the Pasha. A spirit of independence, which was formerly conspicuous by its absence, has been created. Under such circumstances, it can be no matter for surprise that the educated youth should begin to clamour for a greater share than heretofore in the government and administration of their country. Nothing could be more ungenerous than to withhold a certain amount of sympathy from these very legitimate aspirations. Nothing, on the other hand, could be more unwise than to abstain, at this early period of the National movement, from pointing out to all who are willing to listen to reason the limits which, for the time being, must be assigned to those aspirations. I am too true a friend to the Egyptian people to endeavour either to flatter or to deceive them.

I ask myself, therefore, what is it that the Young Egyptians, in so far as their views are represented by the National party, wish to accomplish ?

In the first place, they wish to rise to such of the higher administrative posts in the Government service as are now occupied by Europeans. I have not a word to say against this aspiration. I propose, in another portion of this Report, to deal fully with this branch of the question. Here I will only speak of the wider and more strictly political portion of the National programme. I understand that what is demanded is a wide and immediate extension of Parliamentary institutions. A good deal of misapprehension appears to

exist, especially in England, as to the extent to which Parliamentary institutions already exist in Egypt. I deal with this question in another portion of my Report. For the moment I propose to confine myself to inquiring how far it would be possible or desirable to extend the powers of the Legislative Council and Assembly.

I am not aware that the Egyptian National party has ever formulated its programme in any very precise terms, but, so far as I am able to judge, they advocate the creation in Egypt of an institution similar to the British House of Commons. I have not noticed whether it is proposed to vest all power in a single Chamber, or whether it is suggested that a second Chamber, which would take the place of the French Senate or the British House of Lords, is contemplated. Neither am I quite clear as to whether it is proposed that the Egyptian Parliament should legislate, without distinction, for all the inhabitants of Egypt or only for local subjects. The former of these two methods would require the consent of all the Powers, which would certainly not be obtained. Leaving aside these doubtful but very important points, I conceive I shall be right in holding that what is proposed is, first, the creation of a Ministry responsible to the Chamber, and dependent for its existence on the maintenance of a majority; and, secondly, complete control over the finances of the country, such as that exercised by the elected Chambers in the United Kingdom and in other European countries.

The adoption of the first of these proposals would, unless I am much mistaken, produce a state of things which may without exaggeration be termed chaotic. Intrigue of all sorts would be rife. The system of bribery and corruption which was at one time so prevalent in the country, and which is even now only dying a lingering death, would receive a fresh impulse. It is more than probable that, under the specious title of free institutions, the worst evils of personal government would reappear.

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The adoption of the second proposal—that of handing over complete financial control to the Chamber—would almost inevitably lead to national bankruptcy.

It requires, indeed, some mental effort to discuss these proposals seriously. Can any sane man believe that a country which has for centuries past been exposed to the worst forms of misgovernment at the hands of its rulers, from Pharaohs to Pashas, and in which, but ten years ago, only 9·5 per cent. of the men and ·3 per cent. of the women could read and write,* is capable of suddenly springing into a position which will enable it to exercise full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself and to others interested in its welfare? The idea is absurd. The programme of the National party is quite incapable of realisation at present, and it may well be doubted whether, in the form in which it is now conceived, it can ever be realised. In any case, I must wholly decline to take any part in furthering proposals the adoption of which would, in my opinion, constitute a flagrant injustice, not only to the very large foreign interests involved, but also to those ten or twelve millions of Egyptians to the advancement of whose moral and material welfare I have devoted the best years of my life.

Is there, then, no hope for Egyptian Nationalism? In the form in which that idea is conceived by the Egyptian National party there is, I am convinced, little or none. But it is well for a nation, and even for practical politicians, to entertain an ideal, even although its realisation may be distant and beset with many difficulties. I venture, therefore, as a counter-programme to that of the Egyptian National party, to put forward an ideal which I have for long entertained. It is, that the only possible Egyptian nationality which can ever be created must consist of all the dwellers in Egypt, irrespective of race, religion, or extraction. So

* I give the figures of the last census, taken in 1897. I do not doubt that the census about to be taken will show a large diminution in the numbers of the wholly illiterate classes.

long as the country was well-nigh throttled by impending bankruptcy, so long as the fate of the Sudan was uncertain, and so long as Anglo-French rivalry was in a more or less acute stage, discussions or reflections on this subject could be nothing more than academical. These obstacles have now been removed. Another, however, remains. So long as the regime of the Capitulations, in its present form, exists, not only must the Egyptians and the foreigners resident in Egypt always be divided into two separate camps, but also no thorough solidarity of interest can be established between the various communities of Europeans *inter se*. There can be no real cohesion and no concentrated action. That cohesion can only be secured by the creation of a local International Legislative Council. I dealt with this subject in my last Annual Report, and I revert to it in another portion of this Report. Apart from other grounds on which it may be defended as a reform beneficial alike to Europeans and Egyptians, I maintain that this measure will tend more than any other to create a community of interest amongst the heterogeneous population which inhabits the valley of the Nile, and that it will be a first step towards the formation of an Egyptian national spirit in the only sense in which that spirit can be evoked without detriment to the true interests of the country. I am very fully aware of the difficulties which have to be encountered before effect can be given to this proposal. Possibly some long while may yet elapse before the first European Legislative Council meets in Egypt. But I have no fear for the ultimate result. The success of the cause which I advocate does not wholly depend on the opinions of a few individuals, whatever may be their position or influence. Neither does it wholly depend on the local opinion, whether European or Egyptian, of the day. The bestowal of legislative autonomy on the Europeans resident in Egypt, to take the place of the present cumbersome and unworkable system of legislation by diplomacy, is a measure naturally indicated by the ordinary canons which

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apply to political evolution. The cause will certainly triumph, although the triumph may be delayed.

Before leaving the question of the Egyptian National movement, I have yet one further remark to make. Besides those who have assumed the title of Nationalist, there exists a small but increasing number of Egyptians of whom comparatively little is heard, but who deserve that title quite as much as their competitors of a different school of thought and action. I allude to the party which, for the sake of brevity, I may call the followers of the late Mufti, Sheikh Mohammed Abdou. I have in previous Reports frequently alluded to the opinions held by this section of Egyptian society—opinions which are very analogous to those advocated by the late Seyyid Ahmed, who founded the Aligarh College in India. Their fundamental idea is to reform various Moslem institutions without shaking the main pillars on which the faith of Islam rests. They are truly Nationalist in the sense of wishing to advance the interests of their countrymen and co-religionists, but they are not tainted with Panislamism. Their programme, if I understand it rightly, involves not opposition to but co-operation with Europeans in the introduction of Western civilisation into the country. The main hope of Egyptian Nationalism, in the only true and practicable sense of the word, lies, in my opinion, with those who belong to this party. In the past they have not, for reasons on which I need not dwell, but for which the British advisers of the Egyptian Government are in no way responsible, received all the encouragement they deserve. Recently, however, one of their most distinguished members (Said Zaghloul Pasha) was appointed Minister of Education. The main reason for his appointment was not, as was sometimes supposed, any dissatisfaction with the manner in which the work of the Department of Public Instruction had been conducted; still less did it indicate an intention of making any radical changes in the educational policy heretofore pursued. It was mainly due to a desire to associate an able

man and enlightened Egyptian of this particular section of society with the work of Egyptian reform. The experiment, for such it is, will be watched with interest. Should it succeed, as I hope and believe will be the case, some encouragement will be afforded to move further in the same direction. Should it fail, the necessary consequence will be to throw the continuance of the work of reform to a greater extent than formerly into European, and notably into British, hands. In any case there can be no retrogression. The work of introducing Western civilisation into Egypt is proceeding in every department of the State on lines which have been carefully considered, and which admit of development but not of reversal or of radical change.

Another important chapter in this Report was devoted to the Capitulations—a subject of such complexity, and which arises so frequently during the modern history of Egypt, that no survey can be complete without repeated mention of it.

The Capitulations were the treaties agreed upon by Turkey and the European Powers—Egypt being a legal part of the Ottoman Empire—and which guaranteed certain privileges to foreigners residing in the country. Not only were they exempted thereby from the jurisdiction of the local tribunals, but no alteration in the legislation of the country which affected them in any degree could be made without the consent of the European Powers concerned. It will readily be understood that such safeguards and privileges, however essential in former days, had long since become unnecessary obstacles to good government. They now did little to further the interests of the Europeans, while they effectually blocked the way to serious legislation which might affect the Europeans, whose increase

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in numbers and commercial and official importance grew yearly. Moreover, the system divided the people of Egypt into two great classes—foreigners who had privileges, and native-born Egyptians who had none—and thus was responsible for the Nationalists' charge of inequality of treatment.

In accordance with the Capitulations, the Mixed Tribunals—instituted in 1876—consisting partly of native and partly of foreign judges, exercised jurisdiction between natives and foreigners and between foreigners of different nationalities. These tribunals had a limited penal jurisdiction in cases of police offences, and of late years also in regard to offences against the Bankruptcy Law. There were three of these Mixed Tribunals of First Instance, with a Court of Appeal sitting at Alexandria. Civil cases between foreigners of the same nationality were tried by their own Consular Courts, which also tried criminal cases—not within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals—in which the accused were foreigners. Chaotic as this unwieldy judicial system had become, the legislature was in even worse case, since no important law could be applied to the European residents in Egypt without the consent of fifteen different Powers. Even when legislation of primary importance was brought forward, the obtaining of this consent was beset with such a host of difficulties as to make the Egyptian Government despair of ever concluding the necessary negotiations.*

* See "The Law affecting Foreigners in Egypt as a Result of the Capitulations, with an Account of their Origin and Development." By J. H. Scott, B.A., LL.M., of the Khedivial Law School.

In fact, the question of the Capitulations had become one of the main stumbling-blocks in the path of the Egyptian Government, and for many years Lord Cromer and others had wearied their brains with efforts to evolve some practical scheme for the modification of the system.

In Lord Cromer's Report of 1904 there is a suggestion that the Powers should transfer to Great Britain the legislative functions they then collectively possessed. In 1905 there was another proposal, which recommended the abolition of the system of Capitulations with a dissolution of the Mixed Tribunals, termination of the Caisse de la Dette, and the creation of a consultative Parliament, whose members would be practically subservient to the Egyptian Government and to the representative of Great Britain at the Khedivial Court. Again, in 1906, Lord Cromer evolved another plan for the easing of the Capitulations yoke, which received the approval of many authorities, and with which his name will always be associated. Among its important propositions were :

1. Instead of legislation by diplomacy in all matters regarding European residents in Egypt, there shall be legislation by a local Council entirely composed of Europeans and subject to the British and Egyptian Governments. No law now requiring the consent of the Powers to come into force until it has been accepted by a majority of the Council and approved by the above-mentioned Government.

2. Europeans to be deprived of no right or privilege which they now enjoy under the Capitulations without an adequate guarantee being given against the recurrence of

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the abuses against which their rights and privileges were intended to guard.

3. The Mixed Courts to all intents and purposes to continue under a legal obligation to administer laws passed by the European Legislative Council and approved by the British and Egyptian Governments. Their internationalism to be affirmed with a three-fold guarantee that there shall be no break in the continuity of the codes which they administer: these guarantees being—a proposed declaration of the British and Egyptian Governments, the international character of the Council, and the reference of doubtful questions to The Hague Tribunal.

4. The rights of Europeans accused on criminal charges to be secured by a series of guarantees which will ensure that the future European Criminal Courts will administer justice in a manner at least as satisfactory as that of the Consular Courts.

5. Domiciliary visits not to be permitted without the authorisation of a magistrate who is the subject of a treaty Power, and the presence of an officer of the Court who is a subject of a treaty Power.

6. In all cases of arrest a European to have the right to be at once liberated on bail, or to be brought before a European magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest.

Briefly, these proposals of Lord Cromer may be taken as voicing his desire to free Egypt from restrictions under which Europeans and the Egyptians alike suffered. He wanted to abolish in part the "legislation by diplomacy"—which, in practice, means the absence of much legislation imperatively and urgently required—and to substitute legislation subject to certain limitations by a local Council composed of Europeans, elected by Europeans, and able to legislate only with the assent of both the Egyptian and British Governments.

These proposals being published only a few weeks after the clamouring of a certain section of the General Assembly for a representative Constitution, led to a number of the agitators suggesting that these modifications were the result of their action : a supposition which was strongly repudiated by Sir Edgar Vincent and the Hon. Sidney Peel, whose approval of Lord Cromer's scheme is worthy of mention :

" Lord Cromer's plan," says the former, " appears to me to meet the case with fairness and impartiality. The foreign communities now under Consular protection would gain rather than lose under this scheme, as they would have a more influential voice in the direction of Government affairs than is now the case. The authority of Lord Cromer in all matters Egyptian is so great that, apart from the merits of this plan, any plan put forward under his authority deserves the most thoughtful consideration of all the European Powers in Egypt. It is absurd to suppose that Lord Cromer, in putting forward his suggestion, has been influenced by any temporary display of feeling on the part of certain agitators or by anything other than his mature judgment of what is best in the permanent interest of the country and the legitimate protection of foreign interests engaged in Egypt."

The Hon. Sidney Peel, who had a long and intimate acquaintance with the Consul-General, writes in even higher terms of the latter's judgment and sagacious control of Egypt. Dwelling on the Nationalist agitation for a Constitution, he voices the opinion that he has never known a people more absolutely unfitted for parliamentary institutions, as we understand them, though he would be more than willing to accept Lord Cromer's suggestions regarding an international Council.

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However, the force of circumstances connected with the resignation of Lord Cromer and the policy of his successor led to this scheme for the modification of the Capitulations being shelved for the moment, and even to-day Egyptian affairs are being hampered and aggravated by the unwieldy system which still is in operation.

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CHAPTER II

CLOSE OF LORD CROMER'S RULE

Meeting of the General Assembly—Its Legal Functions—The Resolutions passed—Comments of the *Times*—Protests from the Copts and from Chambers of Commerce—Lord Cromer's Resignation—Sketch of his Great Work for Egypt—His Valedictory Speech—His Shortcomings—Criticisms of Mr. Edward Dicey and Mr. J. M. Robertson—Mustapha Pasha Kamel's Absurd Charge.

DURING the month of February, 1907, with all due pomp and ceremony, His Highness the Khedive opened the session of the General Assembly of the Legislative Council. For four days the members of this strangely incompetent and impotent Chamber wrangled and fought over the various proposals, which some of them could not read and many could not understand, but which were advanced, presumably, for the betterment of their country.

By virtue of the Constitutional Law of Egypt, and in accordance with the scheme promulgated by Lord Dufferin, this Assembly meets every second year to discuss certain propositions—chiefly with regard to taxation. It possesses no legislative functions, although it is entitled to pass resolutions on any subject of public interest—resolutions which the Government is free to consider or not, as it pleases. It holds certain rights as to matters of irrigation, public loans, and classification of lands for purposes of assessment, but its only real power is fiscal, it being impossible to create new

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taxes without its consent. Its members consist of those of the Legislative Council, the Ministry, and forty-six representative Notables from the principal towns and country districts.

Dwelling on the subject of the General Assembly, Lord Cromer, in his last Report, says :

I see it occasionally stated that Lord Dufferin contemplated an early development of the institutions which he created, and that the British and Egyptian Governments are guilty of what is almost tantamount to a breach of faith in not fulfilling the promises which Lord Dufferin is alleged to have made. I do not know on what evidence these statements are based. They are certainly not borne out by anything which is contained in Lord Dufferin's Report. It is, indeed, impossible to read that Report without arriving at the conclusion that the thought uppermost in Lord Dufferin's mind, at the time of writing it, was that any very rapid development of self-governing institutions in Egypt was to be deprecated. After pointing out "how slow, hesitating, and tentative" were the steps which had in India been taken in this direction, he added: "The arrangements proposed for Egypt are a far more bold and generous move in the direction of self-government than anything the most revolutionary Indian statesman has hitherto dared to suggest for that country." I may add that I was for many years in constant and intimate communication with Lord Dufferin. I can confidently assert that neither in conversation nor in correspondence did he ever give utterance to any such opinions as those which, as I have already observed, are sometimes attributed to him. On the contrary, the impression left on my mind from all Lord Dufferin said and wrote was that he had no very great confidence in the results of the experiment which he initiated, and that he was gratified, and perhaps somewhat astonished, at the degree of success which had been achieved. In other words, Lord Dufferin's wide

experience and statesmanlike grasp of public affairs were such as to preclude his entertaining any illusions as to the rapidity with which self-governing institutions could safely be developed in Egypt. All he hoped to accomplish was "to erect some sort of barrier, however feeble, against the intolerable tyranny" of the former rulers of Egypt, and to create institutions which could in time be "fostered and educated" into being "fairly useful." This is a very different programme from one involving a rapid advance to constitutional forms of government in their fullest sense.

Lord Cromer's words show that there had been already certain dissatisfaction as to the limitation of power wielded by the General Assembly, and it appears certain that this brief session of February, 1907, was strongly biased by Anglophobe influences, and that its proceedings were of a disorderly nature. But as no reporters were present it is difficult to state with any certainty the exact causes of contention. During the four days of the session, however, no fewer than eighty-five proposals were discussed with more or less vigour and feeling, and some thirty-one were rejected, among the latter being one limiting the membership of the Assembly to those who could read and write, and another proposing a temporary land tax for the extension of the number of primary schools (*kuttabs*) in the country districts

Such trifles being considered of small moment, the members turned to more absorbing topics, many of which had figured largely in the petition presented by the Nationalist party. Many of these were childish in conception, and some were framed presumably in ignorance of the limitations imposed by the Capitula-

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tions. Others betrayed the deep-rooted hatred of the European element generally, and of the British in particular. Among the resolutions passed were the following demands and protests :

1. The abolition of the Special Tribunal and the immediate release of the Denishwai prisoners.

2. A Constitution and representative government.

3. Government to regulate all market prices by the creation of Chambers of Commerce, which shall fix the daily tariff for all viands.

4. All high official posts to be reserved for Egyptians.

5. A National (Egyptian) Municipality for Cairo.

6. A protest against high school fees.

7. Arabic to be the only official language, and school instruction to be given only through the medium of Arabic.

8. Greater freedom for Egyptian pilgrims.

9. Reform of the Mehkemeh Shariah.

10. A protest against the presence of English sovereigns and the official patronage extended to these foreign coins.

11. No more concessions to foreign companies.

Commenting upon the session, the *Times* remarks :

These proposals, it will be observed, are those of a part of the Nationalist programme. They are the work of the same party who, only last year, were anxious to restore the authority of the Sultan in Egypt, and who did their utmost to stir up an anti-British movement in his favour at the time of the Akabah—Turko-Egyptian frontier—incident. Had they succeeded in their designs, they would hardly have enjoyed any great measure of parliamentary liberties. Doubtless they would not even have asked for anything of the

kind. They would have attained their real object, which is a return to the old system of class-privilege, oppression and corruption, and attained it in the most direct and effective way. As they were baffled in their attempts to gain it directly, they are now seeking to gain it by indirect means. That and nothing else is, with the great majority of them, the cause of this sudden devotion to the cause of constitutional freedom. They are the men who intrigued with the French as long as they had any hope that the French would help them to get rid of the honest and orderly administration which they hate. Now that they have had to renounce all hopes of that kind, and that their efforts to provoke the intervention of the Turks have lamentably failed, they are seeking to play upon the weaknesses of extreme British Radicalism by posing as the champions of Nationalism and of parliamentary government.

An article in a contemporaneous number of the *Spectator*, on the subject of a Parliament for Egypt, pointed out how unfitted Eastern countries are for purely Western institutions, by comparing the failure of Home Rule in Morocco, Turkey and Persia with the advantages which have accrued from the British control in Egypt under Cromer, and dwelt on the impossibility of our sharing that control and responsibility.

But perhaps more striking proofs of the undesirability of the scheme are to be found in the petitions and protests from communities and individuals addressed to Lord Cromer on the subject. Not only did the Copts protest vehemently against the resolutions, knowing full well what would be their portion if the Moslem Nationalists attained political power, but the British Chamber of Commerce, the Alexandria General Produce Association, the Alexandria Import Association—repre-

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sending together the most important trade interests of Egypt's commercial capital—forwarded strongly-worded appeals against such a policy. Their example was followed by the other Chambers of Commerce, and also by numbers of business men, who declared unhesitatingly against any change in the existing system of legislation.

As might be expected, these protests and petitions excited great indignation in the Nationalist Press, and resulted in various demonstrations in the Esbekieh Gardens and elsewhere, where youthful Mohammedans vied with each other in the violence of their speeches, certain that the more fanatical their utterances the more liberal would be the applause. And when, a few weeks later, the news of Lord Cromer's resignation was bruited throughout the country, there were but few of the Nationalist party who did not attribute it openly to the fact that he had been given the choice between countenancing representative parliamentary institutions in Egypt or bringing his regime to a close.

In forwarding his resignation, Lord Cromer declared that his action had not been influenced by any political considerations, and that it was only on the score of ill-health that he was unable to continue the strain of his work in Egypt. For close on fifty years he had laboured in the public service of his country; for nearly a quarter of a century he had been ceaselessly vigilant over the affairs of Egypt. During those long years he had laboured honestly and truly to produce order out of chaos, to replace corruption by honesty, and ineptness by efficiency, never losing sight of the welfare of the people over whom he ruled. The career of no living

statesman has been more closely bound up with the development of any country than that of Lord Cromer with Egypt. It was his reforms which converted it from a land of fiscal oppression and judicial corruption into one which might well be compared with any in the East. He found it virtually bankrupt, and hopelessly corrupt in every branch of the administration. He went to it hampered by the Utopian impracticability of Lord Dufferin's celebrated scheme of government, with its imperfect, incongruous and irritating details, which permitted no radical alterations. Yet Lord Cromer eventually succeeded in evolving from it a workable system which in no way weakened the essence of its policy, which was to help the Egyptians to work out their own salvation. With wonderful patience and tact he carried his main points one by one, never losing sight of his ultimate aim, which was the good of the country; although at times the country waxed restive under the process of regeneration. But, on the whole, he achieved his ends without needlessly overriding native authority; and although at the conclusion of his career he became the object of the spleen of the Nationalist agitators of the baser sort, there was not one of the true patriots who was not grateful for what he had done for the country. Faults, of course, he had, but they were the faults of the strong man who has held his position alone for long, weary years in a corrupt and suspicious country. If, at the end of his regime, his hand grew heavier on the reins, and he became less far-seeing in his judgments and less inclined to trust the younger generation in the

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places of his contemporaries, who can hold him alone responsible ?

It was to be expected that some of those whom he had guided always to their advancement—though not always to their gratitude—should wreak their spite upon him whenever they got an opportunity, and in this light we must regard the jubilations of the Nationalists on his resignation. Some declared that he was virtually dismissed, and that the dismissal was the result of the actions of the National Assembly ; others saw in it a consequence of the Denishwai affair, and regarded his departure as the logical outcome of his policy.

It is pleasanter far to read the words of Mohammed Bey Wahid, the leader of the Egyptian Liberal Party (whose views found expression in the columns of *El Mokattam*), in his farewell to the great Proconsul :

Egypt bids farewell to-day with profound and universal regret to its first reformer, the first founder of justice and permanent prosperity in it, the first ruler who combined mercy with justice in a manner unknown to Egypt since the days of Omar and Saladin. We bid farewell to the man who has left traces of his good and beneficial work everywhere. The Egyptians bid farewell to a venerable gentleman who was a loving father to them, who brought them up in his justice and protected them, doing his best to develop their interests and promote their welfare for twenty-five years, during which he has brought them to a state of tranquillity and prosperity undreamt of before. He has given them personal and religious liberty, and in the hearts of all liberal-minded individuals a debt of gratitude everlasting. These grateful Egyptians wish him health and happiness wherever he may be, and thank him from all their hearts for what he has done in Egypt.

Thus, accompanied by bursts of mingled praise and vituperation, Lord Cromer made his last appearance on the stage of Egypt. His great valedictory speech at the Khedivial Opera House on May 4th was in the nature of an historic oration, having as its aim the enunciation of the two great facts of the continuance of the British Occupation, and the control by the British Parliament of the general administration of the country, with the continuance of the present system of government.

During the earlier part of his speech, Lord Cromer gratefully recognised those who had been his willing coadjutors during his long service—H.H. the late Tewfik Pasha, and all those in the Ministry, as well as the Europeans who had so generously upheld his policy. He spoke of the extraordinary increase in the material prosperity of the country, comparing it with the moral and intellectual advancement which had not increased in anything like similar proportion, and, as has been said, he dwelt upon the fact that the British Occupation was to continue for an indefinite period according to the formal assurance of the British Government, and declared that the present system of government, in spite of its numerous defects and anomalies, was to be continued under his successor with every hope of good results.

That Lord Cromer did not attach great weight to the influence of the Nationalist movement, even at the very close of his reign, was shown by the latter portion of his speech, which was devoted to the subject, and which we reproduce verbatim ;

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Whatever influence I can exert will be exercised in the direction of steady progress on the lines already laid down. I shall deprecate any brisk change and any violent, new departure. More especially, should it be necessary, I shall urge that this wholly spurious and manufactured movement in favour of a rapid development of Parliamentary institutions should be treated for what it is worth ; and, gentlemen, let me add that it is worth very little. It does not really represent the voice of the intelligent dwellers in Egypt, whether European or Egyptian. When all the nonsense and exaggeration are swept away, it will, I think, be found that the difference of opinion between my opponents, especially those in England, and myself, is really not so much one of principle as one of degree. They wish to gallop. I consider that a steady jog-trot is the pace best suited to advance the interests of this country. It is a pace which has done us good services in the past. I say it should be continued, never relaxing into a walk, or breaking into a gallop ; and my strong conviction is that if the pace be greatly mended, a serious risk will be incurred that the horse will come down and break its knees.

I wish to tell you, gentlemen, why I entertain, and why I now state, these opinions. It is not because I hold that any political advantage will accrue to my own country from their adoption. It is not even because I believe them to be shared by all the most intelligent classes, whether European or Egyptian, in this country. No, gentlemen, it is mainly because I hope that what I am now saying will eventually be translated into the vernacular language, and will thus reach the ears of some, at all events, of the voiceless millions, the blue-shirted fellaheen, on whose labours the prosperity of his country really depends. I, who claim to have always been their true friend, warn them against allowing themselves to be duped and misled by their pseudo representatives, who, without a shadow of real authority, credit them with ideas which they neither entertain nor fully comprehend,

and who advocate a political programme the immediate adoption of which, whilst detrimental to all other interests, would, I am firmly convinced, be specially hurtful to those of the poorest classes of the community.

Gentlemen, if instead of being a defender of the regime which has now lasted nearly a quarter of a century, I were to turn my hand to criticising it, I should be disposed to dwell on the point that progress, far from having been too slow, has been so fast that the reforms which have been effected have not as yet been thoroughly assimilated by the mass of the population.

There is yet one further word of advice which I wish to give before I sit down. The maxim that "union is strength" applies not merely to those who are in the service of the Government, but to all who are interested in the introduction of true civilisation into this country. They should hold together. I do not mean merely that the Englishman, the Frenchman, the German, and other Europeans should lay aside their petty international rivalries and combine together in a common interest, but also that all who are in favour of rational government and of steady progress—be they Moslem or Christian, European, African or Asiatic—should unite in resisting those forces which are in reality, whether from ignorance or intention, advocating the cause of retrogression.

Reviewing the trend of political affairs from our present standpoint, there is no denying the fact that the late mischievous growth of Nationalism has been greatly due to the leniency with which Lord Cromer treated it in its infancy. An article in the *Edinburgh Review*, about the time of Lord Cromer's departure, attributes its development almost entirely to his policy, and declares it to be the natural outcome of the blessings of peace and prosperity in a people whose moral and intellectual growth had not progressed in like measure.

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The same article points the moral that Lord Cromer failed in not recognising what merit existed in the feeling, and giving this national spirit all the scope which was possible and consistent with the preservation of the advantages conferred by the British administration under his otherwise most sagacious control. It was his very policy of belittling the movement and ignoring the malicious and intemperate character of the vernacular Press which has since made the work of his successor so hard.

With all admiration for his vast knowledge of statesmancraft, recognition of what he has done for Egypt, and respect for his integrity, it is useless to pretend that he did not give cause for adverse criticisms, or that his detractors had not justification for some of their complaints. Mr. Edward Dicey's book, "The Future of Egypt," is scarcely to be reckoned an unbiased or authoritative criticism, but an article he wrote at the time of Lord Cromer's departure in some respects voiced opinions held by many. In it he declared that it would be to the advantage of both England and Egypt if his lordship were replaced by a younger man, less autocratic in character, more sympathetic in disposition, and more ready to recognise the fundamental differences between the West and the East. He tabulates the following reasons for the state of affairs at the end of the Cromer regime :

1. Though Lord Cromer's reign has been of material gain in prosperity and order, it has not earned, nor could be expected to earn, the gratitude of the native.
2. By the twenty-five years' rule of Egypt by an absolute

though benevolent autocracy, Egypt becomes less fitted for self-government or any kind of autonomy than she was at the commencement of our occupation.

3. The latent dislike entertained by Moslem races for Christian supremacy constitutes a permanent cause of unrest.

4. The attempt to administer affairs in Egypt by English officials to the exclusion of natives from any important share in the internal administration has proved a failure.

5. That so long as England declines to regularise her position by claiming a protectorate, it is a blunder not to avail ourselves of the co-operation of the Khedive by utilising his personal influence as the legal sovereign of Egypt.

Mr. J. M. Robertson, while paying tribute to the work of Lord Cromer, likewise expatiated on the shortcomings of his system, which he declared could never have been contemplated save as a momentary arrangement and one so irregular and indefensible that it required thorough reconsideration. He also—though at a later date—dwelt on the imperfections of the educational system and the tendency to increase the English element to the detriment of the native.

That Mustapha Pasha Kamel, and others of his party, should bespatter the benefactor of their country with contumely was no more than was expected, and the supposition of the former that Lord Cromer was directly responsible for the period of acute financial depression that followed on his departure, did not cause surprise among those who knew the Nationalist leader and his methods. Mustapha Pasha made the utmost of the absurd charge in the columns of *El Lewa* :

It is said that our defeated enemy, having known that his false accusations brought against Egypt have proved a

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failure in revenging himself on the Egyptians, began to engineer some plots against them at London, trying to cripple the coming cotton market through spreading unfounded rumours to the effect that the Egyptian peasantry are, by nature of their present financial state, obliged to sell their cotton crop at any price that might be advanced to them.

We believe that our enemy will prove unsuccessful for the second time, but this does not prevent us from taking the necessary steps against such plotting and thrusting in the dark.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW BRITISH AGENT

Sir Eldon Gorst—His Reception and Early Policy—The Attitude of the Khedive to the Politics of his Country—Increase of Crime—Fostered by the Vernacular Press—The Lambert Affair—Release of Denishwai Prisoners.

SUCH then was the state of affairs when Sir Eldon Gorst arrived on the scene to undertake the thankless task of continuing a system which was thoroughly unpopular with those who controlled the opinions of the masses by means of the Press. A man of undoubted ability and no newcomer to the country—for he had held various positions under the Government there since the year 1890—he had the advantage of the personal friendship and confidence of H.H. the Khedive, and had always been held in high esteem by Lord Cromer, to whom his appointment was mainly due. A comparatively young man, he appeared to possess many of the qualities declared necessary for the post by Lord Cromer's critics, and, presumably, his policy was actuated by many of the hints advocating conciliatory methods and a more sympathetic attitude towards the Egyptians, which had figured among their demands.

From the beginning of his regime there was a tendency to fill Government positions as far as possible by native officials rather than by Anglo-Egyptians, and so positive were the natives that radical changes were to

be made in the Cromer system that there is no doubt that they anticipated a speedy and wholesale acceptance of all their various demands. A party of notables signed and presented a petition to the new Consul-General, which, had he consented thereto, would have plunged the country into complete and absolute chaos, for it practically demanded the removal of the Army of Occupation and the abolition of the posts of the British advisers. They demanded an Egyptian representative Parliament, with an electoral test of intellectual capacity instead of wealth, an extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts, with increased powers to the Mixed Court of Appeal, whereby the European Code would be modified and extended. Among their further demands were the release of the Denishwai prisoners and abolition of the Special Tribunal, the gradual substitution of capable Egyptians for foreign functionaries in the Egyptian service, a municipality in Cairo as well as a university, a Chamber of Commerce, a Ministry of Agriculture, extensions of industrial and agricultural training, and many other educational developments with Arabic as their medium, a return to the old coinage, the water of the Nile for drinking and other purposes instead of that of Rod el Farag, and a dozen other items of more or less grave importance in the opinion of the petitioners.

The demands put forward by these notables, and others who hoped either to intimidate or beguile the inexperience of the new ruler were difficult to answer, and subsequent events have suggested that the task was many sizes too large for the man elected to

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carry it on. Whatever Lord Cromer's defects, he had personality and a ripe wisdom which none could disregard. He understood the importance of preserving a ceremonial and impressive state, and if his word was law, there was not an individual, however mean and small, who did not know that in his word lay absolute justice and integrity. His successor, Sir Eldon Gorst, was said to be too subject to dictation from the home Government, and the natural result was a weakening of his personal authority. His attitude has not impressed the Oriental, nor has it inspired the European with confidence. His diffidence of manner has laid him open to the charge of incapacity ; his policy of self-effacement has made him not only difficult of approach, but has also led to his being treated with scant respect ; and his prestige has been still further diminished in the minds of the native by his association in public places with those whom they stigmatise as " second-class " people. Even his carelessness of appearances has afforded material for condemnation. However much they had covertly rebelled against the iron hand of Cromer, they have openly revealed their distrust in Gorst, and that in spite of his having made concession after concession until the European community stood aghast at his temerity.

Undoubtedly, Sir Eldon Gorst undertook the control of Egypt at a critical juncture, for not only had he to contend with a public just awakening to a knowledge of its rights, but the first months of his reign were clouded by a financial depression which threatened to spread ruin throughout the country. But, nevertheless,




Photo : Lafayette, Ltd.

SIR ELDON GORST

he was received with open arms and with manifestations of public rejoicings as representing a new and progressive era.

So far, no mention has been made in these pages of the attitude of H.H. the Khedive, the legal sovereign of the country, towards its political affairs and, indeed, it is almost impossible to say with any certainty whether he entertained any consistent political views.

Ruler *de jure*, but certainly not *de facto*, his position must always have been a galling one, and especially during his youth, when there is but little doubt that he would willingly have shaken himself free of British control by any means within his power. Relations between him and Lord Cromer were never cordial, and frequently were strained, but such summary and humiliating consequences resulted from his early attempts to assume command over the Anglo-Egyptian army that he never again attempted openly to flout the dominating Power. But though he seemingly acquiesced in the existing conditions, there seems to have been little doubt that he would have thrown his weight, *sub rosa*, into any scheme to further his own ends, although after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, he must have realised that he had lost the support of the one Power who could have been of real service to him.

Whatsoever his real inclinations at the time of the Turko-Egyptian frontier affair, he publicly supported the rights of Egypt, and went so far—on Cromer's insistence, it is true—to write to the Sultan declaring that in case of open hostilities his troops would be with Egypt.

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With much ability, certain energy and discernment—though of an Oriental, subtle nature—the Khedive is also said to be an adept in the art of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Although at various times in his career he has been suspected of deep-laid plots, he has often found opportunities to express not only his patriotism, but also his gratitude for England's presence and protection. There have been times when the Nationalists have been loudly jubilant over his suppositive sympathy with their cause ; there have been others when they have been equally loud in their denunciations of his suspected duplicity.

They had reason for their rejoicings in the publication of an interview accorded by His Highness to a correspondent of *Le Temps* in February, 1907, in which he denied that the Nationalist aims were either anti-foreign or fanatical, and declared that he had learnt the necessity for a sovereign to be in accord with his people. "It is time," he continued, "to make every possible effort for the satisfaction of the intellectual and moral needs of the Egyptian people." His one political aim, he declared, was to work in agreement with anybody for the good of his country, and that he would never oppose any measure which he believed would be useful to Egypt. Throughout this interview there was never a mention of England's share in the government of the country, and the Nationalists triumphed over his words as though they were a protestation of faith and significant of his resolution to identify himself with their party. Indeed, according to Mustapha Pasha Kamel's rendering, these sentiments read as co-operation of the

nation with the state, a Constitutional Government and the complete breakdown of Lord Cromer's rule.

Judge then the gnashing of teeth when, a few months later, force of circumstances led to his Highness according another interview, which seemed to point to a sudden veering round of his views. Mr. Edward Dicey was the interviewer. His Highness declared that the British Occupation was preferable to any other, and that he was very sensible of the high services rendered by Lord Cromer. Not only this, but he declared his gratitude to England for not proclaiming a protectorate in the place of the thankless Occupation, and he expressed his recognition of personal courtesies extended to him by King Edward VII., and of the value of the friendly relations between England and Egypt.

Mustapha Pasha Kamel was far from pleased ; and at first he argued that Mr. Dicey was not to be depended on. Then he issued a manifesto to show that such sentiments meant nothing, and if they did " Egyptians are conscious of their rights and duties, and they know that their country is above all Khedives and above all sovereigns. Men come and go, but the Fatherland remains, and our only *raison d'être* is to serve in its cause all our personal interests."

Perhaps the reason for this second interview may be found in the publication of rumours in the London Press only a few weeks earlier, which suggested that not only had His Highness materially supported the Nationalist cause, but that he had been deemed guilty of bribery and corruption and other practices unbecoming in a ruler under British control. It was

whispered, too, that relations between His Highness and our own King Edward were not exactly harmonious, and that the former was glad of an opportunity to make honourable amends and repudiate, at the same time, the libellous suggestions which had distressed and annoyed him. In which case he was surely justified in giving an emphatic and complete denial, even though that denial cost him the loyalty of the vernacular Press and resulted in the vehement assertion of Mustapha Pasha Kamel that the Khedive had no part or lot in the present movement.

Lord Cromer's departure meant the relaxation of a very strict and irksome guardianship as far as His Highness was concerned, and in his successor he welcomed not only a man of practically his own generation, but an old friend and one with whom he had many interests in common. If the truth might be known, we should probably learn that Effendina has passed through the turbulent stage of hot-headed youth, has learnt which side his bread is buttered, and prefers carrying on his peaceful agricultural pursuits, which are of very material benefit to him, to pinching his fingers in political machinery. But if his change of attitude has caused an ever-widening breach between him and the Nationalists, there is certainly a strong anti-British feeling in his family. Many of his relations are suspected of being in active sympathy with the movement, while even his heir-apparent evinces the greatest disinclination to pursue his acquaintance with the English language.

It would not be fair to attribute the recrudescence of lawlessness and crime in the year 1907 entirely to the

influence of the Nationalists, although the various street demonstrations, strikes of cabmen, carters, weavers, and students were mainly based on political issues and engineered as protests against the Government and its agents. It was one of the boasts of Ismail Pasha that an unarmed foreigner might progress from end to end of his country without fear of molestation. Judging from the horrible crimes in the provinces which filled the columns of the newspapers of 1907, it was safe for neither foreigner nor native to venture off the beaten track. Some attributed the increase of crime to the youth and inexperience of the English officials of the Parquet, who were prone to trust to others in the detection of crime and to accept the distorted and often dishonest views of the native Mamurs or Omdehs.

Native official circles were said to be hotbeds of corruption, and as it was manifestly impossible in the interests of the law-abiding population to increase their powers, there was a feeling that the strength of the Inspectorate and police force should be increased. In the meantime, however, things went from bad to worse, while the general feeling of unrest and discontent was fostered in the vernacular Press by garbled tales of the inefficiency and malpractices of the existing Government.

Seeing how easy it was to sow the seeds of dissatisfaction in the minds of the credulous fellah of the provinces, it may be judged how much more easily these took root in the minds of the students at the big Government schools of the towns. Among these the fallacious arguments of Mustapha Kamel and other

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Nationalists were seized with avidity, and the encouragement to make capital out of every petty detail of the curriculum, and to defy every regulation pertaining to school discipline, eagerly welcomed.

Great things had been expected of Said Bey Zaghloul, the Minister of Public Instruction, nominated during the last year of the Cromer regime, and although he had shown much energy and foresight in his reforms, he had in no way won the esteem and gratitude of the students. His adviser, Mr. D. Dunlop, is not liked by them. His policy has been doubtless arbitrary and possibly lacking in tact. Whether the unpopularity of the Minister and his adviser are contributory causes it is hard to say, but the fact remains that the bulk of the up-growing generation, instead of being prepared by their education to become useful members of the community, were destined to swell the ranks of the anti-English section of the people, an anomalous result which was entirely satisfactory to Mustapha Kamel. The latter lost no opportunity of condemning the methods of Said Bey Zaghloul, but his criticisms of the Minister of Public Instruction were mild compared with his vehement and persistent attacks upon the latter's adviser, Mr. Dunlop. Perhaps the most notable of these attacks was in connection with the removal of Mr. Lambert, the French Director of the Khedivial School of Law, who had been replaced by an Englishman. The technicalities of the Lambert affair are too complex to be detailed here, but the Ministry appear to have been perfectly justified in their action. In Kamel's view, however, the dismissal was in the highest degree

unjust, and he attached to it an almost international importance. There were, consequently, student demonstrations, and meetings in the Esbekieh Gardens, where torrents of lurid abuse flowed unrestrained from callow lips; while a ready sale was found for the pamphlet entitled "Dunlop the Destroyer, or the Courageous Professor and his Tyrant Chief," (price 5 milliemes, or 1½d.).

The conclusion of the year 1907 was marked by an act of Khedivial clemency in regard to the Denishwai prisoners, which may or may not have been brought about by the many petitions framed on the subject. A decree was promulgated authorising the release the following month of two prisoners sentenced to penal servitude for life, and the release, after eighteen months, of seven who had been sentenced to imprisonment for periods varying from seven to fifteen years. This act of clemency on the part of the Khedive was fully approved by the British Government, who considered that it had sufficient guarantee that such act would be received in the same spirit in which it was bestowed, and not regarded as a sign of weakness. Naturally, however, it was not allowed to pass uncriticised by certain sections of the English and Egyptian Press, which regarded it as a partial and tardy reparation of a grievous wrong.

CHAPTER IV

THE WANING OF MUSTAPHA KAMEL'S INFLUENCE

Criticism of the Nationalist Party—Its Composition and Tenets—
Dissensions in the Nationalist Camp—Hafiz Bey Awad and
Sheikh Ali Youssef—Kamel in France Again—Open Letter to
Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman—Persistent Attacks upon the
Syrians—The “Letter of the Hundred Notables”—Kamel’s
Efforts to regain his Lost Prestige—Omar Bey Sultan.

THERE were other authorities besides Lord Cromer who believed that the Nationalist party, even at the beginning of the year 1907, was of little importance. According to the *Egyptian Gazette*, it had never passed the stage of mere verbiage, nor had it any claim to a corporate existence as a political party with a specific programme. *El Watan*—the leading Coptic organ—declared that the “party” only adopted the name “Nationalist” for want of a better, and that its motive power was not patriotism, but a blind hatred of the British Occupation. The same journal also declared that the party was actuated only by the pursuit of gain, and that its various leaders were only rivals in attempts to gain the favour and money of those who chose to believe in them or who hoped to attain certain ends by their means.

The main, ostensible principles of the party were the removal of all English and foreign power and the substitution of their own idea of government. It must be

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admitted that if the so-called Nationalist party in the early days of 1907 had not evolved a political programme, it wielded a very considerable power, for its leaders practically controlled the vernacular Press, most of them being journalists, solicitors, or discharged employees of the Government. The majority of its disciples were young men of the student class, though it had many supporters among the illiterate, and almost without exception it was confined to Mohammedans. Its efforts to induce the Copts to join in political agitation were entirely without result.

Mustapha Pasha Kamel attained and held his position as the chief of the leaders of the Nationalist party by virtue of his personality and the nature of Lord Cromer's policy. In the face of the common enemy—as the Mohammedan malcontents had come to regard the Consul-General—it was necessary to preserve a united front, and, therefore, the native Press maintained a semblance of cohesion, even though its editors and contributors were often almost as dissatisfied with one another as they were with the British yoke. This combined opposition brought Mustapha Pasha Kamel to the front as leader of the opposition, and maintained him in a position for which his powers as a demagogue, his knowledge of French, and his pleasant manners peculiarly fitted him. But as soon as Lord Cromer had departed, Kamel was no longer essential to his party, and his arrogance laid him open to the attacks of jealous rivals, who until then had been content to serve under his banner.

Thus was started a series of dissensions in the

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Nationalist camp, which waxed so violent that on-lookers were inclined to think that the whole movement would collapse. But, however premature and ill-organised Nationalism might be, there is no question that it was akin to the great awakening to racial consciousness which was making itself evident in other parts of the world. Such a movement could be crippled but not killed by internal dissensions.

The effect of this awakening in Egypt, the land of paradox, was to resolve the political growth into just as many parties as there were newspapers, or journalists able to run them. They all issued manifestoes, and when not occupied in vilifying their common enemies spent their energies in attacking each other with all the vituperation at their command.

So vague and fantastic were many of the claims of these various factions that it is almost impossible to follow them, but, apart from personal and racial animus and on broad lines, it may be taken that the political groupings resolved themselves into three sections :

1. Those who demanded the evacuation of the British from the Nile Valley unconditionally.

2. Those who were willing to wait for evacuation until the Egyptians should become capable of governing themselves, and could supply proof that political and commercial interests should not be injured by the departure of the English.

3. Those who desired to remain for ever under British tutelage.

For the most part the Mohammedans were to be found in the first and second of these sections, while

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the third was almost entirely confined to the Copts and Christian Syrians, who well knew what their fate would be if British protection were withdrawn from them.

Unfortunately, however vehemently these different parties struggled for ascendancy, and however much they protested the strength of their political beliefs, they rarely if ever succeeded in carrying conviction in circles beyond those of their immediate followers. Each mistrusted each, and each veered like a weather-vane if it thought any benefit likely to accrue from a change of view. Yet each of these parties and its organs was wielding an almost incredible influence among its followers. Public offices were really more like party clubs, where the rival merits of newspapers and political questions were hotly discussed, to the detriment of public duties. Accusations against English officials were hurled about broadcast, and none was too absurd to be believed; while encouragement for future exaggerations was found in the misplaced sympathy of certain politicians in England.

As we have already stated, Mustapha Pasha Kamel's predominating influence among the Nationalists began to wane after the departure of Lord Cromer. Early in the year 1907 we find others aspiring to equal greatness, and before its close there were at least half a dozen patriots publishing widely divergent propaganda. Then, too, his European journals—the *Egyptian Standard* and *L'Étendard Égyptien*—did not capture public favour either in England or in Egypt. In spite of his boastings of the support of the Notables of Egypt, funds came in slowly; many of his whilom friends in

England had already transferred their support of his Extremist views to those of more moderate tendency, and in January, 1907, he was reduced to appealing to the English public through the medium of the *Times* in order to advertise his policy of independence and to exploit the fact that he was forming a company to run his new journalistic enterprises. While in England he had procured the services of various journalists, and the promise of contributions from certain well-known people, both English and French; but after the first few issues of the joint *Egyptian Standard* and *L'Étendard Égyptien* he proceeded to dispense with his European staff, with more or less contumely, and replace them with members of his own family.

One of the special victims of the jealous rage which Kamel sometimes displayed was Hafiz Bey Awad, editor of *El Minbar*, who had supplanted Kamel in the favour of English sympathisers, and who had acted as guide to Mr. J. M. Robertson during the latter's tour of Egypt. Jealous of any encroachment on the prerogatives of their director, the *Egyptian Standard* assailed the afore-mentioned Hafiz Bey Awad in unmeasured terms, accusing him of inconsistency and self-seeking, and of falsely claiming to be the originator of his programme and representative or delegate of the National movement. "That he should go to London," said the *Standard*, "and seek notoriety is a right we cannot deny him. But that he should do so at the expense of other people, and by palming off other people's ideas as his own, is a questionable procedure." Hafiz Awad was not the only Egyptian who had been

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received with signal honour during his visit to London, for Sheikh Ali Youssef had also been there, and was a welcome guest at the Mansion House and other places ; so that Kamel had some reason for his bitterness. Still more intolerable to him was the loss of the goodwill of both the Egyptian Parliamentary Committee of the House of Commons and of the Aborigines' Protection Society, both of which preferred to support the principles of the Moderates to those of the Extremist party.

Out of favour in England, Kamel endeavoured to beat up sympathy in France, the country which had treated him with so much indulgence in his early youth. In the *Figaro* of May 8th, and in the name of his party he published the following formal programme of demands :—

1. Formation of an acting Ministry composed of good elements and never fearing to point out to the English Agent the mistakes of his policy.

2. The limitation of the rôle taken by the English Councillors, that is to say, to express opinions and advice, but not to give orders that destroy all the powers of the Ministers.

3. The creation of a Parliament dealing with matters of public education, justice, and the administration of the country, to which the Ministers shall be responsible.

4. A radical change in the system now followed by the Ministry of Public Education (including the development of higher education, the creation of new schools, the restoration of the Arabic language in education, which has been suppressed in favour of English); the re-establishment of the gratuitous system abolished by Lord Cromer, as well as the missions in Europe, and the formation of professional schools.

5. The gradual replacing of foreign officials by capable

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Egyptians, so that Egypt may be really governed by her own children.

6. Reform of the Capitulations, not by mutilating them, as Lord Cromer proposes, but by granting to the Mixed Tribunals the right of judging offences and crimes committed by foreigners, and giving the Mixed Court the power to a certain degree of changing the regulations and laws governing Europeans.

Some months later, and while still in France, Mustapha Pasha Kamel published, also in the *Figaro*, an open letter addressed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman on the occasion of the double anniversary of that day (September 14th) which had seen the evacuation of the British troops a hundred years previously and their return seventy-five years later. In this letter he demanded the redemption of the promises made by the Government of Queen Victoria for the liberty and independence of Egypt.

But France was tired of Kamel's vapourings, and was of no mind to risk the *entente cordiale* by injudicious sympathy with the patriot; and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman ignored the letter. Only one or two of the English papers gave it even a cursory mention, and all this treatment was as gall and wormwood to the disappointed demagogue.

Meanwhile, *El Lewa* and its European sister sheets continued their mischievous crusade, a notable feature of which was the persistent attacks upon the Syrians. Then there was the "Letter of the Hundred Notables," which enjoined readers not to "read patriotism except in your own papers. Do not buy goods except from your brothers, even if their goods are bad and dear.

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Make religion the basis of your children's education. Be kind and merciful to every foreigner in your country. Be strong and determined before any current tending to swallow your interests and humiliate you. Remember God's warning that 'He does not regenerate men unless they regenerate themselves.' " Besides this conglomeration of good advice, bad advice, and mixed metaphor, there was a petition to the Khedive praying for the release of more of the Denishwai prisoners. Then there was a truly Mustapha touch when, in regard to the horrible mortality from plague in Upper Egypt, *El Lewa* implored the Government to intervene "unless, of course, it is the Government's wish gradually to eradicate the native-born inhabitants from Egyptian soil, employing the praiseworthy methods employed by Anglo-Americans with the Red Indians of the United States." Inquiries eliciting the fact that the "native-born inhabitants" who had fallen victims to the scourge were cattle, the appeal fell flat.

Further agitations were set on foot on Kamel's return to his native country. Seditious circulars were distributed broadcast in the public schools, calling upon every student to register his name on the lists of the Nationalist party, and scarcely a day was allowed to pass without some outrageous act of British brutality being recorded in the columns of the patriot's specious organs. He claimed for his journals that they "have revealed to Europe, and to England in particular, the true situation of Egypt and the sentiments of the Egyptian people. Through their means, England and Europe, hitherto deceived by the lies of the Imperial

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Press, are no longer able to ignore the claims of the great people which throughout the entire Nile Valley demands loudly its liberty and independence. . . .” This burst of grandiose eloquence is fairly representative of the tactics of the subtle Egyptian, who never failed to reach the hearts of his own followers by the bitterness of his invectives against others and the honey-sweet of his flattery to themselves.

After his futile mission to France, and with the bitter consciousness of having lost favour in England and having been practically disowned by the Khedive, Mustapha determined to make one last effort to establish himself as undisputed leader of a united Nationalist party. With this end in view, in the autumn, shortly after his return to Egypt, he engineered a monster gathering at the Zizania Theatre, Alexandria, at which he made an impassioned appearance as the deliverer of his countrymen. For an hour and a half he continued his oration, with unabated ardour and fervent gesture, and that in spite of the fact that the enthusiasm which had greeted his appearance melted into indifference before his final words were uttered.

He dwelt, of course, upon the Denishwai miscarriage of justice, Lord Cromer’s intolerable policy, and the misdeeds of the Ministry of Education. He insinuated that the Khedive belonged to that class of persons who sacrifice their dignity to their pleasures, and put up with endless insults which render them contemptible alike in the eyes of their friends and of their foes. He alluded indirectly to the Syrians and their treacherous return for the hospitality extended to them. He dwelt

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upon religion and the vital necessity for religious education; and above all he urged upon his audience the necessity for rallying round him as the leader of that independence which was Egypt's heritage.

The following day the columns of the vernacular Press were filled with torrents of hostile criticism of this speech, which was characterised as mere rodomontade, falsehood and recrimination, and which could only delay the making of any experiment in the way of self-government. Its aim was denounced as an attempt to rouse the passions of the ignorant, and its feverish declamations and highfalutin rhetoric as being unconvincing. The issues were clouded by personal ambitions: the National aims were made subservient to the fact that the orator himself must represent them. In fact, there was scarcely a paper beyond his own organs that did not devote itself to the purpose of exposing the hollowness of Kamel's pretensions, and the futility of the demands and aspirations embodied in the following programme, which was published in the name of his party a few days later:

1. The autonomy of Egypt (or her internal independence) as established in 1840 by the Treaty of London, and guaranteed by Imperial ^{the}firmans. (This autonomy guarantees the throne of Egypt to the descendants of Mohammed Ali and the internal independence of the country; it comprises all the countries given to Egypt by the Imperial firmans.) This autonomy England has officially promised to respect.

2. The institution of representative government so that a governing authority may be responsible to a Parliament possessing authority like that of European parliaments.

3. The respect of treaties and financial conventions which

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bind the Egyptian Government to pay its debts and to accept a financial control like the Anglo-French condominium, so long as Egypt remains the debtor of Europe, and Europe demands this control.

4. The outspoken criticism of all ill courses and actions, the recognition and encouragement of the good, and the demonstration to the Government of the interests of the nation, of its desires and the reforms of which it stands in need.

5. The furtherance and spreading of education throughout the entire country on a strongly national basis, so that the poor may have the largest share; war against errors and stupidities; the propagation of sound religious principles which inoculate progress; and the incitement of the rich and influential to aid education by founding universities, by sending missions to Europe, and by creating night schools for the working classes.

6. The development of agriculture, industry, commerce, and all the branches of social life, in order to enable the nation to win scientific and economic independence.

7. The enlightenment of the minds of the Egyptians regarding the present situation, the propagation of the national spirit, the inculcation of union and harmony between the two elements of the nation, the Mussulmans and the Copts, the indication of the duties incumbent on all towards their country, and the accomplishment of these duties while taking care to assure peace and security in every nook and corner of Egypt.

8. The encouragement and assistance of every useful project, and the amelioration of the sanitary conditions now prevailing, so that the inhabitants may increase in numbers, and in that manner augment the strength of the nation.

9. The development of the bonds of union and friendship between Egyptians and all the foreign colonists, the effacement of all misunderstanding, and the judgment of foreign criminals by the Mixed Courts.

10. The strengthening of the ties of friendship and attachment between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, the development of the relations of friendship and confidence between Egypt and the European Powers, the refutation of all accusations framed against Egypt, and the winning over to the national cause of partisans everywhere, so that they may constitute a superior moral force, helping the nation to gain recognition by others of its legitimate rights, and to foil the attempts made against its interests to hide the truth.

Not content with this programme, Mustapha Kamel was again to the fore at a mass meeting towards the close of the year when, among other things, the rival merits of other parties were disposed of :

“ We can affirm loudly that the whole nation considers our party as that of devotedness, sincerity, outspokenness and dignity, and that every other party is founded merely to thwart and divide the Egyptians while borrowing of its ideas. . . . This is the first and greatest and loftiest patriotic demonstration made by a large number of Egyptian patriots who have assembled to proclaim to the entire world : ‘ We are the Party of Hope, Party of the Fatherland, Party of Independence. . . . ’ ”

At the same time was discussed the formation of a political club, which was, of course, to overshadow the League lately formed by the National Reformers. And here for the moment we must leave the voluble patriot, framing statutes and collecting fees, assisted by his devoted admirers, chief among whom was Omar Bey Sultan, an eminent authority on finance, who was as well versed in the fashionable life of Cairo, and an ornament to any society in which he might mix.

CHAPTER V

THE MODERATE REFORMERS

Hafiz Bey Awad—His Political Attitude—Petition to Sir Edward Grey—Sir Edward's Answer—Sheikh Ali Youssef—The Enmity between him and Mustapha Pasha Kamel—The Sheikh's Suggestion for a Political Club—Mustapha comes forward with a Counter Proposal—The Constitutional Reform League established—Its Programme—The Party of the People—Death of its Leader, Hassan Abdul Razik Pasha—Its Initial Policy and Early Transformation—The Egyptian Liberal Party—Mohammed Bey Wahid, its Leader—His Telegram to Mustapha—The Republican Nationalists.

WE must now turn our attention to the five reform parties of Moderate tendency. These parties embraced the bulk of Egyptian reformers, and their objects were not the violent overthrowing of the British control, but the gradual and statesmanlike development of internal self-government on lines suitable to the needs of a semi-Oriental people. They recognised the splendid services rendered by Lord Cromer in fostering the development of the material resources of Egypt and the consequent improvement of the social condition of the people, but they claimed that the time had arrived for bolder advance in the direction of self-government.

Mention has been made already of the attentions paid to both Hafiz Bey Awad and Sheikh Ali Youssef in 1907 by the English supporters of the national movement, and the welcome that was extended to them during their visits to London in the summer of that

year. Perhaps the ready sympathy and confidence which were offered to these astute editors were the cause of a modification in their former views; at any rate, the fact remains that, subsequently, the first was likened to the chameleon which changes its colour to suit its surroundings, and the second was dubbed a political trimmer destitute of fixed principles.

Speaking of Hafiz Bey Awad, the *Daily Chronicle* described him as another mere aspirant to notoriety and the tool of Sheikh Ali Youssef; but *El Watan*, more candid in its criticism, accused the Bey of revelling in revolutionary articles and poems in order to continue agitation in the name of Denishwai. It charged him also with objecting to all sorts of genuine reform on the score of religious fidelity, and denounced him as one of the most violent agitators in the cause of immediate evacuation, absolute independence, and up-to-date parliamentary institutions. If the indictment were justified, then Hafiz Bey Awad must have possessed, among his many undoubted talents, more than his share of native cunning. He claimed that his party represented the most substantial and responsible element in the population, and that its policy was all for an harmonious working with the British authorities, for the development of the institutions sanctioned by Lord Dufferin in 1882-3. Although wishing to work hand in hand with England for the immediate present, the Bey held the opinion that, unless a considerable number of his demands were immediately satisfied, his party might find it incumbent to throw in its lot with the Extremists.

In an interview published in the *Daily Dispatch*, he

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made further expression of his views, declaring Egypt to be capable of pursuing a particular course of development and incapable of being induced to follow any other. He was of the opinion that the leaders of the Nationalist movement were men worthy of representing their countrymen, and that they enjoyed the latter's confidence, the only dissenters being certain Syrians, whom he characterised as mere mercenaries in the English cause, having little interest in the welfare and future of Egypt. He also declared that there was not a single Egyptian who wished to see Turkish authority re-established in Egypt—a sentiment which was taken as a bold declaration of independence and treason to the Sultan. A result was that *El Moayad* was prohibited in Syria as being calculated to undermine the authority of Turkey in Egypt.

For the programme of Hafiz Awad's party we must refer to the petition forwarded by him to Sir Edward Grey in August. The following are some of the proposals contained in it :

1. Free and compulsory education in the kuttabs and primary schools.
2. Arabic to be the medium of instruction in all schools.
3. The creation of a constitution under which the Legislative Council should have increased jurisdiction as far as concerns Egyptian interests.
4. Government officials of European nationality to be gradually replaced by Egyptians.
5. Criminal jurisdiction of the Consular Courts to be transferred to Mixed Courts.

The petition also contained as subsidiary points demands for the release of the Denishwai prisoners, a

municipal government for Cairo, and a readjustment of the methods of electing the village omdehs.

The answer to the petition may be found in Sir Edward Grey's declarations at the meeting of the Parliamentary Egyptian Committee, in which he stated that Egypt would not be granted self-government until there was evidence that Egyptians could be trusted to administer the affairs of the country with wisdom, justice, and impartiality ; that a thorough general education through the medium of Arabic was impossible ; and that preference would be given to Egyptians in the nomination to such posts as they were capable of filling.

Sheikh Ali Youssef, the editor of *El Moayad*, though said to be destitute of fixed principles, was a man of vigorous ability and an opponent not to be despised. He and Mustapha Pasha Kamel had long been enemies, not only on political grounds, but also on account of his marriage, which had called forth vehement insults from Kamel. Against these onslaughts the Sheikh had protested, not only in his own name, but also in that of his party, and thenceforward the breach between the two was ever widening, till at length Sheikh Ali Youssef demanded that legal proceedings should be instituted in order to stop the fanatical fury of Kamel and his clique.

We have no longer any need henceforth to enter into discussion with this deluded fellow, who has been made blind and deaf owing to folly and lack of reflection. He is no longer capable of understanding, and can only regard himself. In madhouses there are numbers of fools and lunatics of the same kind that we are now dealing with.

To Sheikh Ali Youssef must be given the credit of

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being the first to suggest the formation of a political club, a scheme which was promptly imitated by Mustapha Kamel. The Sheikh, enjoying the patronage of H.H. the Khedive, was able to reckon among his supporters many of the princes and notables of Egypt, and henceforward the Constitutional Reform League figures largely in the history of the day. Its chief premises were situated in one of the best European quarters, and other branches were to be formed for the provinces. The League was under the control of a general committee and an administrative council. It had no aims of startling novelty, and its demands were couched in language of scrupulous moderation. It protected itself from a possible charge of promoting Panislamic propaganda by excluding all religious topics from discussion, except so far as the management of religious institutions was concerned, and in spite of the warnings of the Copt papers that this apparent evidence of moderation was mere show, and that the Sheikh was one of the most uncompromising of Panislamists, the League seemed to merit encouragement.

The Constitutional Reformers' programme differed little from the others, but, as it is necessary that the early principles of the various parties should be known in view of a proper appreciation of their later developments, it is as well to reproduce the programme in detail. Here, then, are the demands of the Reformers :

1. Maintenance of the Khedivial authority as guaranteed by the firmans conferring upon Egypt administrative independence.
2. Reliance upon the pledges given and declarations made

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by Great Britain at the time of the Occupation, and a claim for their fulfilment.

3. A demand for representative institutions invested with full political and administrative powers in so far as Egyptians and Egyptian interests are alone concerned.

4. Primary education to be general and gratuitous.

5. Arabic to be the medium of instruction in all Egyptian Government schools.

6. Posts in the Egyptian Government to be given to natives, according to their capacity and merit, with the object of diminishing as far as possible the number of foreigners in the service of the Government, and thus enabling the Egyptians to learn to govern themselves.

7. Extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts, which already try civil, commercial, and petty offences, to criminal cases in which foreigners are concerned, until such period as it may be possible to inaugurate unity of jurisdiction and thus affirm the great principle of justice for all who inhabit the same country, namely, "Equality before the law."

Towards the autumn of 1907 there appeared even another political party, so moderate in its opinions at first, and so cautious in its workings, that its actions were scarcely noticeable. The leader of this Party of the People was Hassan Abdul Razik Pasha, who died before the end of the year. He was a member of the Legislative Council, and an excellent example of the most intelligent type of Egyptian. Many members of the Legislative Council and the General Assembly and Government officials were in the ranks of this party, and they expressed their desire for progress in the direction of self-government in a formal programme, and published a paper, *El Garida*, for the furtherance of their aims. They acknowledged the material progress

achieved in Egypt during the past twenty-five years, but lamented the fact that throughout that time there had been little attempt to reform the educational and political systems, and declared that the representatives of the nation were not given privileges consistent with Egypt's improved social condition. Pending the granting of autonomy in accordance with the negotiations between Britain and Turkey in 1887, they aimed at making elementary education general, obligatory, and free, promoting higher education and persuading the Government to acknowledge the natural rights of the people by extending the jurisdiction of the Provincial Councils, Legislative Councils, and General Assembly in such a way as to produce an effectual co-operation of the representatives of the people and the Government in public matters in order that autonomy might ultimately be attained.

So far the programme of the Party of the People ran on lines similar to those of the other Moderate factions, and even *El Watan* claimed many of them as being identical with those preached in its columns for many years. No sooner, however, was *El Garida* congratulated on its policy, which was declared to embody the chief aims of the journals of all the other reforming parties, than it published an indignant denial of agreement with any of those other papers, and issued a manifesto containing a declaration of rights, after the manner of the French Revolutionary epoch, enunciating the absolute independence of Egypt then and there and without any reference to the limitations of either *firmands* or conventions.

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Another section of reformers was to be found in the Egyptian Liberal Party, which had for its leader Mohammed Bey Wahid, and for its mouthpiece *El Mokattam*. Among the supporters of this party were a few enlightened Mohammedans, practically the whole of the Copt community, and the majority of the Syrians and residents of foreign descent. Its main principles were the support of the present system of government in its policy of reform and justice, and opposition to the violent antagonism aroused against it by the Nationalist Press. As might be expected, this party had many opportunities of exposing the fallacies of its contemporaries and of protesting its satisfaction with the existing regime. Mohammed Wahid's farewell to Lord Cromer has already been mentioned; his welcome to Sir Eldon Gorst was not less expressive of the attitude of the Liberals; while in his open letter to Sir Edward Grey in September he paid a flattering tribute to the benefits conferred by the British Occupation, and declared that although the aspirations of his party were for the gradual cultivation of the blessings of self-government they were not incompatible with the motives which had inspired, and it was hoped would continue to inspire, the party's policy.

The salient features of the programme of the Egyptian Liberal Party, as detailed by Mohammed Wahid in this same letter, were :

1. The maintenance of friendly terms with the British Government and with foreigners resident in Egypt.
2. The education of the people for the adoption of the methods of European civilisation.

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Needless to add, the attitude of Mohammed Bey Wahid and his followers, coupled with the energetic campaign of their paper in disclosing the hypocrisy, sedition, and misdeeds of their opponents, led to a very wordy warfare, especially on the part of Mustapha Pasha Kamel. At the moment when the latter was preparing to harangue his audience at the Zizania Theatre, he received a telegram from Wahid couched in the following terms :

In the name of the beloved Fatherland and of the holy faith which you make use of in order to spread abroad falsehood and confusion, and which are witnesses against your vileness ; in the name of freedom and uprightness, whereby you are unmasked and shown to the world in true colours, I herewith accuse you, at the very time when you would display your cunning and your rascality, of being simply a vile impostor. All those in Egypt who are men of understanding hold you to be a blemish and creature of ill omen for this land. They know that you are a traitor to your country, an enemy to your fellow countrymen, urged on by evil, paid to praise the methods of slavery, despotism, decadence and worse ills, which you cloak beneath the names of freedom and faith. You and your lies are only believed in by the crawlers, the fools, and men who have lost their posts, and by those whose baseness is notorious. May God fight you ! He will show to all Egyptians the right road to peace whereby they will be able to gain the trust of the reformers, which is the sole and lasting good of Egypt.

Naturally, Mustapha Pasha Kamel was not averse to taking up the challenge. Mohammed Wahid was accused of having been sold to the English, "masters in the art of trafficking in consciences and making use of such merchandise." The leader of the Liberal Party

was invited to make public display of the numerical strength of his followers in comparison with the army of 4,000 who met to welcome Kamel, etc.

To English ears, accustomed to the dignified traditions and impersonal tone of our Press, Mohammed Bey Wahid's invective and personal vituperation is not only abhorrent, but it also seems hysterical and out of place ; yet such abusive attacks are common to all parties among native Egyptian politicians. It is, nevertheless, satisfactory to find that there was at least one section of the community which was loyal to and appreciative of British control.

Before concluding this list of political parties in existence towards the end of 1907, mention must be made of the Republican Nationalists, which, as a separate body, came into existence at the close of the year. It issued a manifesto declaring the reason for its existence to be the education of the people in republican principles lest, at the conclusion of the Occupation, the country should relapse into a condition similar to that of the Mameluke period. In succeeding chapters we shall have to make further mention of its clear and trenchant programme, and of its leader, Mohammed Ghanem.

PART III—1908

CHAPTER I

DEATH OF MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMEL

Peaceful Prospects for 1908 — Release of remaining Denishwai Prisoners—Dr. Rutherford, M.P., in Egypt—Mr. Brailsford's Visit —The Legislative Council Election—Apathy of the Electors—Successful Candidates unseated—Death of Mustapha—Impressive Scenes of Public Mourning—His Successor: Mohammed Bey Farid—Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish.

THE year 1908 opened with so fair a political prospect that few, indeed, could have foreseen the troubles which overshadowed its close. Sir Eldon Gorst was undertaking a tour of inspection in the Sudan; while expressing his intention of following in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor, he was, nevertheless, forming impartial opinions. The release of the Denishwai prisoners had been effected without untoward excitement, if we may except the exultant claim of Mustapha Pasha Kamel that the release had been brought about by his own efforts. H.H. the Khedive celebrated the occasion by permitting another semi-official interview to appear in the columns of the *Daily Telegraph*. Therein he recorded the delight he felt at the return of Sir Eldon Gorst, and his appreciation of the sympathetic and enlightened interest which he took in the country. He also expressed his pride at the progress of Egypt, especially in the matter of

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education, and if critics among his own subjects found reason for complaint in his reference to the section of Young Egyptians who were seeking self-advertisement rather than improvement of the country, they were partially appeased by his concluding remarks as to the subsidence of agitation and the absence of fanaticism in the country.

The Moderates, meanwhile, were happy in the presence of two of their English sympathisers—Dr. Rutherford, M.P., and Mr. Brailsford, of the *Daily News*, both of whom were bent upon studying the Egyptian Question on the spot. Not only did the former devote considerable attention to the affairs of the Constitutional Reform League, but he also had interviews with many of the Ministers and English advisers and officials, the only section of the community which did not respond to his extreme graciousness and goodwill being that under the presidency of Mustapha Kamel, who refrained from mentioning the English politician's name in his organs.

The Constitutional Reform League entertained Dr. Rutherford at a magnificent banquet at the Savoy Hotel, at which loyal toasts were drunk, complimentary speeches made, containing allusions to the rise of the new civic and national spirit, and the duties of England in Egypt, etc.—all of which was entirely gratifying.

The result of Mr. Brailsford's visit was embodied in an article published in the *Albany Review* after the production of Lord Cromer's book, "Modern Egypt." In it he theorised on the subject of the growth of a national spirit in a people practically uneducated, and

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the present unfitness of Egypt for parliamentary institutions, owing not only to their want of the necessary mental endowment, but also to the many faults and weaknesses of the British control and our failure to understand or sympathise with the people we were there to educate. The article was obviously the work of one who possessed an insufficient knowledge of his subject, and while the good faith of the writer cannot be questioned, it must be declared that such inexpert treatment of matters of grave importance is often productive of unfortunate results.

Meanwhile, Mr. Robertson, the champion of the Nationalist cause, was moving amendments in the House of Commons and demanding fresh extensions of the representative institutions already existing in Egypt, so as to develop "gradually and prudently the capacity for self-government." These demands the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was in no way inclined to grant, and his attitude was in no way disturbed by an urgent telegram which he received from the Egyptian Nationalist party, stoutly maintaining that their country was as ripe for self-government as many European States. This message failed to convince Sir Edward Grey that it would be wise to apply the principles of self-government to a people who, he declared, neither by education nor training had yet had any opportunities of acquiring the qualities which would enable them to make right use of them.

During the first month of the year the elections for the Legislative Council took place, and to well-balanced minds they afforded salutary proof that the

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majority of the people were far from understanding the value of representative institutions.

In his Report (published in May) Sir Eldon Gorst shows how an analysis of these elections reveals the indifference displayed by the bulk of the voters, and he mentions also the extraordinary methods used to gain votes. In Cairo, although there were 34,000 electors on the register, only some 1,500 voted, and only twelve delegates took part in the second stage of the election for the thirteen districts, for in one district no electors put in an appearance. Reports from the provinces showed that no real interest was taken by the fellaheen in the election of its delegates. In some cases the omdehs had to bring in the electors by force and practically tell them how to vote, and many declared their dissatisfaction at not being paid for their trouble.

As might be expected, the Party of the People was fully represented in the new Legislative Council. It counted among its members many of the better educated and more thoughtful men of the country, who had already been in office, and its original programme contained many of the tenets of the late Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, the most single-hearted patriot of his generation, who was much respected by Lord Cromer. The organ of the Party of the People, *El Garida*, had been conducted in straightforward fashion until Lord Cromer's departure, when, with common native inconsistency, it veered round and angled for the support of the public by attacks both on the late Consul-General and the British Occupation, and severe criticisms of certain high officials. This change of view led to various

dissensions and schisms in the party, and to the secession from its ranks of many of the pashas and notables who had been among its founders. Curiously enough, some of these seceders were among those who clamoured, later, for a constitution on republican or democratic lines, while others took refuge among the Constitutional Reformers, whose programme had so many points in common with that which the Party of the People had now practically discarded, that it was surprising that the two parties had not already coalesced.*

Sheikh Ali Youssef, leader of the Constitutional Reformers, and *persona grata* with the English Radicals and the Parliamentary Egyptian Committee, was among those who were elected to the Legislative Council. Greatly to his chagrin and the disappointment both of his party and his English sympathisers, his election was petitioned against and annulled by the Cairo Court of Appeal, not only on counts of personal import, and the fact of his not having paid the obligatory minimum in taxes on his Cairo properties, but also because of the publication of a work entitled "El Mesamir," of which both letterpress and illustrations were adjudged as being injurious to the interests of the public.

Sheikh Ali Youssef was not the only unlucky one of his party, the other sufferers being found chiefly among those of his followers who were actively antagonistic to the Party of the People in spite of the simi-

* According to the principles it avowed a few weeks after the elections, the Party of the People was not clamouring for immediate evacuation, nor did it ask England to grant full parliamentary institutions at once, though it looked forward to a day when complete autonomy should be bestowed on the country by a slow and sure policy.

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larity of programmes. Mustapha Pasha Maher, Mudir of Dakahlia—who was regarded by Dr. Rutherford as one of those efficient Egyptians whose existence entitled the country to self-government—was, indeed, proved to have permitted only 40 out of 300 voters to record their votes.

Never a man of robust constitution, the health of Mustapha Pasha Kamel had already given rise to anxiety among his friends and relations, and early in 1908 he was obliged to refrain from active work and retire to Zeitoun for a rest cure. Unfortunately, the cure was unable to stay the progress of the disease from which he had long been suffering, but nevertheless it was not thought that the reformer's end was so near. On February 10th the news of his sudden and unexpected death ran like wildfire through the country.

Never was there such a spontaneous and universal demonstration of grief, for, whatever the main motive for his political attitude, there is no doubt that he gained the affection of the Egyptian public as no other Egyptian patriot has done before or since. Huge crowds of mourners, among whom were many of his vigorous political opponents, collected in the neighbourhood of the offices of *El Lewa* to participate in the pathetic scenes of public mourning, while black despair raged in the hearts of his family and those of the students to whom he had ever appeared as the champion of liberty. His funeral the following day was one of the most impressive sights ever witnessed in Cairo in modern times.

Although never able to pose as a political martyr,

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for Lord Cromer had very wisely refused to take any legal action against his inflammatory and seditious writings, Mustapha Pasha Kamel had certainly won his way into the hearts of the Egyptian public, and had he lived he would undoubtedly have taken a leading part in the political life of the next few years. As it was, he was the life and soul of his party ; and though it would be difficult to attribute any really constructive policy to his initiative, his sudden death was an irreparable loss to the cause he had made his own.

Forty days after his death there was a second enormous procession to the cemetery, when wreaths and garlands of flowers were placed upon the grave, and emblems of mourning displayed throughout the city. Not unnaturally, this second demonstration of feeling lacked much of the spontaneity of the first, and there is no doubt that, even in those forty days, the memory of the national hero had begun to fade. Some of his followers might still bemoan the loss of their leader, some find cause for complaint at the apotheosis on the music-hall stage of their hero, crowned by angels and surrounded by a chorus of *houris* in classical costume ; but when it came to perpetuating his memory by a great national memorial which called for funds, the public interest waned and dwindled till even now it awaits consummation.

The new leader of the Extremists, appointed at a general meeting within a fortnight of Mustapha Kamel's death, was Mohammed Bey Farid, who had formerly held official position in the Parquet. The son of a wise and much-respected man who had faithfully served

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his country in an official capacity, Farid was a man of modern ideas and education, and fairly prosperous in this world's goods. His training as an advocate and facility in oratory were counterbalanced by his comparative lack of that magnetism and determination which distinguished his predecessor, and those other characteristics which go to make a popular leader of men. With him were associated Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, Mustapha's brother, a man who had already made his mark in the military world, but who had not yet demonstrated his aptitude for politics; and Ahmed Bey Loutfy, a man of moderate opinions and common sense, a barrister with a fair practice and an orator of some persuasive quality, who had great influence with the Higher Schools Club. In none of these, however, burned the sacred fire which animated Kamel and enabled him to sway the impulses of multitudes.

There was one, however, among those associated with Farid, who quickly took a prominent position in the Nationalist Party. Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, by the fury of his political fervour and the violence of his methods, soon became the most popular and influential of Farid's lieutenants.

Tunisian by birth, though claiming French nationality, he had spent several years in England, where he had occupied the chair of Professor of Arabic at the University of Oxford, and where he might have been supposed to have imbibed some appreciation of English thought and culture. In Egypt he had held high office in the Ministry of Public Instruction, and had every claim to be considered a good specimen

of the modern, educated Egyptian, although not actually a native of the country. But the one practical result of his training, to judge from his freely expressed opinions, was a thorough detestation, not only of the English and the English Occupation, but also of the non-Moslem and, in fact, anybody who crossed his path.

Among his earliest contributions to *El Lewa* was a diatribe against the English, who, he declared, had "no history worth reading, no ideas worthy study, no philosophy deserving consideration except the systems of Darwin and Spencer, the former of which had no respect for the human race, while the latter dealt only with material benefits."

His bitterness and wealth of invective, his unreasoning fanaticism, his overwhelming egoism, and his malignant perversion and disregard of truth, made him indeed an incredibly venomous opponent; and though at times he overreached himself in his efforts to rouse the fury of his followers, he was always certain of a hearing among the more irresponsible members of his party. Eventually he succeeded in alienating the sympathies of all the more thoughtful sections of the community; and to Shawish equally with Farid must be attributed most of the later follies and futilities of the Extremist group.

Henceforward we see the rift between the Extremists and the Moderates growing ever wider and wider, the only organs keeping within measurable distance of *El Lewa* being *El Dustoor* and the *Phare d'Alexandre*.

Mustapha Pasha Kamel having died in debt, and his vernacular paper, *El Lewa*, being in financial distress,

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in spite of its enormous circulation and the support of the wealthy native classes, it was determined to turn its management into a limited company—independent of its two European editions—the shares in which should be allotted to the various creditors. Mohammed Bey Farid, who, as has been said, was a wealthy man, had already refused the honorarium attached to the post of director of the paper, and on the formation of the new company the post of president of the superior administrative board was vested in the person of Ali Fehmi Kamel, in whose name the company was registered. The fortunes of the *Standard* were likewise on a downward grade, in spite of its concentrated Anglo-phobia and continuous anathemas against the Occupation. Without any reference to the unfortunate subscribers, the daily issue was withdrawn, and it was transformed into an ineffective weekly journal of little influence and less merit.

In the *Oriental Review* of March, 1908, a section of Nationalists advocated the necessity of restoring the Khedivial authority before agitating further for parliamentary powers, and the editor supported the suggestion by declaring the necessity of having first as Khedive a man who would resist every encroachment, by Britain or any other Power, upon his independence, identify his own interests with those of his countrymen, and call upon the best men in the country to assist him in the work of government. Thus only, said the editor, could the Egyptians hope to have self-government—"a government which would both elevate and strengthen them."

CHAPTER II

SIR ELDON GORST'S FIRST REPORT

"Modern Egypt"—Its Effect upon the Extremists—Dissensions among the Nationalists—Mohammed Bey Wahid in Trouble—Mohammed Bey Farid's first Great Speech as Leader of the Extremists—Sir Eldon Gorst's Report—His Scheme for the Provincial Councils—Fanous Bey's Criticisms—The Attitude of the Copts—*El Watan's* Views of England's Magnanimity.

THE publication of Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt" roused the Nationalists to fury. Not only did its financial success call forth torrents of abuse, but its contents were deliberately used as instruments for exciting further animosity against the English, certain isolated passages being cited as insulting to the faith of Islam and impugning the nation's capacity for self-government. Unable, or unwilling, to appreciate the depth of reasoning and the broad outlook, they hurled insult upon insult at "the titled slanderer and murderer of Egypt." Lord Cromer's attitude in regard to the Denishwai affair produced the following examples of Nationalist eloquence :

Stop ! indignantly exclaim Sir Edward Grey and Lord Cromer, as with hands still stained with the blood of Denishwai murders, and themselves as fully entitled to capital punishment as any individual murderer, they pocket their blood-money. . . .

Under the regime of Cromer, the Egyptian fellah has been reduced to abject poverty and murdered for defending his home against the attacks of British officers who have

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deprived him of his food and murdered his wife and himself out of their love of sport.

Which seems to suggest that the fellah is as plentifully endowed with lives as the proverbial cat.

A regrettable result of the strong feelings aroused by the publication of Lord Cromer's book was the refusal of the native officials of Alexandria to sign the testimonial to Sir William Garstin on his retirement, owing to the statement in the document that the "moral advancement" in Egypt was due partly to his work. This refusal was thought to be based either on the assumption that it was not possible for an Englishman to promote the moral advancement of Egypt, or in consequence of Lord Cromer's pessimistic theories regarding the morality of the country.

El Lewa devoted no fewer than five columns to the criticism of "Modern Egypt," and, among other things, Lord Cromer was stigmatised as a tyrant, thief, liar, malefactor, and an enemy to truth and justice :

He acted like a fanatic here, and showed the whole world that he was lower than the common Egyptian in moral accomplishments. . . . His agitated mind and ridiculous reasoning have made the position of his country perilous in Egypt. He will only awaken by his diabolical writings on Egypt a keener sense of duty in our nation. Our nation is now strong and united, endowed with rare intelligence, and proud of a glorious history. Let the irrational Lord say again what he thinks of us. He will only serve our purpose and teach us how to act and succeed. . . .

The grandiloquence of these Extremist attacks, which laid them open to the ridicule of sensible people, was appreciated by the youthful and by the ignorant.

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The bombastic utterances fired the imagination of the young students, who, finding that "hard words break no bones," gave themselves up to the delirious pastime of ignoring regulations and defying discipline.

When not actively in combination against some alleged injustice on the part of the loathed Occupation, there were plenty of intestine questions to be wrangled over; and, if truth be told, the Extremists were not the only party to indulge in petty spite when opportunity afforded. Thus there was something approaching a personal feud between Mohammed Bey Ghanem, leader of the Republicans, and Mohammed Bey Wahid, leader of the Liberals, because their programmes were so closely allied that it was difficult to tell one from the other. This, too, was not very long after a rumour was abroad that Mohammed Ghanem had become Wahid's paid secretary and editor of the new Liberal organ, and that his place in the Republican Party had been filled by an ex-Liberal. Wahid Bey was also at daggers drawn with one Saleh Bey Chaker, a journalist on the staff of *El Garida*, whom he was said to have beaten with sticks and bitten—for which assault, in spite of Wahid's strenuous and public denials, he was haled off to the Esbekieh Summary Court.

Mohammed Bey Wahid was in almost everybody's bad books at this time, and among his various troubles Sheikh Ali Youssef had found grounds for an action for libel against him. Indeed, so busy was the Liberal leader, endeavouring to alleviate his personal worries, that he had little time to give to the interests of his party.

El Lewa distinguished itself by finding a fresh

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grievance in the fact that certain Ministers were guilty of leaving visiting cards printed in English after the inauguration of industrial schools in the Fayoum. Sir Eldon Gorst, however, had written his name in Arabic, from which fact *El Lewa* deduced that this Gorst might not be fanatical English after all.

Farid Bey was responsible for a manifesto on the rumoured abolition of English advisers, which he declared, if true, not to be of any great significance as long as the country is supported by the English garrison and the British Agent supports his advice "by bayonets and guns":

Therefore we are not deceived by such news, which, if true, cannot be considered as a victory or triumph so long as the goal lies before us: the goal which we endeavour to attain, and in attaining which we consider the greatest sacrifices as insignificant: the goal which we will one day attain by the evacuation of the British troops from the whole of the Nile Valley from the Equator to the Mediterranean, and the acquisition of a House of Representatives with powers like those enjoyed by such institutions in independent civilised countries, in which the supreme legislative authority is invested.

There were rumours, also, that not only were the English advisers to be removed, but that Sir Eldon Gorst was to be moved on to the Porte so as to make place for Lord Milner: a rumour which, when discovered to be without foundation, added rather to the general gloom, which from time to time had been lightened by unfounded expectations of a speedy evacuation. But when the anniversary of Lord Cromer's resignation passed, and the nation at length began to

realise that the British Government had no intention of changing the fundamentals of its policy in Egypt, no story was too incredible to be given currency in the Press in order to make the task of the Government more difficult.

It was shortly after this first anniversary of Lord Cromer's resignation that Mohammed Bey Farid uttered his first great political oration in Cairo, which, though lacking the turgid eloquence of his predecessor, had more substance and weight. The two main points of interest were his advice to his hearers never to resort to force—since they had always before their eyes the results of 1882 in the shape of the Occupation, and another attempt of the same sort might lead to a Protectorate—and his attitude towards the Capitulations, which he hoped to see abolished.

He made a violent attack upon the Constitutional Reformers and Sheikh Ali Youssef, whom he accused of having tried to foment discord among the Extremists and of hiring journalists at home to make speeches and write against them, and he also stated that certain English officials in Egypt had sold their services in the same cause. He delivered an historical disquisition on the growth of Constitutional institutions throughout the world, and explained that the object of his party, now, was to forward petitions to the Khedive for a Parliament. His hearers need not be discouraged by Sir Edward Grey's declaration that English support was necessary for Egypt:

For this is not possible unless they should appear before Europe as despots and tyrants, whose spoils are a people's

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rights, especially after the Egyptian nation has shown its respect for the rights of European colonies and their international engagements, until Europe at last will recognise their good intents and agree to abolish them. . . .

We do not ask England for a Parliament, but it is from the Khedive that we beg for it.

To ask England would be tantamount to an acknowledgment of the Occupation, and they were convinced that the Khedive would not fall into the trap which the British Government, so notorious for its policy of duplicity, was laying for him :

He shall not allow himself to be deceived by the sweet disposition of Sir Eldon Gorst, nor by his marked attention to His Highness, nor by the frequency of his visits to Abdin.

If they could not get a Parliament without the preliminary condition of asking England's advice, it would be far better to do without it for the moment. But if so, they would show to the world how England treats them, and the sovereign of the country how she prevents him from giving his people a share in the government, and preserves autocracy.

Farid also alleged that the Ministers did little work and took large salaries, and declared them to be, not the right hands of the Khedive but merely the executors of the orders of the advisers, some of whom knew nothing. But he dwelt on the necessity for setting aside party disputes and any idea of revolt, and showing a united front, so that eventually they should gain their Constitution, parliament, effective control over the government, and the final removal of the English authority.

On the whole, the speech of the leader of the extreme

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Nationalist cause was little more than a collection of barren platitudes and the usual vituperative attacks against the Occupation. Yet Mohammed Farid Bey, with his advocate's training, his apparent culture, and his knowledge of Western civilisation, might have done much to consolidate his party and lead it towards a legitimate realisation of its ambitions. But from that time onward he and his coadjutors have only succeeded in inciting it to a series of excesses, each more violent and foolish than the last, till to-day we find it in its death throes, deserted by nearly all of its thoughtful and reasonable followers.

The hopes entertained by certain sections of the Egyptians that Sir Eldon Gorst would at once reverse the policy of his predecessor, quickly began to evaporate. They entirely disappeared when Sir Eldon made his speech at Khartoum, in which he declared his intention of proceeding on the main lines of Lord Cromer's policy.

There were, of course, various minor changes noticeable under the new regime, among them a more rigid system of administrative economies (more or less popular),* the substitution of Egyptian officials, where practicable, in the place of English, and increased

* One of the most important of these economies was Sir Eldon Gorst's refusal to grant a loan of £2,000,000 for the purpose of projected land cultivation, on the plea that the Government was not in a position to sanction such a loan. Shortly afterwards a much larger sum was guaranteed for the purpose by the *Crédit Foncier*, much to the satisfaction of the Constitutional Reformers and the Party of the People, who expressed their gratitude to the French Diplomatic Agent accordingly.

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facilities for instruction in the vernacular in the schools. The most noticeable change, however, and one which was regarded with increasing distrust and suspicion, was the real friendship existing between the Khedive and the British Agent.

Sir Edward Grey made it patent at home that Sir Eldon Gorst was not being hampered by his instructions, and that he was amply repaying the trust reposed in him. But the growing curiosity of the public, both in Egypt and at home, with regard to his future policy, was not allayed until the publication of his first Report, in the late spring of 1908.

Very much shorter, and more concise in form than those voluminous compilations of Lord Cromer, Sir Eldon Gorst's Report loses in interest by its careful avoidance of topics which might give rise to violent discussion in the vernacular Press—a fact which was deprecated by certain organs, which were thus deprived of their annual opportunity for wholesale adverse criticism.

In addition to the references to the Khedive as a liberal-minded sovereign, and to the necessity for devising a modern system of legislature to take the place of the Capitulations, Sir Eldon Gorst gave many instructive details as to the state of the country and its prospects. Dwelling on the late elections for the Legislative and General Assemblies, he spoke of the apathy which characterised the bulk of the voters, and the amount of moral and intellectual progress which must be made before the creation of representative institutions, as understood in England, would

have any result other than to give a complete set-back to the present policy of administrative reform. In this respect he considered that it was not at present expedient to make any fundamental change in the organisation or functions of the above-mentioned Assemblies, though he suggested various schemes whereby the scope of the Provincial Councils (hitherto practically powerless) might be enlarged and by which the members would exercise real powers which would serve as an education in local government. As the details of this scheme were violently criticised as soon as made public, we give them in their entirety.

1. The number of members to be considerably increased.

2. Separate representatives to be given to the different districts into which each province is divided.

3. The reduction of the duration of their mandate.

4. The Councils to be allowed to meet as frequently as their own rules may prescribe, instead of once a year, as by Khedivial Decree. They will act as advisory Councils to the mudirs and may put forward representations as to the administrative requirements of their province generally, and particularly as regards agriculture, irrigation, means of communication, public security, public health and education. The Councils to be consulted as to any proposed new local regulations and on irrigation projects, to be given definite powers in regard to village police organisation throughout the provinces and the establishment of fairs and markets, and to be elected education authorities, schools of agriculture and handicrafts being included in their ad-

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ministration. They would have power to vote for the raising of contributions and supervision over their application. The Government was to retain the general power of veto, and any scheme of local taxation by the Councils would require sanction by Khedivial Decree, though the municipalities of the larger provincial towns should not be required to obtain such sanction.

In spite of its avoidance of controversial topics, the Report, with its allusions to the good results of the existing regime and England's intention to continue on the main lines of the same, was sufficient to arouse the Nationalists to their old activity. Not only in the native Press, but also on the platform, the leaders of Young Egypt's many factions seized the opportunity to give vent to their political fervour and unconsciously to testify to their lack of common sense. *L'Etendard Egyptien* compared Gorst with Cromer :

. . . a man who had certain ideas and showed some talent in maintaining his opinions. His style was elegant and refined, and allowed one to believe that we were dwelling with a diplomatist of some breadth, howbeit sometimes he had deplorable moments of fury, during which his brutal character was unmasked and showed itself in a very unfavourable light. We are now in a peaceful epoch, and fall back upon the mean spirit of a nonchalant official, destitute of ideas, and so we must content ourselves with his business-like attitude and try to dissect his conciseness with a view to attempt to unroll the fate of the country from this report.

El Lewa headed its remarks on the same subject with the title "*Sakata dahran, notaha kufrat*" ("He kept silence for an age and then uttered blasphemy"); and

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even *El Minbar*, one of the most moderate organs, moaned dolefully of the iniquities of the English race in general, and Cromer and Gorst in particular :

Yes, verily, malice lies concealed in the soul of each Englishman, and venom is hidden in every one of them. This English race of 40,000,000 men, who bear sway over four hundred millions who dwell in all quarters of the globe, is an evil nation, ever seizing the opportunity to spring on feeble nations and suck dry the blood of their offspring. After Lord Cromer comes Sir Eldon Gorst with all his cleverness and malice, and makes it impossible for us to tell the difference from one or the other. For us Egyptians, every Englishman is a Cromer and every Gorst is a Cromer. How numerous are the Cromers among the English. We cannot tell whether Cromer and Gorst are not one and the same individual.

Shortly afterwards Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel addressed his party from the platform of the Zizania Theatre, Alexandria, so lately occupied by his illustrious brother, and after having roused his hearers to a frenzy of delight by telling them that 4,000 years ago the name of England did not even exist on the map, he and they sent a joint telegram of protest to Sir Edward Grey, who must already have become weary of such communications :

We six thousand (?) Egyptians—notables and merchants—who met this evening at the Zizania Theatre to hear an address by Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, beg to remind the British Government of its promise to withdraw from Egypt, and we desire hereby to strongly protest against the report of Sir Eldon Gorst, whose statements are not based on facts. We cherish great hopes for the future, and are sure of the attainment of our demands at a future date.

{ But it was not only the Extremists who objected to

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the policy underlying Sir Eldon Gorst's Report. We have the opinions of various other Egyptian politicians equally expressive of disappointment at the trend of affairs. The speech made by Loutfy Bey el Said, leader of the Party of the People, at the offices of *El Garida*, on the text of the Report, was said to have been one of the best efforts of its kind, and showed a moderation greater than had been known for many a month past. The later phases of the political question were studied, analysed, and developed with vigour and understanding, although to the belittlement of Sir Eldon Gorst's attitude, and in spite of his friendly relations with the Khedive :

In this understanding between the Khedive and Sir Eldon Gorst we find the sole difference between his policy and that of Lord Cromer. But what has the nation to gain from this understanding? Nothing whatever. Further, it is highly disagreeable for us to admit that our Sovereign should be praised in the report of the servant of a Government whose occupation of Egypt has no legal basis, and the more since we have reason for believing that the Khedive is satisfied with the policy of the new pro-Consul, which tends to destroy in us all longings for independence. Till now we have noted no action on Sir E. Gorst's part which can persuade us that his policy is progressive. We admit that he has been but a short time here, but his report is a sufficient indication of his intention of maintaining the political *status quo*. . . . We despaired of the former British Agent; we have no proof whatever that his successor will give us any grounds for hoping that our situation will improve. You have seen that the English are what they are. Despite his understanding with the legitimate authority, Sir Eldon Gorst is more dangerous to us than was Lord Cromer with his misunderstanding. To reach the goal of independence we

must count upon ourselves, on our own energy, devotion and union.

Fanous Bey, a Copt of rare intelligence and acumen, was also explicit on the subject, and his criticisms of Sir Eldon's views with regard to local self-government were much to the point. He quoted the following passage from the Report :

It is clear that if anything is to be done to meet the desire which exists among certain sections of the population for a larger participation in public affairs, it must be in some such direction which would provide a suitable outlet for their activity and prepare them for the exercise of more responsible functions hereafter.

Fanous sets out to prove that in this passage the British Agent admitted the necessity of propitiating the public desire for participation in public affairs, and definitely endorsed Lord Dufferin's dictum that local self-government is the best preparation for a constitutional regime.

But on examination of this new scheme for Provincial Councils, which should be the foundation stone of that much-desired regime, these real powers are conspicuous by their absence, insignificant in themselves, and devoid of anything that can lay claim to a constitutional principle. The organisation of local police, establishment of fairs and markets, control of elementary or Kuttab education, are scarcely proper functions for a real constitutional training, while " advisory " power is understood, from past experience with the Legislative Council, to be of no value at all.

In fact, all properly called constitutional functions are carefully withheld from these Councils, and even the taxes to be levied for educational purposes must be enforced by Khedivial Decree, which gives the power of discussion and

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formulation of the law into the hands of the Government. To be of any practical value, the Council should be given plenary power to vote and levy whatever rates it may see fit for local purposes, especially educational and sanitary, which power would give to the people the knowledge that they were bearing the burdens according to their wish, and be an excellent training in practical economy. Thus the Councils would be given the miniature powers of a real Parliament, with its legislative measures in the form of local by-laws of police and sanitation, education, etc., and its petty budget for its various services. The Government would stand in relation to these Councils as Crown does to Parliament in all constitutional countries, being given the power of formal consent or veto to any measure passed by these Assemblies. And in this way only can the habits of self-government be really fostered, and a sense of responsibility developed in our political classes.

Akhnoukh Fanous was one of the foremost of the Copts, that section of the community which has, perhaps, the sole right to claim pure Egyptian blood, and who, by the persecution they endured for centuries at the hands of the Mohammedans, have developed a spirit of loyalty to their English protectors which had hitherto prevented them from taking part in the popular agitation. Comparatively few in numbers—they form about a sixth part of the population—they are among the most useful inhabitants of Egypt, especially in the commerce of the country. Pliable and industrious by nature, they took kindly to office and mercantile life; they are quick at figures, intelligent handicraftsmen, money earners, and money savers. Many of them hold offices of trust in the Government service.

Held in subjection by their Mohammedan conquerors, they attained such power and influence under the British Occupation that at length the Mohammedan organs, and especially those of the extreme Nationalists, began to threaten a dire and summary vengeance on them if they encroached further upon those high administrative posts which the Mohammedans regarded as their especial property. The Coptic papers, *El Watan* and *El Misr*, were consistently friendly to England; but as their position became more sure and influential, even they began to find fault with the Government. Thus we read in *El Watan* :

For several months we have stood alone—entirely alone—in warning the Egyptian public against this ominous silence of the authorities and this fearful inaction, when all and sundry had seen that the Government should step forward and stem the tide of disaffection and revolution so carefully fostered by Nationalists and Extremists not overtaxed with real patriotism or foresight. We have repeatedly asserted that the British authorities and their agents in this country cannot really think that the daring campaign of sedition and agitation which has lasted so long can end without dire consequences, or that the British Government could in reality be indifferent to these consequences. It is idle to deny that they have shown mischievous contempt for the facts at their disposal, either because they entirely misjudged the situation, and thought that nothing would result from this campaign of religious and racial agitation, or they knew better, and held their tongues because the results of such continued incitement was not disagreeable to their purpose. In other words, the friends of England always held that Englishmen saw no danger in the effervescence consequent upon sustained sedition, and they tried to open the eyes of England and make her think otherwise; but others less

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friendly suspected England of sinister designs, accusing her of favouring the seditious and revolutionary campaign in order to make the coming revolution the official pretext for annexing Egypt, or at least substituting a permanent protectorate for the present temporary occupation.

Thus were the inaction and the silence of England interpreted by different communities in Egypt. For our part, we maintain, however, unhesitatingly our oft-repeated belief that England has allowed her enemies to predominate in Egypt, and held aloof while revolutionary and fanatical ideas were being daringly disseminated in consequence of a misconception and an ill-advised magnanimity. And we have in recent British history several instances of this mistaken chivalry: instances in which the error was brought home to the British public only when a great disaster had ensued, and where enormous sacrifices were necessary to put matters right.

We sincerely hope that in our case England will be fully convinced of the errors of her ways, and that some action will be taken to stem the tide of religious and racial trouble now being assiduously worked for by persons and agencies well known to all, before the advent of the debacle which is destined to fall unless England moves in the right direction now.

Last week we ventured to predict that others will come round to our way of thinking on this subject. We had only a few days to wait, for not only a Prince of the Khedivial family has said the same thing about the danger of silence and inaction while the revolutionary parties are hard at work, but an old and well-known newspaper hitherto friendly to the anti-British cause, has seen the question in this light, and seriously cautioned the youthful patriots of Egypt against going too far in their uproar and their demonstrations. That newspaper is *El Ahram*. We, however, regret that both Prince Haidar and *El Ahram* seem to think that England is actually paving the way for a repetition by our countrymen

of the atrocities of 1882, as such atrocities will be made the pretext for conquering Egypt anew, and annexing it finally to the British dominions beyond the sea. They both deprecate the present policy, and hope that England will not be allowed to push Egypt once again to her fate. They agree with us that the policy of silence is ruinous to Egypt; but we do not agree with them in the interpretation of this policy, or in attributing to the English Government such black designs. We are afraid that those who foresee the danger of this policy and call it an error of judgment, as we do, are far less numerous than those who accuse England of deliberately working for agitation and revolution in Egypt as a means for realising a long cherished ambition, and a pretext for putting an end to the present status of Egypt and the Sudan.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONALISTS UNDER NEW LEADERS

Farid Bey's Mission to England—Sheikh Shawish in the Editorial Chair—His Violent Attack upon the Copts—The Kamlin Affair—Punishment of the Offenders—Reports in *El Lewa*—Trial of Sheikh Shawish—Enthusiasm at his Successful Appeal—Further Mission to England—New Programme of the Egyptian Liberals—The Revolution in Turkey—Its Effect in Egypt—The "Young Egyptians"—Boycott of Austrian Goods.

TOWARDS the end of May, Mohammed Farid Bey, following the example of his predecessor, visited England, where he was entertained by many sympathisers, to whom he confided the usual hopes and programme. His revised programme was published in the *Manchester Guardian*, with topical and personal allusions.

In addition to his demand for immediate evacuation, he claimed the restoration of the Constitution, bestowed by Tewfik in 1881, and taken away, by Lord Dufferin's advice, in 1883, after Arabi's revolt. Farid Bey considered Egypt much more advanced now than then, in spite of all that the Nationalists had said in criticism of the Ministry of Public Instruction. He promised, in Egypt's name, to respect the International Treaties, Mixed Tribunals [whose powers should be extended to criminal matters] Capitulations, Public Debt, and the tribute due to the Sublime Porte. He demanded that

the English Parliament should put an end to arbitrary rule in Egypt, and to the mismanagement of the country's finances. He declared that European residents need have no fear, seeing that he and Egypt undertook to respect their privileges until Europe should consent to their being abolished, as they had been abolished in Bulgaria and Japan. No ground of complaint would lie in the management of Egypt, he declared, if her revenues should be devoted to the advantage of her children, instead of being recklessly devoured by others. Egypt was at least worthy of equal consideration with Servia, Greece and Bulgaria, whose independence was protected by the European Powers—particularly by England.

On the subject of education, Farid was more than usually eloquent. He declared that the level of education had deteriorated, that the number of secondary and superior schools was notoriously insufficient, and that the Government's schemes for the extension of primary instruction were futile. He proclaimed the need of further facilities for the production of men of learning :

We want men of learning and professors, and as long as the budget and curriculum of the Ministry of Public Instruction are in the hands of Mr. Dunlop and Co. we will never attain that end. A Parliamentary regime is essential, for it alone can make the country advance in the path of progress.

Certainly the condition of the Government schools at that time did require attention, but more especially in the matter of discipline, which was notoriously slack. It is impossible to believe that the granting of a Parlia-

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mentary regime to those who were most loudly demanding it would have sufficed to produce men of learning. Under the influence of Mustapha Pasha Kamel the schools had become practically political clubs, and by the baneful example and encouragement of his successors they developed into hotbeds of insubordination. Authority was openly defied, and the young champions of extreme views in politics were ever to the fore with demonstrations, open letters, and revolutionary speeches. Indeed, almost the entire strength of the extreme Nationalist cause was drawn from their ranks. The tolerant attitude of the school authorities encouraged these young, rash, and inexperienced politicians, who refused to obey orders and neglected their studies in favour of the discussion of absurd propositions, criticism of the authorities, and in order to attend political functions. Incident after incident of insubordinate behaviour was virtually ignored, or visited with altogether inadequate punishment.

No sooner had Mohammed Farid Bey departed for England, leaving the editorial chair of *El Lewa* to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, than the tone of that paper became daily more violent and fanatic. Not only were the natives incited to actual violence against the English, England being said to be too weak to resist, but dissensions were fomented between the Copts and Moslems, until at length the former were goaded into calling public meetings, and forwarding to Sir Eldon Gorst letters of protest against the attitude of the Mohammedans. As an example of the extraordinary vehemence of the attacks made on the Copts, we give below a

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quotation from *El Lewa*, which, though afterwards declared to have been directed against the editors of the Coptic newspapers, must have been little to the liking of the community in general:

It was Islam, you fools, who delivered you from the power of the Greeks after many hundreds of years of slavery, when you were as cattle in the hands of their master. In those days you were insulted, kicked, and treated as submissive slaves. After the Greeks had gone you threw yourselves into the arms of Islam. Your lives were spared and your children and womankind respected. If Islam was a religion of the kind you pretend it to be, you would have been crushed, and what remained of you would have been thrown to the winds, and the earth would have been cleansed of your dirty bodies. Islam would have cut out your tongues by the roots, so that you might not speak, and would have cut off your fingers, so that you might not write. Howbeit, you have agreed to the overlordship of Islam, and you have come under its protecting wing. It has given you your life as a nation, and has allowed you to have your own laws, while leaving you free to come to us for aid when it seemed good to you. You have spent thirteen hundred years in a Moslem land, where you have increased and multiplied and waxed fat in wealth and riches. If for but one quarter of that time you had lived with the English you would have become even as the Redskins of America, and your lot would have been like that of the beasts of the field. If you were the lieges of King Leopold, the hair of your heads would have been used to make ropes with, your skins would have been turned into covers for slippers and your bodies would have been beaten with rods.

It was hardly likely that diatribes such as these would smooth the way to the conciliation between Moslems and native Christians which would have




Photo: Zola.

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furthered the cause of the Nationalists. Many leading Nationalists protested against the Sheikh's violence, and even Ali Bey Fehmi and the executive committee of the *Lewa* organs regarded it as a tactical error. Meetings were held all over the country, and although there were rumours of secret conclaves where the summary ejection of all Copts from official posts was considered and approved, there were many expressions of hope from both Mohammedans and Copts that these dissensions might be put an end to, as they imperilled the welfare of the country and were at variance with the spirit of patriotism.

In the first days of June, Egypt was electrified by the news from the Sudan of the rebellion of Abd el Kader—known as the Kamlin Affair—which manifested itself by an attack on the British troops at Katfiya, in which some dozen British officers and men lost their lives. Summary punishment of the ringleaders followed. Abd el Kader was executed, and twelve others who were implicated in the affair were also condemned to death, although later their sentences were commuted. Before even the Sudan mails containing the details of the trial had arrived in Cairo, *El Lewa* was publishing inflammatory articles, entitled "A New Denishwai," purporting to have been contributed by correspondents at the scene of the affair, and denouncing the cruelties of the authorities, who were described as murderers and wild beasts. The twelve accessories on whom death sentence was passed became seventy in these articles, and their execution—which never took place—was described in detail. Sheikh Shawish, the Tunisian and

ex-Professor of Oxford, was summoned before the Native Parquet to answer the charge of having published these articles. His attempt to evade the Court's jurisdiction by pleading French nationality was fruitless.

Farid Bey, his stay in England shortened by the news of religious dissensions and the misfortunes of his coadjutor, hurried back in order to be present at the subsequent trial of the Sheikh before the Abdin Tribunal. Charged with the publication of false news detrimental to public safety, and insults levelled against the Ministry of War, the defendant had the satisfaction of seeing the Court crowded with unruly students. Tremendous enthusiasm marked the end of the trial. There were demonstrations in the streets, and riots; the police were attacked with stones, and the rough handling of Europeans resulted fatally in more than one instance. The carriage containing Sheikh Shawish was dragged home by enthusiastic followers.

The judgment, delivered a few days later, acquitted him on the first count, but condemned him to pay £E20 on the second; but the latter sentence was reversed on appeal. Further street demonstrations followed the triumph of the popular hero; but, thanks to increased police precautions, no untoward violence occurred. The joy with which the Extremists welcomed the reversal of the sentence found no echo among the Europeans, nor among the more moderate natives. Rightly or wrongly, they deemed that it established a precedent which would encourage certain newspapers to continue in their irresponsible ways.

El Lewa was not the only offender in 1908 in inciting

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to violence and rebellion against the English. One of its former editors—a list of these editors would fill a volume—who had taken over the control of *El Kasr el Misri*, was also endorsing the revolutionary policy :

Are our present aims to obtain a new Constitution or to restore an old one ? Are 4,000 soldiers of the Army of Occupation able to stand against 12,000,000 when they come to ask for the withdrawal of the Occupation in fulfilment of England's promises ? . . .

In connection with the Nationalist desire for the withdrawal of the Occupation and the fitness of the Nationalists for self-government, it is interesting to recall Fakri Pasha's answer to one who was anxious to prove the value of the agitation. Said the supporter of the Nationalists :—

“ But the Nationalist Party, Excellency, which is working for the welfare of the country, has improved the national feelings, raised the value of patriotism, and made the young Egyptians strong patriots ; and so the Egyptian nation has become a strong one.”

The Minister laughed, and said :—

“ I thought you were wiser than you are. It is easy, my son, to write on paper many words like these but it is very difficult, and it requires long years, to verify these words and apply them to real facts. I mean that it is very, very hard to rejuvenate a dead spirit, a ruined conscience, a mean soul ; to transform them into noble, national sentiments, true wisdom, and loyalty.”

In addition to Farid's mission, Ismail Pasha Abaza and four of his friends also went to England in 1908

in the hope of arousing fresh sympathy there. Recruited from the ranks of the General and Legislative Assemblies and local Provincial Councils, this little party was a very mixed deputation. The leader, an ex-journalist and member of the Legislative Council, was a Mohammedan *sherif*, who was said to be descended both from the Prophet and from a Copt. None of them spoke any European language with the exception of Abaza, who had some knowledge of French; they had no settled plan of action, nor, apparently, were they certain about their own aspirations beyond the fact that they did not intend to agitate for immediate evacuation. So, followed by the derision and protests of both Copts and Mohammedans, they journeyed to London, where they were welcomed by Mr. Robertson, Dr. Rutherford, Professor Brown, Mr. Brailsford, and many others, who expressed their sympathy and desire for friendship, and procured for them the attention of the Egyptian Committee to their trite report of the conditions of Egypt, and complaints as to the apathy of the Government, especially in the matter of education. As Sir Eldon Gorst declared, there was no practical value in this report—nothing new, and nothing that Sir Edward Grey did not already know. Indeed, many of the reforms suggested by Ismail Pasha Abaza and his friends were already in progress, the only difference of opinion between them and the Egyptian Government being the rate at which it was expedient to proceed with their application.

In the hot, weary days of summer came the startling news of the bloodless revolution in Turkey, and of

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the unexpected victory of the Young Turks. At once the flagging hopes of Egyptian Nationalists were galvanised into fresh life, and Egypt's relationship to Turkey appeared a sufficient reason why Egypt should participate in Turkey's new-found liberties. The pages of the vernacular Press were flooded by congratulatory articles; the demonstrations of rejoicing in the streets were participated in by Egyptians as well as Turks; a party of "Young Egyptians" was formed, under the ægis of the *Lewa* organs, in imitation of the party of Young Turks; and congratulatory telegrams and demands for a similar constitution to that of the suzerain Power followed hard on each other's heels.

As a contemporaneous issue of the *Times* stated, there was nothing astonishing in the fact that this *dénouement* in Turkey should give fresh stimulus to the demands of the Nationalists:

That the organs of the Extremist party should have profited by the occasion to indulge in violent tirades against the British Occupation was also to be expected. But as there is a world of difference between the Anglo-Egyptian bureaucracy and the defunct Palace *camarilla*, whose cruel and unscrupulous chiefs made Turkish administration, save in a few favoured cases, synonymous with espionage, oppression and venality, so there is little or no community of ideals between the Ottoman Reformers and the majority of the Nationalists in Egypt. The Young Turks have set their faces not only against racial and religious feuds, and against the traditional policy of the Moslem governing class to which they themselves belong, but also against the traditional policy of reserving the highest administrative posts and the military profession for Moslems alone, and of thus forbidding the non-Moslem to attempt to qualify himself for the ultimate

test of citizenship—the right and duty to take an active part in the defence of the Empire of which he is a subject.

Unfortunately, the Nationalist war-cry of “Egypt for the Egyptians” had always meant “Egypt for the Moslems.” Even Sheikh Ali Youssef, one of the most moderate of reformers, had not been above urging his co-religionists to treat Christian immigrants as potential enemies, while the scurrilous articles on the subject of the Copts, which had appeared in certain papers, had given an unpleasant hint of what might be their fate if the Nationalists had a hand in setting up a new regime.

For the moment, however, religious differences were said to be forgotten, and this in spite of the resignation of many Coptic members of the new party of Young Egyptians and the notorious fanaticism of the latter. Everything was done by this old party with a new name to show that Egypt, sensible of its near relationship to Turkey, was also worthy to be liberated with her. Most of the Young Turks, who knew the Egyptians, were sceptical both as to their fitness for Parliamentary Government and the sincerity of the popular leaders. For years past they had watched the efforts of the Yildiz *camarilla* to control the Nationalist movement by means of spies, *agents provocateurs*, and subsidies. It was believed that both Turks and Syrians of Liberal opinions had, on several occasions, been denounced as conspirators by persons possessing considerable influence in Nationalist circles. These enlightened Turks knew that the very Nationalist organs which had shown most vehemence in demands for Parliamentary institutions and in the denunciation

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of the tyranny of the Occupation, had also been distinguished by the fulsomeness of their adulation of the Hamidian regime. From England, too, the Young Turks had received counsel and assistance, and, for this reason more than any other, they were hardly likely to favour Nationalist aspirations so long as the Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt was recognised by the occupying Power and the Khedive.

A question much discussed, but never satisfactorily elucidated, which grew out of the establishment of the new Turkish regime, was that of the exact relationship between the Khedivate and the Ottoman Empire. A privileged province, independent of the suzerain Power so far as domestic affairs were concerned, Egypt, it was contended by some, could not participate in Turkey's new representative institutions. Whether the privileges the country enjoyed were granted to Mohammed Ali and his successors as rulers of the country, or to the country itself, were the questions which formed the basis of this profitless discussion.

In a speech given at the Party of the People's Club before a large number of its members and other Nationalists, Ahmed Effendi Abdul Latif declared to his own satisfaction—and presumably to that of his audience—that the real independence of Egypt had been obtained in the nineteenth century—the century of freedom:

By recognising the independence of Egypt, with Mohammed Ali as its ruler, the Powers meant, according to the Treaty of London, to grant all privileges to the Egyptian nation as represented by Mohammed Ali, and to the ruler himself as an individual member of the same.

Not very long after this view of the matter had been expressed, Sheikh Ali Youssef submitted to the board of administration of his party—the Constitutional Reformers—a lengthy political report, dealing with the same subject, in which he sought to prove that the privileges enjoyed by Egypt as a distinguished *vilayet* were granted to the dynasty of Mohammed Ali, and not to the nation. Necessary measures, therefore, should be taken to obtain the right of participation in the constitution of the Ottoman Empire, in order to safeguard their general right to have a voice in the decision of the Ottoman Parliament. This, said Youssef, would not prevent them from claiming a special *Dustoor*, which they could obtain as in the case of the independent states in America and Germany.

However, in spite of slavish adulation, protestations of friendship and kinship, and the formation of the “Young Egypt” party—whose adaptation of the name of the famous Turkish reformers was not accompanied by the spirit that inspired the latter—there was little sympathy in Turkey for the Egyptian cause, and the permission to hold a Nationalist meeting at Constantinople was only granted on condition that no attacks were made upon England, and no demand made for the evacuation of Egypt.

Such an attitude towards England must have been a bitter blow to the Egyptian Nationalists, but they must have experienced a still greater shock when Turkey solicited the services of various English and Anglo-Egyptian officials to undertake the reorganisation of some of their most important Government departments.

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Out of the sympathy for Turkey aroused in Egypt at the restoration of the former's national liberties grew the enthusiastic but short-lived sentiment to regard, not Turkey's friends as Egypt's friends, but Turkey's enemies as Egypt's enemies. And so, during the autumn of 1908, Egypt determined to follow the example of her suzerain and boycott Austrian goods imported into Egypt—if not the Austrians themselves. The most noticeable and important outcome of this boycott—which lasted a very short time—was the substitution for the universal crimson *tarboosh*—chiefly of Austrian manufacture—of some head-covering which would distinguish the patriotic Egyptian. Fashion and the love of change were in favour of the white *tarboosh*, made in Constantinople, but the neatly-blocked crimson one, with or without its smart, blue tassel, had become so universal a badge of Egyptian life and Egyptian service that to discard it for one of a different colour required much more courage than the average Egyptian, who is extremely sensitive to ridicule, possessed. Mohammed Bey Farid was one of those who made great parade of his sentiments in this matter, but his preference in headgear, as well as his political opinions, laying him open to a very straight talk from a well-known notable, the Chancellor of El Azhar, and a friend of his father's, he quickly discarded the white *tarboosh* for a less conspicuous head-covering.

CHAPTER IV

THE KHEDIVE AND THE EXTREMISTS

The Party of Independent Egyptians—Its Aims—The Khedive's Visit to England and Turkey—Extremists' Report of the Results—Shaouki Bey's Semi-official Announcement—Disappointment of the Extremists—Their Attempts to restore Belief in their Report—Futile Demonstrations—Display of Loyalty to the Khedive—*El Lewa's* Attack upon the Khedive—The Party of Nobles—*El Lewa's* Attack upon Sir Eldon Gorst—Sir Eldon's Reply—Interviewed by *El Mokattam*—Farid's Retort—Meeting of the Legislative Council.

THE extraordinarily virulent language used by some of the Extremists when alluding to the Copts, is a remarkable characteristic of the Nationalist agitation. It is not without importance, too, when considering the agitators' repudiation of the charge of fanaticism. The following translation of an article in one of the vernacular papers is a sample of the coarse abuse of the Copts in which the Extremists indulged :

A PARTY WHICH DESERVES DEATH

That faithless gang organised by some low-class Copts which has fallen upon its country like an unruly son which attacks his kind mother. . . . The punishment of such a gang should be that they should be kicked to death. . . . They still have faces and bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof that they hide poisonous spirits within their evil souls. The fact that they exist in the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generated from monkeys. You sons of adulterous women, you descendants of the bearers of trays! have you become so foolhardy

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that you should start and abuse the Moslem faith? The curse of Allah on you! . . . You tails of camels with your monkey faces; you bones of bodies, you poor, dreaming fools, you sons of mean rogues! Is it with such acts that such people should win renown? . . .

There was probably more than a grain of jealousy concealed beneath these diatribes, for it was given to one of the despised race to inaugurate a party and formulate a political programme which was perhaps the most rational and far-seeing of the lot, and which was certainly worthy of more consideration than it was accorded. We have already had occasion to mention Aknoukh Fanous Effendi and his criticisms of Sir Eldon Gorst's Report. A few months later (31st August) he was interviewed in the *Egyptian Gazette* with regard to his recently formed Party of Independent Egyptians. In this interview, at the outset of his campaign, he made a comprehensive statement of his ideas, and declared unhesitatingly that the friendship and sympathy of England were obviously necessary to the well-being of Egypt. He contended, however, that England's position in regard to the country once secured, she should have no further objection to handing over the reins of government to the Egyptians, who, assured of protection, would be able to devote all their energies to internal affairs. The details of these aims of Fanous' party are further interesting inasmuch as they constitute the first really serious attempt to solve the question on those broad and comprehensive lines which might be fairly expected to fuse the many distinct racial elements into a cohesive nation. His was the

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only party which had any claim to the title Nationalist, and the fact that it was not seriously considered at the time only proves that the majority of the inhabitants of Egypt were not sufficiently educated to appreciate it. The following were the aims of the Party of Independent Egyptians :

1. To ensure for Egypt the possession of and command of the Nile, which is the life of the country : Egypt and the Sudan must be one and inseparable.

2. The independence of Egypt.

3. The abolition of the Capitulations.

4. The prosperity and progress of the dwellers in the Nile Valley.

5. To consider the word " Egyptian " as comprising those of Egyptian origin and those naturalised.

6. To facilitate the condition of Egyptian naturalisation.

The means to be employed for the attainment of these ends were :

1. The establishment of real friendship and sincerity between Egypt and England, in order to gain the confidence of England.

2. To retain good and friendly relations with the foreigners resident in Egypt, and to guarantee the safety of their rights and interests by a sure and just Legislation.

3. To entirely separate religion from politics, and to ensure perfect equality to all residents in common rights, and of the Egyptians in National rights, by a sure and just Legislation irrespective of race or creed.

4. The imposition of an Income Tax on all residents, foreigners or Egyptians.

5. The making of a treaty between England and Egypt for the purpose of, on the one hand, ensuring the freedom of English trade in Egypt, and guaranteeing the freedom of the Egyptian ports and of the Suez Canal to England in time

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of peace and war ; on the other hand England will promise to uphold the independence of Egypt and to prevent foreign aggression.

6. The formation of two Constitutional Chambers of the country composed as follows :

(a) The First Chamber, with legislative powers, to be composed of members half of whom are to be elected from foreigners who have resided in Egypt for at least five years, the other half to be Egyptians.

All members to be elected in such a manner as to fully represent each community.

The President to be elected by the members ; in case of an equal vote the decision to be made by the drawing of a " lot."

In case of an equality of votes on any question in the Chamber the casting vote to be given by the President.

(b) The Second Chamber for general control to be composed of Deputies elected by Egyptians only, in such a way as to represent each community.

The functions of the Legislative Chamber to be :

The passing of laws either on their own initiative, or on the request of the Second Chamber, or of the Government. These laws will not be passed without going before the Second Chamber, but only with the object of obtaining and considering its observations regarding them.

This Chamber will also exercise a general supervision over the Legal Courts and the election of foreign judges.

It will also decide in case of disagreement between the Second Chamber and the Ministers.

The functions of the Second Chamber to be :

(a) The control of all the actions of the Government.

(b) The control of public education.

(c) The levying and general supervision of taxes.

7. The compulsory preliminary education of both sexes.

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8. The uniformity of jurisdiction.

(a) One common law, civil and criminal, to be applied to all residents of Egypt, Egyptians or foreigners ; one jurisdiction also for all.

(b) In cases of mixed contention, the cases to be examined by an assembly of which the majority shall be foreign judges.

(c) Cases of mixed "statut persona" (except of marriage and divorce) will be decided by the said civil courts in conformity with the laws passed by their national or ecclesiastical authorities.

(d) In like manner, Egyptians will be tried by the laws passed by their national or ecclesiastical authorities.

(e) Courts of discipline shall be permitted to pass sentences of fines or degradation in one degree only ; anything beyond that must be submitted to the decision of the higher court.

(f) All other administration trials to be abolished.

Mention has already been made of the feelings of the Nationalists in regard to the friendly relations existing between H.H. the Khedive and the British Agent, and the blow they sustained by his clearly avowed policy. Denied even an appearance of passive sympathy, they had to fall back upon mysterious hints, unfounded rumours and wild suppositions in order to keep up the farce of trying to make people believe that it was really they who knew the true intentions of their ruler. Thus they declared that His Highness was in active sympathy with the demand for evacuation. After his visit to England, where he received a kindly and most gratifying welcome from King Edward VII., they spread abroad wild statements that he was return-

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ing a *de facto* ruler, with responsible control of the whole Egyptian administration, the appointment of Ministers, and independent of the British Agent, except through the intervention of the Council, etc. Among the many changes to be effected there was to be a drastic curtailment of the number of Copts employed in the Ministry of Finance, and another rumour circulated was that His Highness had received the consent of the British authorities to grant a Constitution on condition that the Egyptian Parliament should neither meddle with the British Occupation nor the Egyptian Debt. It was said that the Constitution would not be promulgated until the following year, this lapse of time being fixed perhaps solely in order that the baselessness of the rumour should not become apparent too soon.

Instead of returning straight to Egypt, as had been expected, the Khedive spent some time at Constantinople, where there was a hitch in the granting to him of a special audience on the occasion of the Sultan's accession day. Whilst at Constantinople he received a visit from Ghazi Muktar Pasha, High Ottoman Commissioner to Egypt, who advised him, so it is said, to take the necessary measures for declaring a Constitution, and to point out to the English that, considering the Egyptian state had been entrusted to the keeping of the Mohammed Ali dynasty by the Ottoman Government, to which the former pays an annual tribute, the head of the Khedivate has to conduct the administration of the country. Therefore he should demand the promulgation in Egypt of the Dustoor, the same having been promulgated in Stamboul.

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With these and many other rumours in the air, wild expectations were rife as to the probable changes to be effected on His Highness' return; but scarcely had he shaken the dust of travel from him before a semi-official statement appeared in *El Moayad*, through the medium of Shaouki Bey, Poet to the Royal Household, which fell like a bomb in the midst of the sanguine hopes of the popular agitators. According to this statement, the Khedive is said to have expressed his natural inclination for a Constitution, and claimed that during his sixteen years' reign he had never committed any real political error, in spite of the many difficulties of his position. He declared, also, that none but an autocratic king, wielding absolute power, could deny his people a Constitution; that such a description could in no way be applied to him, but no radical change in the government of Egypt could be brought into force unless by the co-operation of the occupying Power. On the other hand, the Khedive always did what lay in his power to improve the reputation of the Egyptian nation among those of Europe, and was sincerely anxious to see her in the front rank of the progressive and prosperous nations, which are naturally constitutional.

Great perplexity and no little annoyance were caused by these semi-official announcements of Shaouki Bey, for the Extremists were all agog for demonstrations and the demanding of "El Dustoor" from the hands of the sovereign. Thousands of little flags were in process of making, and the most elaborate preparations were being made to ensure his appreciation of their demands. Then Shaouki Bey took all the point

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out of the movement by making an ill-timed, discouraging, semi-official announcement, and—which was even more disheartening—the Government informed the leaders of the proposed demonstration in Alexandria that they would be held responsible for any disturbances which might result. Nevertheless, some 2,000 demonstrators endeavoured to carry out the programme, but the police stopped and dispersed them, arresting twelve, and taking away their flags. A small section found its way to the vicinity of the Ras el Tin Palace and began singing the National Hymn, and the Palace Guard turned out and stopped them. The only sight obtained of the sovereign was as he passed from his carriage into the railway station, so that they had hardly time to cheer him, and no opportunity at all to impress him with the waving of their banners of freedom.

From this time onward, however, the Khedive was pestered with demonstrations whenever he appeared in public: demonstrations from detractors, demonstrations from sympathisers, and demonstrations from men, youths and children, all of whom hoped, by the waving of little flags and their cries for “El Dustoor,” to gain the constitution they imagined would prove the panacea for all their troubles.

The irresponsible Farid Bey published a statement towards the end of September in which he attempted to show the reasons which had led to the alleged political outlook of the Khedive. In this statement he declared that the Khedive had formerly been in favour of the Nationalist movement and its organisers, and had

encouraged the formation of the parties and political clubs, but more as a personal protest against Lord Cromer than against the British Occupation. His aim in employing Nationalism had been to depose Lord Cromer, and when the latter retired, and the office of British Agent was filled by the Khedive's friend, Sir Eldon Gorst, the Khedive's reason for supporting Nationalism disappeared. The movement, however, had by that time become too powerful to be checked. Whether or not Farid Bey had any grounds for his assertions we cannot say—certainly it would be as difficult to prove as to disprove the truth of them—but their sensational nature did much to ruin his cause. Great indignation was caused by the statement; many of the native residents of Alexandria signed a protest declaring that the article was written with malice, and had offended all wise men, who had never failed in their support of Mustapha Pasha Kamel. Even the English residents forwarded a petition to Sir Eldon Gorst—published in *El Akhbar*—demanding that “as the English occupy Egypt only for defending the Khedive's position, and as the Nationalist party has now started to threaten and abuse His Highness for not having promulgated the Dustoor claimed by that party, the petitioners request the British Diplomatic Agent to put an end to the temerity of those Nationalists, so that the sovereign's dignity may not be exposed to the public criticism.”

Seemingly Farid Bey also wrote to a notable of Turkey, in a manner calculated to lower the dignity of the Khedive. But he got no sympathy there, for

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the notable, through the medium of a third party, answered by expressing grave displeasure, and assuring Farid that, even if there were any truth in these assertions of the past, they carried no weight with the Liberal actions of the present, and that the Ottoman Empire was too busy with her own affairs, and too conscious of England's assistance, to embroil itself in the worries and grievances of Egypt.

Instead of gaining by his lurid statements, Farid Bey only drew upon himself the disgust of many whom he had hoped to propitiate, and, furthermore, hurried the secession of a number of valuable allies from his party and its cause.

Despite these disappointing results, a few days later Farid made amazingly insolent statements regarding the Khedive. His Highness, he declared, had recently contracted a loan with English and Belgian capitalists, to be immediately repaid should the Occupation come to an end, and this was one of the reasons why His Highness refused to grant the Constitution. Farid demanded the publication of the documents connected with this alleged loan transaction "in order to relieve the anxiety of his loyal subjects."

Both these attacks upon the Khedive appeared in *El Lewa*, the most widely circulated Arabic newspaper in the world; but, in spite of its readers' taste for highly seasoned "news," such malevolent and personal attacks against the ruling sovereign, the representative of the Mohammed Ali dynasty, proved too venomous even for their liking.

Even Mohammed Wagdi Bey, the editor of *El*

Dustoor, attacked Farid for his attitude, at the same time offering himself and his organ for the confidence of the country. Another new party, "The Party of Nobles," recruited from the best classes of young Egyptians, young Turko-Egyptians, and seceders from the *Lewa* policy, sprang into existence as a direct result of Farid's recklessness.

Hassan Bey Hilmi, whose father was ex-Minister of State Domains, was the leader of the Party of Nobles, and at one of its first meetings he took the opportunity to allude to the old friendship between England and Turkey, the necessity for English assistance, and the duty of all self-respecting Egyptians to break away from the *Lewa* group, in consequence of the terrible political errors of Farid Bey.

Thebat Effendi Farag El Girgawi made public protestation of his reason for having severed his connection with the aforementioned *Lewa* party :

By Allah and my honour I swear that I have left this party because I loathed to attach myself to it and its leader on account of what I have heard and seen of their disreputable acts. This is a specimen : I went once to the party's club with a friend of mine, in order to discover what our leader was intending to do against the Khedive, in view of the publishing in *El Lewa* of a statement of his which offended every Egyptian. There I heard a secret conversation between certain members, and I discovered that the Nationalists were arranging to organise a great demonstration in front of Abdin Palace, on the arrival of the Khedive from Alexandria. They will ask the Khedive to grant Egypt a Constitution. If the Khedive grants their request all will be well, and they will thank him ; but if he refuses they and all Nationalists will

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cease to pay taxes and will resist the Government, come what may.

Having maligned the Khedive, *El Lewa* next turned its attention to Sir Eldon Gorst, in an article entitled "Cunning Politics":

Where is Gorst? Where is he hiding? What plot is he hatching? What misery preparing for us? These are the questions that we put to ourselves when we think of Sir Eldon Gorst concealed, brooding, lips compressed, hands extended, like a stone statue erected in his castle by the Nile. Those who visit this gentleman get nothing out of him. This dissimulation astonishes us all the more when we remember how his predecessor loved to pose and make a display. Sir Eldon Gorst seeks to divide the nation from its ruler. This is the real policy of England—to divide in order to rule. It will be an unhappy day for Egypt when this happens, for a division between the ruler and his subjects can only result in the triumph of "the foreigner" over both of them. Always when Lord Cromer struck at us we saw it and prepared. With Sir Eldon Gorst it is the opposite. With a prodigality of courtesy and good manners, we have not advanced since his arrival. . . .

In reply to these and other attacks on Sir Eldon Gorst and his rumoured change of policy, an authorised interview was published in *El Mokattam* towards the end of October. In this interview Sir Eldon Gorst is reported to have stated clearly that there was no truth in the rumour that Great Britain had even given thought to the question of the annexation of Egypt, since annexation would be a violation of pledges given to Turkey and the Powers of Europe to respect the rights of the Sultan. These pledges had been reaffirmed in 1904 at the time of the Anglo-French Agreement, when

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the British Government had asserted that it had no intention of altering its political status in Egypt. He denied that he had received any instructions from the Home Government, in consequence of recent events in Turkey, to introduce a constitutional régime in Egypt, and stated that the question of how far the Egyptians were ripe for self-government was in no way affected by late happenings in Turkey. He laid weight upon the fact that Egypt already had a constitution as laid down by the Organic Law of 1883, and that there was every intention of extending its powers to correspond with the intellectual advance of the population, and that already measures were being prepared—in connection with the Legislative Council—to give the people an opportunity of taking greater control over the internal affairs of the country.

Such measures, when passed, would give the Egyptians more opportunities for showing their aptitude for public affairs, and might eventually lead to improving the organisation and enlarging the powers of existing elective bodies.

He expressed himself as no believer in making an experiment by giving practical self-government at the risk of temporary failure, which might inflict suffering at home and destroy credit abroad, and would certainly have to be abandoned before it could produce any satisfactory fruit. A premature introduction of representative institutions would inevitably result in a reaction which would be fatal to the hopes of those anxious for Egyptian autonomy.

Sir Eldon laid stress on the necessity of confidence

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in the intentions of Great Britain, and co-operation in its efforts in a progressive direction. It lay with the Egyptian people to prove to the British that existing and suggested institutions could do useful work, and be of material help to both Government and the community, and thus bring forward the best possible argument in favour of extension of their powers.

He did not believe that the slightest good would accrue from political agitations—wild and foolish utterances in the Press or on the platform—which only served to confirm the impression that the country was not yet fit to govern itself. These patriots should learn that, so long as the Occupation lasted, any measure of self-government rested with the British Government, and the British people are the last in the world to be hustled into unwise or premature action by the clamour of irresponsible agitation :

If this cry for a constitution means the establishment of an unrestricted Parliamentary Government as it exists in England and other European countries, I can only reply that the conditions necessary in order that the country may be properly administered under such a system do not at present exist, and that it would be absolute folly to think of introducing now a change of this revolutionary character.

Naturally, this plain, unequivocal reply to the taunts of *El Lewa* was not received in a kindly manner by that contentious organ. Speaking for the party it in no way represented, it protested “severely against your declarations in *El Mokattam*, in which you have denied the existence of the qualities which make the Egyptian nation ready to obtain self-government and

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a Constitution from its ruler. The party declares that Egypt is more fit for self-government than many European nations, and that she will continue to strive for freedom and independence until she obtains them."

It is much more satisfactory to read the telegram sent by the Constitutional Reform League to the British Agent, acknowledging with thanks his recognition of the Ottoman suzerainty, but asking that the encouraging sympathy of the English nation for the constitution of the Ottoman Government should be extended to Egypt. "If the Dustoor is permissible for other Ottoman *vilayets*," pleaded Skeikh Ali Youssef, "why not for Egypt? It seems that if Egypt had been an ordinary, unprivileged *vilayet*, and if not occupied by British troops, it would have received support from England for a Constitutional Government, an attitude against reason and the noble sentiments which England now shows for the Ottoman Empire."

This action on the part of Sheikh Ali Youssef and his Reform League was the signal for another vituperative letter from Farid, who read between the lines of the telegram a subtle attempt to subdue the national movement for claiming the Dustoor and "to stupefy the nation by introducing despair into the Egyptian hearts so that they may accept the present state of the country without murmur or protest. But Sir Edward Grey and Sir Eldon Gorst are very much mistaken if they think thus to remove every hope of obtaining the Dustoor, for we will continue to go on asking by the necessary pacific means. Consequently the members of the Legislative Council must decide at the next meeting

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to ask officially for the promulgation of the Dustoor, and not to meet afterwards till that end is attained."

This next meeting of the Legislative Council was held under the presidency of Abdul Hamid Pasha Sadek, on October 31st, and according to the instructions of Mohammed Bey Farid, the question of presenting a formal demand for the Constitution was made. However, the discussion which followed was of a ruinously violent nature, opinions being singularly divided and obstinate, and the meeting was brought to a close without any definite decision being arrived at.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE NEW MINISTRY

Return of the Khedive to Cairo—The New Prime Minister a Copt—Boutros Pasha Ghali—Nationalist Opinions of his Appointment—The New Ministry—Strike of *El Lewa* Staff—Strike of Students of Engineering School—Sheikh Shawish's Estimate of Himself—Shawish on British Rule in India—Sheikh Ali Youssef's Protest—*El Lewa's* Attack upon Him—Hafiz Bey Awad also Attacked—Demonstration against Sheikh Ali and *El Moayad*—Widespread Discontent at Apathy of Authorities—Open Letter to Sir Eldon Gorst.

EARLY in November, H.H. Abbas Hilmi II. returned to Cairo for the winter, entering the city in state through crowded, decorated streets. Thanks to the precautions of the police, the rumours of a great Nationalist demonstration were not followed by untoward disturbances, beyond a certain number of cries for "El Dustoor"—which, apparently, did not attract the attention of His Highness—and of "Resign! Resign!" which latter were evidently addressed to the Ministers. Unimpressive as were these exhibitions to Western eyes and ears, they figured largely in the columns of *El Lewa* next morning:

We say to the nation that the Khedive saw with his own eyes, and heard with his own ears, from those faithful youths of strong patriotism and firm resolution, that nothing will ever satisfy them except the return of that honourable era, the era of the Dustoor, of autonomy, and of self-government. May the Khedive, after seeing what Egypt showed

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him, support her claims, and declare to the whole world: "I am with her; I am with her!"

Unfortunately, the Khedive never evinced the slightest inclination to take *El Lewa's* hint, and the only reply he gave to the advice of these highfalutin patriots when they warned him not to attend the official review of the British troops on the occasion of the King's birthday, or to stand beneath the English flag, was to command the police authorities to take all due precautions for the prevention of disturbances on that day.

As it was, the Khedivial Law School students did their best to raise the cry of "El Dustoor," and, according to *El Lewa*, "these cries were soon repeated by the crowd, whose loud shouts reached the sky, overpowering the Occupationist tumult, even as right overpowers wrong. Oh, may the youths of this nation, its deliverers, live for ever!"

Not content with mere cries, these brave students and their friends started sending telegrams to their sovereign. They showered leaflets broadcast among the natives, calling upon them to follow their example, and monster petitions were drawn up and signed extensively.

When petitions, leaflets, and cries for "El Dustoor" failed to shake the resolution of the Khedive, Farid Bey resorted to abuse. He compared his Highness with the German Emperor, talked of his commercial interests, and the fortune he was amassing, and of the time and energy he was devoting to the construction of buildings on his property at the expense of the

interests of the State. He launched forth, indeed, such a torrent of violent vituperation that, had the Khedive resembled some of his predecessors, Farid Bey would have ere long regretted his words.

The same month (November), the existing Ministry went out of office, and for the first time in the history of modern Egypt a Copt was nominated to the high post of Prime Minister. It is an equally curious fact that no Mohammedan Egyptian had ever been Prime Minister during the period referred to. Nubar was Armenian and Christian; Riaz, Jewish by origin, though Turkish by character, education and sympathy; Sherif was pure Turk, with French sympathies; while Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, who had held office since 1895, was also of Turkish extraction. His successor, Boutros Pasha Ghali, K.C.M.G., was pure Copt from Upper Egypt—an intellectual, intelligent and upright man of marked ability. It was not to be expected that the appointment would please everybody, but on the whole it was popular, and several Nationalist papers expressed their approval. *El Lewa* was not of these:

We members of the Nationalist Party believe that Boutros Pasha Ghali was not promoted to the Premiership because he is the most qualified Minister in Egypt, nor because he is cleverer than any other Minister in giving satisfaction to the Occupationists, but because the British Diplomatic Agent in Egypt believes that his appointment to the supreme post will create a great gulf between the elements of Egyptian Nationalism. Notwithstanding this, the members of the Nationalist Party, who cannot be deceived by such political tricks, sincerely declare that their party is based on principles of equality and fraternity, irrespective of creeds, and every

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sincere patriot can join the party. At any rate, now that the sovereign of Egypt has approved of Boutros Pasha's appointment as Premier, we do accept him without regarding his political effects. . . . We are ready to forget the past, and welcome the new Prime Minister of Egypt, if he will render a satisfactory service to the country as a straightforward and true patriot. The future will show.

El Lewa, however, had spoken on the subject in a by no means resigned tone a few days before, declaring the appointment to be a deep wound to the feelings of the nation, on account of Boutros Pasha's office in the Denishwai special court, and of his having signed the Sudan agreement which caused the loss "of that country where our money was spent and our brethren's blood poured out."

Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, also of *El Lewa*, took the more hopeful view that the appointments to the new Ministry were made by the free will of the Khedive, and that the friendship existing between him and Sir Eldon Gorst meant that his authority was being restored, and that the policy of usurpation adopted by the English Occupation was gradually decaying.

On the whole, there was a singular absence of hostility to the new appointments, but the greatest blow to the Nationalists on the formation of the Cabinet was the retention of Said Zagloul as Minister of Public Instruction. More than any other native he had been the victim of their bitter attacks, and his retention was irrefutable evidence that the Khedive not only refused to be associated with the movement, but also that he intended to convince the world at large, and the Nationalists in particular, of the firmness of his attitude.

In spite of the tragic utterance of a contributor to the French edition of *El Lewa*—"Let us stand in line and watch the funeral procession of freedom"—so few manifestations of antagonism or fanaticism were aroused that an English sympathiser and an Egyptian Nationalist wrote plaintively on the subject to the *Egyptian Gazette* and the *Temps* respectively. According to the former, a great opportunity had been lost for further pestering Sir Edward Grey by appealing to the indignation of the Egyptians in having a Prime Minister thrust upon them. It was difficult to pursue a policy of discontent under such circumstances, said the writer, and the *entente* between Sir Eldon Gorst and the Khedive was extremely annoying, as the latter was fighting against the Nationalists with all his might. It would take a great deal to balance the efforts of the British Agent, which tended to stifle the voice of the people and their hatred of the Occupation. The writer had hoped that Boutros Pasha's appointment would arouse religious as well as Nationalist feelings.

Boutros Pasha Ghali and his colleagues were present at the meeting of the Legislative Council on December 2nd, and expressed their intention henceforth to attend these meetings in accordance with the Organic Law, in order to facilitate discussion and avert unnecessary divergence of views, and to co-operate with a view to a better understanding between the Government and the representatives of the people. Various valuable projects with regard to the administration of the interior by the natives and the imposition of taxes on the native population were discussed and forwarded



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to the Egyptian Government, and the meeting was held to be one of the most satisfactory and unanimous that had ever been held.

Each violent outburst on the part of Mohammed Farid and his coadjutor, Sheikh Shawish, had resulted in fresh secessions from the ranks of the party which had hailed Mustapha Pasha Kamel as its heaven-sent leader. The Party of Nobles was growing more influential daily, its lofty aims of regeneration, loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, devotion to the Khedivate, and the enthusiasm with which its propaganda was being disseminated, being especially inspiring to the minds of the educated youth who had formerly rallied round Mustapha's banner. Not only had the leaders of the Extremists become unpopular with the public, but they were also quickly earning the dislike of their immediate adherents. Jealousies and dissensions were of common occurrence in the editorial offices of the *Lewa* organs. Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel was said to be instrumental in fomenting these, and it was assumed by many that the other members and followers of the Kamel family were not averse to any action which might result in a definite rupture with the quasi-patriots whose chief ambition seemed to be to excel each other in animosity and invective. The arbitrary dismissal of members of the staff of *El Lewa* served as a pretext for a general upheaval.

One morning Farid and Sheikh Shawish discovered that the entire staff of *El Lewa* had gone on strike, leaving them to bring out the paper unaided. Consternation reigned for a time. Then came a hurried

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search for men to replace the strikers. The services of student disciples were solicited, and Loutfy Bey, editor of *El Garida*, not only showed his magnanimity by offering to print the sadly shrunken issue of *El Lewa* at his own press, but also did his best to heal the breach between the leaders and their recalcitrant staff. There was a meeting at the *Lewa* offices, and a reconciliation between certain whilom enemies, but none with the strikers, who, it was rumoured, were already arranging the publication, in a paper of their own, of startling revelations as to the *Lewa* tactics.

With its experience in the matter of strikes thus uncomfortably gained, *El Lewa* shortly afterwards tried to inspire one itself among the students of the Engineering School, who objected to the hours of work fixed by the authorities. They needed little encouragement. The greater number of them absented themselves from their class-rooms, but, somewhat to their astonishment, the authorities refused to accede to their demands, and—which was infinitely more discouraging—expelled them from the school for the space of two months. *El Lewa* came to their assistance again, with advice as to a plan of campaign and with the formation of a committee to consult the Ministry on their behalf.

Fortunately, Sheikh Ali Youssef gave them more sensible counsel :

Ye men of to-morrow, but children of to-day, you have not overthrown the Ministry, you will not drive the English out of Egypt by your infantile demonstrations ; but if you prepare yourselves well to-day, if you zealously apply your-

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selves to the conquest of science, perhaps you will be the men who to-morrow will overthrow the Ministry, and hasten the evacuation of your country.

And the two months' enforced abstinence from studies, which, truth to tell, they valued, brought these young men to see the futility of their ways.

The students at the Khedivial Law School also made violent demonstrations when their school was removed to Abbasieh, and had to be seriously taken to task by Said Pasha Zagloul himself, who advised them to give up foolish agitations which were only injurious to their interests and hindering the progress of politics and journalism. So convincing were his remarks that, before the end of the year, he was able to pay a congratulatory visit to the school, and express the Khedive's contentment at the students' change of conduct and his hopes that their good behaviour might continue.

In spite of—or perhaps on account of—his egoism, fanaticism, and bombastic utterances, Sheikh Shawish had, in a small degree, inherited some of the popularity which had formerly been the strength of Mustapha Kamel. Where Farid was barely tolerated, Shawish was welcomed; where Farid was criticised, every fresh outburst on the part of the Tunisian was greeted by the violent acclamations of his youthful adherents. The description of this demagogue by his own hand is instructive reading :

I am a determined man. I hold firmly to my religion, and am keenly interested in my language. I like outspoken candour, fearing no blame and no troubles. I possess virtues and active qualities which I have acquired from the great

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English nation. I am a hard worker, working incessantly, and with an energy that knows no fatigue. I am a ripe fruit produced by English reformers. My heart is imbued with the love of justice, freedom and independence ; with the love of science, virtue and nobility of character. I am the man who sits in the chair of Mustapha Pasha Kamel, a strong-willed individual, an ardent adversary of the Occupationist. This being my secret, let it be known to all whom it may concern.

There were certainly some of his accomplishments which had not been acquired from the great English nation, and association with Englishmen had given him the opportunity of acquiring others which he had neglected to avail himself of. Love of truth and fair-play were not conspicuous among Sheikh Shawish's qualities, as his comments on the English rule in India—made in connection with an interview with the Sheikh el Islam and Sir Bampfylde Fuller at Constantinople, and published in *El Lewa*—bear witness :

How can Sheikh el Islam say that the Moslem Ottomans should live in peace under the British flag—the flag that has four crosses on it ? Sheikh el Islam knows that the English will never give liberty and equality to other nations, except when they are compelled to do so. He also knows that the Indians are being shot dead with bullets, and blown up with dynamite, and crucified in the streets, for no other fault than claiming liberty and the right to manage their internal affairs ; after, the English, having eaten their flesh and sucked up their blood, leave them as walking skeletons and talking images. They have brought plague, diseases and famine to their country, and emptied their treasuries, and wished after all that the Indians should worship them in the place of their own gods, that their tongues should pronounce nothing except eulogies of them, and that they

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should dream of nothing better than their despotic government and flagrant injustice. The Sheikh el Islam knows all that. Is it reasonable, then, that he should declare that it is a blessing for the Mohammedans to be governed by such a nation as the English, of which there are always found people who insult the Moslems, their religion, Prophet and Koran, and also their habits and character?

Such language naturally called forth protests from the less violent Nationalists, and the Coptic organ pointed to it as proof of the fanaticism of the Extremists and the unfitness of Egypt for self-government. Sheikh Ali Youssef, editor of *El Moayad*, also took *El Lewa* to task for circulating such libels, which action brought down upon his head wildly extravagant denunciations.

Meanwhile, the other exponent of moderate principles, Hafiz Bey Awad—editor of *El Minbar*—was also a victim of the execrations of the Extremists, and had entered into a violent controversy with the Committee of the Higher Schools Club. Hafiz had been one of the originators, and most energetic supporters, of the club, but quietly, and without notification, his name had been expunged from the list of members.

Before the end of the year, the Extremists had not only succeeded in thoroughly alienating themselves from every other political party, but also were on terms of open hostility with the greater number of them, even while formulating the Nationalist Congress, which was supposed to include all constitutionalists, irrespective of creed.

So bitter was the feeling engendered by *El Lewa* against Sheikh Ali Youssef that actual disturbances resulted. On Christmas Eve there was a demonstra-

tion of some 4,000 excited Extremists in the Esbekieh Gardens. Lashed into fury by the torrents of violent declamation in which their irresponsible leaders indulged, the demonstrators wreaked vengeance upon copies of *El Moayad*, which were mutilated, stamped upon and defiled. Telegrams expressing bitter loathing were dispatched to the offending Sheikh. Further demonstrations were held simultaneously in other parts of the town, and a mob rushed in the direction of the offices of *El Moayad*, howling cries of vengeance. A large body of police, drawn up before the buildings of the Constitutional Reform League, happily prevented any untoward disturbance there, and, as usual with such demonstrations, the mob quickly showed that it had no real stomach for fighting.

The unpleasant and reprehensible episode called forth many protests, even from native circles. A petition, signed by many Egyptian merchants, was forwarded to the Government complaining of the supineness of the authorities with regard to the increasing licentiousness of the malcontents, and begging for prohibition of such manifestations, which imperilled political and financial stability. The students of El Azhar also presented a petition to the Ministry of Education, protesting against such disgraceful tactics.

El Shark published an open letter to Sir Eldon Gorst on the same subject and, referring to the comparative immunity from punishment of such disturbers of the peace, said :

What are you doing to hinder them from preaching revolt, and from poisoning the minds of the ignorant, and

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corrupting the youth? The names of these leaders whose tactics have had such an evil effect on the land are known to you. Why, then, do you delay to punish them?

El Shark was not alone in wondering at the apathy of the authorities, and to what scenes of violence that policy would lead. Even at home the English sympathisers with Nationalism were becoming tired of the continual outbursts of irresponsible passion on the part of the misguided youth of Egypt, while we, who lived in Egypt, were more than weary of such futile and objectless performances. The vernacular Press openly stated its alarm and fears that the country was on the brink of another revolution like that of Arabi Pasha. It was well enough for Lord Cromer, in his speech at the Eighty Club in London, to declare that the Nationalist movement was in no way inconsistent with the British policy in Egypt, and that it required not discouragement but guidance, especially in the direction of bringing home to the Nationalists the main points with which they had to deal; but we who were on the spot were beginning to realise that reasoning with people drunk with the fumes of specious and fallacious argument was a profitless task, and that though much might be "forgiven to youth, to inexperience, and to a lively, if sometimes misdirected, spirit of patriotism," there should be but little mercy shown to those who were deliberately engineering that same spirit of patriotism for their own ends, and to the detriment of their country.

The chief argument against Egyptian Nationalism is, indeed, to be found in the peculiar characteristics of

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the native mind. While their desire for self-government is a perfectly legitimate ambition, those who clamour most loudly for "El Dustoor" and the evacuation of the country by the British seem quite unable to realise either the difficulties and responsibilities of government or their own present unfitness for facing the one and undertaking the other. It follows that they are equally incapable of realising the serious situation which would inevitably arise if their demands were yielded to at the present stage of their political development.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Scheme brought forward in 1907—Mustapha Pasha Kamel's Enthusiastic Support—Details of the Scheme—Poor Response to Appeal for Subscriptions—Waning Interest in the Scheme—Resuscitation in 1908—Hassan Bey Said's Munificent Gift—Prince Fouad again elected President—Further Details of the Proposed University—Extremist Attack upon the Scheme and the Committee—Steady Progress to Fruition—Inauguration Ceremony.

THOUGH possessing no political significance, the scheme for a national university must not be omitted from any résumé of the recent history of Egypt. El Azhar, which is perhaps the oldest university in the world, is still devoted to Mohammedan religious training. For many years the desirability of some modern scheme of higher education had been apparent to both Europeans and natives. A project of the sort had been on foot in 1907, and Mustapha Pasha Kamel enthusiastically supported it. The interest of the Khedive, however, was only accorded with the express stipulation that Mustapha Kamel should have nothing to do with the formation of the university. It was, nevertheless, greatly owing to the Nationalist leader's energies that the scheme was first floated. His original idea—an idea which, we are glad to say, has never been abandoned—was that the aim of the university should be for the union of all Egyptians and the strengthening of the national sentiment. Within a few days of the promulgation of the scheme in the native Press, a notable

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of Beni Souif expressed his desire to subscribe a large sum of money, provided that the university should be without religious restrictions, and should be directed by reliable persons, that the substantial sum of not less than £E100,000 should be assured by subscriptions, and that the building should occupy a suitable position on the banks of the Nile.

The scheme struck the popular fancy at once—the lack of higher education having become one of the crying wants of the day—and it met with the hearty approval of the Ministry of Education and of Lord Cromer, who were quite willing to admit that the Government system—which was primarily ordained for the education of the future Government employés—in no way met the requirements of the country or represented the lines along which educational development should advance.

Within a very short time a committee was formed and a programme published, the details of which, though subject to modification, were founded on the following workable basis :

(1) The university that we desire to create is to be absolutely scientific and literary. Its doors will be wide open for all desirous of learning, irrespective of origin and religion.

(2) It will have no connection with politics, or even with men who occupy themselves with politics. Neither in its administration nor in the classes to be organised, will it tolerate the least interference or influence that may have a greater or less degree of public character.

(3) The foundation of a university uniting in itself all the orders of education—primary, secondary and higher—will be for us an ideal that we will strive to attain in a future

that is more or less near, and as such forms part of our programme. But it is evident that the complete and immediate realisation of a work so enormous will require considerable resources, a staff and organisation that are difficult to realise at present. We are, therefore, obliged to carry out for the present only part of our programme, beginning with that which has appeared to us most urgent and most profitable. Moreover, the primary and secondary education, and that which we have called professional, exists already in the State and private schools, and nearly satisfies our needs. Moreover, it has seemed to us that for the present we may, without inconvenience, not occupy ourselves therewith, reserving all our efforts to inaugurate a higher education which is lacking in our country. We will create professorships to teach what is not taught in Egypt: chairs of Arabic and European literature, sciences, philosophy and history. These will be filled by professors carefully chosen in Europe, and Egypt when they are available, under the direction of a technical committee, presided over by a both competent and experienced man. Naturally, the number and importance of these classes will depend upon the resources of the university.

(4) The classes will be public, so that all desirous of learning may attend them. But in addition to this attendance of persons of all ages and all professions who attend a class to pass their time in an agreeable and profitable manner, the university will admit enrolled students who will follow all the classes during a certain number of years. These students will undergo an examination at the close of their studies, and receive a diploma similar to that awarded by the School of Political and Moral Science at Paris. It is understood that the diploma will only have a moral authority, but it is to be hoped that in the course of time our Government will take it into consideration and attach special privileges to it.

(5) The meeting of the present subscribers will elect two committees, one of which will be appointed to collect sub-

scriptions, and the other to deal with the technical preparation of the education.

Such was the programme of those who were the first supporters of the proposal for the foundation of the new university, and though it may be judged too ambitious, it betokened a progressive and disinterested spirit, and was a direct denial of the suggestion which appeared in some of the London papers, that the proposal was set afoot with a view to promote political aspirations.

Unfortunately, the carrying out of this great scheme depended upon the subscriptions of the general public, and, enthusiastic as the public was over the proposal at first, there was comparatively little enthusiasm noticeable when further appeals for financial assistance were made. Indeed, the "closeness" of the Egyptian in such matters was never more apparent than on this occasion.

As time went on, the proposal gradually faded from people's minds. Not only the public, but also the committee, lost interest in it, and but for a few acknowledgments of donations of land and money, and a special supplement to the *Orient and Occident*—which seemed to be the only paper which grasped the vital importance of the proposal, and made any systematic attempt to bring it to fruition—it was practically forgotten.

In April, 1908, however, interest was somewhat re-awakened by a valuable gift of real estate by one Hassan Bey Said; and Prince Fouad, who had been elected president of the committee once more, held

out hopes of the completion of the scheme and the inauguration of the university the following autumn. According to his declarations, the course of instruction was to include courses in general history and the history and civilisation of Islam, and in Arabic, French and English literature. It was also stated that a certain number of students were to be trained in Europe for future professorships.

Further details concerning the aims of the university were published a few weeks later :

(1) Raising of the moral and intellectual level of the inhabitants of Egypt by the diffusion of science—especially modern science—and the study of literature, and the creation of a centre of scientific and philosophical culture in communication with similar institutions in Europe.

(2) Political and religious subjects to be excluded from the curriculum, and no discrimination in regard to race or religion to be allowed.

(3) The holding of public conferences for the discussion of scientific problems, and literary and historical subjects.

(4) The foundation of scholarships, with the object of sending a certain number of students to Europe to follow special courses of study.

(5) The gradual development of different schools of learning, as funds permit.

(6) The engagement, in the early stages, of professors from Europe, and the gradual substitution of Egyptians when competent native professors have been trained.

(7) The university to remain essentially a private enterprise carried on by means of its own resources.

(8) The institution to be administered in harmony with the views of the Egyptian Government.

No sooner did the university scheme show signs of making real progress than the Extremists—always

distrustful, and always on the defensive—began to attack its programme and its committee. Because it was intended to be free from political, racial or religious bias, they declared that it was in no sense national, and that, therefore, it was injurious to the Egyptians, for whose benefit the money of the nation had been collected. They insinuated that the Government had already proved its fear of the scheme, and had consequently drafted some of its own satellites on to the committee for its own ends.

Nevertheless, before the end of the year, in spite of divers obstacles and postponements, the much talked of university did at last come into being, finding a satisfactory home in the Palace Gianiaelis, close to the river bank, and on one of the finest sites in Cairo. The ceremony of inauguration took place on December 21st, 1908, H.H. the Khedive, who had promised an endowment of £5,000 per annum from the Wakf's Administration, declaring the university open before a large and representative assembly.

PART IV.—1909

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1909

The *Spectator* on the State of Egypt—Sir Eldon Gorst's Declaration—Protests from Extremists and from the Party of the People—Loutfy Bey and the Khedive—Anger of the Extremists—The End of Mustapha Pasha Kamel's European Newspapers—Financial Stringency in Egypt—Hassan Bey's Indictment of Sir Eldon Gorst—Hafiz Awad's Proposals for Local Self-Government—The Party of Independent Egyptians—*El Nizam*—The Blessed Party of Socialists.

LORD CROMER'S speech at the Eighty Club was the occasion for an article in the *Spectator* which gave good reasons for the refusal of the British Government to redeem those optimistic promises of the early days of the Occupation. Answering the question as to why Egypt should not be left to govern herself in her own way and live according to her own inclinations, if she should prove unable to create a Parliament modelled upon Western ideas, the writer said :

To do that would be to allow Egypt to return to despotism and misery. If Lord Cromer can make one claim more justly than another, it is that he helped the *poor* people of Egypt. He helped them as against the more nimble-witted and educated class who were very well able to look after themselves and their pockets. It would be an inhuman dereliction of our duty in the world to sacrifice the *poor* Egyptians, allow them to become once more the prey of extortioners and

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bullies. That is our sincere opinion, and we are prepared to stand by it against any plan for sacrificing them, however much that plan might be disguised by political sentimentalism, or however unconscious its authors might be of the cruelty they proposed. There might conceivably be a benevolent despotism for a short time, it is true ; but just as the American proverb about acquired wealth says " From shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves in three generations," so we are sure would it be a case of passing back to the bad old sort of tyranny in Egypt in about the same time, if not sooner.

The people of Egypt have now a direct appeal to British officials. Their habit of petitioning is no empty form. Grievances are examined and remedied as quickly as possible, and the people well know that this is so. It may be, as some pessimists think, that the Egyptian will never qualify for Parliamentary Government. His mind works differently from ours, and it is thought that one might as well invite a horse to become a lion. In any case, we are certain that it will be a long time before Britain can honestly leave Egyptians to their own devices. It is because we are sure of that that we fear lest Egyptian Nationalists should think any of Lord Cromer's generous words are an encouragement which ought naturally to be followed rapidly by the establishment of a Constitutional Government. The chief defect of the Proclamation which Queen Victoria issued when the Crown took over the Government of India from the old Company was, that it employed vague images which Indians have been able to quote ever since as a sort of promise of the gift of self-government. Frankly, we regard the future fitness of the Egyptians for Constitutional Government as an open question. There is no analogy between one country and any other ; the Young Turks have acted with singular coolness and wisdom, the Egyptian Nationalists never have ; and similarly we might go on and demonstrate that there is no possible comparison between Persia (whatever one may think of the prospects of constitutionalism there) and Egypt,

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or between India and Egypt, because of their fundamental differences in personal character and the difference in their obligations to other Powers. Englishmen have that habit of mind which postulates Parliamentary government. We say honestly that we would rather live under a bad democracy in Britain with the continual hope of improvement than under a good autocracy. But then Britain is peopled by men of Western race, and men who believe in and desire free institutions. Nothing we have said can be taken as a symptom of a waning democratic faith. But we refuse to bow the knee in the temple of any universal formula, or to admit that because constitutionalism agrees with white men, it must therefore agree with those of a totally different race.

Another important reason which prevents our Western and modern ideas of constitutionalism from being suitable for the East, and a reason which it seems hopeless to expect the younger Eastern generations to appreciate, is enunciated by Mr. Hogarth in his "Wandering Scholar in the Levant," which appeared in the *Egyptian Standard* on May 8th, 1909 :

These nations of the East are in their childhood; but it is their second childhood. They began to live before us, and, in a climate where there are no strenuous battles to fight with nature, have developed racially, as they develop individually, more rapidly than we. The Egyptian was adult while we were in the caves, and the Anatolian was living in great cities when we were setting up shapeless monoliths on Salisbury Plain. Now they are all very old and cannot put on again their youthful energy or fall into the ways of a later generation. How seldom do we realise this truth in thought or speech ! It is a commonplace to regard the Eastern nations as children, to whom we are schoolmasters. India is to be taught Western methods, Egypt set in the path of our own development,

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Turkey regenerated in our image. Vanity of all vanities; here is the sheerest alchemy! It is we that are the children of these fathers; we have learned of them, but we shall surpass and outlive them, and our development is not just what theirs has been, even as the development of a second generation is never quite like that of the first. When we speak of educating India or Egypt we are the modern son who proposes to bring his father up to date. We are dominant in those lands for the sake not of their but our own development, and in order to use them as our "stepping-stones to higher things." It is possibly not amiss for our own moral nature that we hug an altruistic illusion at home, and we find little difficulty in doing so; but it is less easy abroad. No one who has been long in Egypt appears ever to talk about the "political education" of the Egyptians.

Agitation and a general feeling of unrest, discontent against the sovereign of Egypt, active antagonism to the policy of the British Agent, intestine jealousies and open quarrels among the rival political parties, overshadowed the dawn of the year 1909, and a threatening horizon promised worse to come.

Sir Eldon Gorst's declaration, that as long as the British Occupation lasted no measure of self-government could be granted without the confirmation of the British Government, called forth active protests from both Sheikh Ali Youssef and Loutfy Bey, the leader of the Party of the People vigorously attacking the British for the non-fulfilment of their early promise, and blaming the Khedive for his harmonious relations with Sir Eldon Gorst and his want of confidence in his subjects. With a love of tortuous phraseology he clothed his only half-formed reasonings with a wealth of words which were impressive even if unconvincing :

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As soon as a nation is formed and has become a conglomeration of several individuals who appreciate their reunion and their solidarity, and who know how to harmonise individual interest with public interest, the nation is entitled to a Constitution.

And again :

All political writers agree that every political society, *i.e.* every nation, is a natural emanation of those natural creations which follow the natural principles which regulate the existence of everything created.

Notwithstanding Loutfy's attitude towards the Khedive, His Highness singled him out for special notice on the occasion of the inauguration of the Egyptian University, and for a few brief days the Party of the People basked in the smiles of royalty, which drew upon their leader the fury of the Extremists, whose animosity against their sovereign was daily becoming more bitter. Indeed, so unbridled had their denunciations grown, that quite early in the year the Government considered the advisability of instituting legal proceedings against certain members of the Extremist faction for articles in the Press holding the Khedive up to public odium and contempt. Thanks, however, to the magnanimity of the sovereign, it was decided to take no action in the matter, although only a few months later it was found necessary to adopt measures for the repression of these and other equally dangerous symptoms of opposition to the prevailing regime.

Not only was the Extremist Party at variance with every other party and every representation of constituted authority, but its members were far from

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being united among themselves. After a brief period of existence, its European organs, the French and English *Standards*, lay in the throes of dissolution, and early in January there were well-founded rumours that Farid Bey had severed his connection with these moribund weaklings, whose birth only two years before had been regarded as a substantial step towards the realisation of Extremist desires. Founded to voice throughout Europe the woes of Egypt, and to be the means of arousing sympathy for the Extremist cause, such little influence which they may have had at first rapidly dwindled. They passed from view, regretted by few except those friends of Mustapha Pasha Kamel who resented Farid's action in ridding himself of the journalistic incubi bequeathed to him.

There were pæans of thanksgiving in the Coptic Press a few weeks later, when it became known that Sheikh Aziz Shawish was leaving Egypt for Constantinople. It was hoped that his absence from Egypt would be permanent, but it only lasted a few days. Shawish was by many deemed responsible for the late wave of disaffection and unrest, and the disquieting symptoms of fanaticism. It was said that he had encouraged the hostility between natives and foreigners, the disobedience of the students, the defiance of the brigand and criminal classes, and it was hoped that once his baneful influence was removed Egypt might regain her composure and her prosperity. The continuance of the financial strain, attributed by *El Watan* to Shawish's influence, was pointed to by the Extremists themselves as another item in the

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list of grievances against the Occupation. The alien domination was declared to favour foreign labour at the expense of native. Facts and figures were invented and manipulated to support this view, and when ingenuity failed in this direction *El Dustoor* evolved another brilliant suggestion to account for the crisis. This, it declared, was the necessary consequence of the fight for independence which it and its Extremist contemporaries were triumphantly waging. It warned its readers that surely there were various other calamities in store, but enjoined cheerful submission to the prospect of other woes and worries in the anticipation of the joyful independence of the future.

There were many others who ascribed the financial troubles to the Extremists. Miralai Ibrahim Bey Raggi presented a petition signed by 500 substantial persons—Government officials, notables, merchants, and landed proprietors—to Sir Eldon Gorst, protesting against the mischievous policy of the Extremists, which, by sowing the seeds of sedition and disturbing the peace of the country, was shaking the confidence of Europe in Egypt.

Hassan Bey el Akkad, once a bitter critic of Lord Cromer, and one of the first to welcome Sir Eldon, found a different cause for the continued depression from which the country was suffering :

Since the departure of Lord Cromer, Egypt has been afflicted by all kinds of scourges. The crisis which is still affecting her has already claimed numerous victims, and if the situation does not soon change, the Egyptians will consist of paupers, men deprived of property, bankrupts

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and dismissed employ  s. Further, absolute anarchy reigns throughout the country, and public security exists only in name. In spite of this, Sir Eldon Gorst refuses to intervene, and, unmoved, looks on at the ruin of the country.

In the time of Ismail Pasha, Egypt experienced a similar crisis. During the American War the price of Egyptian cotton rose considerably, only to suddenly fall when the war ended. A bitter crisis naturally followed which had disastrous results. The Egyptians owed in Europe more than  7,000,000, equivalent to  50,000,000 at present. What did Ismail do ? He simply intervened between Egypt and his subjects, putting on the shoulders of the Government the debts of the people, allowing them ten years in which to repay to the Government the moneys which it had expended for them. This was the action of an autocratic and absolute Government ; but what has our present Liberal Government done ? Sir Eldon Gorst should send in his resignation now that he recognises himself as incapable of saving the country. Perhaps his successor would be more lucky than he, and would resemble Lord Cromer to a small degree in energy and initiative.

The feeling against the British Agent which was thus voiced grew steadily stronger. The possibility of his departure was openly discussed, and not only among the natives, but among his own countrymen, the wish was in some cases father to the thought. It is not unlikely that Sir Eldon himself would have welcomed an opportunity that would have paved the way to his resignation of a post which had grown to be a singularly ungrateful and irksome one. The control which once had been wielded so energetically by Lord Cromer had practically passed to the Foreign Office. The office of British Consul-General itself had considerably diminished in importance since the Anglo-

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French *entente*, and, hampered and restricted by the limitations of the home authorities, the British representative had become the scapegoat for the errors of judgment committed by them.

In pleasing contrast to the hostile tone and exaggerated claims of many of the Extremist programmes are the moderate aims and practicable policy of other Nationalist organisations. Early in 1909, in a newspaper article, Hafiz Awad reviewed the progress of Nationalist claims and growth of Nationalist feeling within the last two years, and his proposals, which were submitted by the Legislative Council to the Khedivial Government, were so clearly defined and reasonable as to disarm criticism from all save those who had adopted an uncompromising *non possumus* attitude. Consequently it was unanimously voted to ask the Khedivial Government to prepare a *projet de loi organique*, conferring upon the nation the right to participate effectively in the internal administration of the country, and in the direction of its local affairs. The laws which the Council should be competent to pass were to have no effect upon the international treaties, the Capitulations, the Public Debt, the Law of Liquidation, the relation of Europeans with the Government on their vested rights, the Turkish Tribute, nor upon the treaty-making powers of the Government.

These demands were embodied in plain, precise language, and were confined to general principles and issues, the details of which could be left to the Government without fear of the main issues becoming obscured, though it was more than doubtful that public opinion

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at home would prove sufficiently strong to force the hand of the British Government into making concessions which were against the policies of both Lord Cromer and his successor.

Moderation, also, was the keynote of the programme of Aknoukh Effendi Fanous, leader of the Independent Egyptians, which programme was the result of many months' anxious consideration. Fanous was one of the best orators in Egypt, a far-seeing and able man of real ability, and among his adherents was a large number of highly educated notables. The one main argument against his achieving recognition was the fact of his being a Copt, the question of religion always offering insurmountable difficulties, but even *El Lewa* eventually gave a tardy recognition of the merits of this new party which, owing to the ceaseless squabbles of the others, stood more chance of success in the future.

Another political journal, *El Nizam*, made its appearance about the same time, under the management of Mohammed Effendi Massoud, formerly in partnership with Hafiz Awad. Unconnected with any special party, *El Nizam* advocated a moderate and sober policy, which should pave the way to the acquirement of a constitutional regime.

Another party, of which little was heard beyond its programme and the name of its founder, Dr. Hassan Fehmi Bey Gamal el Din, was the Blessed Party of Socialists, which was said to have produced a marvellous impression on the villagers. Perhaps some day, in the far future, his tenets may prove a power in the

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land, but up to the present, owing to the fact that they have practically no political importance and no religious bias, they have produced little effect. The following is the programme of the Blessed Party of Socialists :

1. To improve the condition of the poor fellaheen, and fix the time of their daily work in the field.

2. The fellah to be given a certain share of the annual income of the land where he works, according to his labour.

3. To give pensions to the aged or sick among the fellaheen.

4. To forbid landlords to employ the fellah's wife or other female relative on his estates.

5. The husband not to compel his wife to do such work as may be too hard for a woman.

6. The fellah not to be obliged to work overtime.

7. The fellah to be treated kindly. In case he receives cruel treatment from his landlord, he should have the right to accuse the latter to the court and to the omdeh.

8. The Government to be requested to examine the "Serkis" of the fellaheen and the landlords.

9. The authorities to adjust any difference which may arise between the fellaheen and the landlords.

10. The omdeh to serve the inhabitants of his village and not to lord over them.

11. The Government to limit the omdeh's influence and create a new regulation to this effect.

12. The fellah not to be compelled to overwork himself or to do any of his wife's work.

13. A wife to serve her husband and children, and manage her cottage.

CHAPTER II

THE STRIKE OF EL AZHAR STUDENTS

Student Enthusiasm for Nationalism—Its Effect upon the Annual Examinations—Strike at El Azhar University—The Students' Riot—Meeting of the Superior Council—Threatened Prosecution of the Strikers—Resignation of the Chancellor—Khalil Pasha Hamada given Temporary Control of the University—The Disorder Spreads—Khalil Hamada tried before the Parquet—The Rioters Pardoned—The Government's Vacillation—Continued Unrest in the University—Ex-Students' Mission to the Provinces—Further Strikes in the Schools—Abuse of the Khedive, the Royal Family, and the Government—Increase of the Army of Occupation.

WE have had many occasions to mention the pernicious influence of the Extremists upon the minds of the young, and especially upon those of the students, in the various Government and other centres of learning in Cairo and the provinces.

Under the ægis of Mustapha Pasha Kamel, many of these schools became hotbeds of agitation and political discussion. Himself an ex-student, he became their idol, and almost to a unit they were his ardent adherents, responding to every sentiment he enunciated, and embracing his specious doctrines with every fibre of their undisciplined natures. Under the more baneful influence of Sheikh Shawish, the wily Tunisian, they became even more demoralised, swelling the ranks of every demonstration and political gathering, to the neglect of their studies, and following his perverted lead with a blind faith.

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Owing to this devotion to politics on the part of the students, there was a lamentable falling off in the standard of scholarship at the annual examinations, a result, however, which was attributed by them and their sympathisers to the hatred of the authorities, who were said to have instructed the examiners to "plough" as many as possible.

Up to the beginning of this year, 1909, the students of the Mohammedan University of El Azhar had mostly kept aloof from political disturbances; and it is on record that, thanks partly to the influence of Sheikh Ali Youssef, they had even protested against the active part taken by other students in the demonstrations against the Constitutional Reformers and *El Moayad*, which had marked the close of the preceding year. However, it was only a few weeks later that troubles occurred in the sacred precincts of El Azhar, which resulted in the students embarking on a series of disorders which were eagerly turned to political account by the malcontents.

The reason for the disaffection and consequent strike which for many weeks swamped the towns and provinces with discontented students, defiled the sacred precincts of the most ancient scholastic edifice in the world with the presence of the police, and created an unwholesome precedent in its historic career, was primarily the contemplation of certain reforms in its curriculum. This curriculum, which had been handed down intact from early mediæval days, cumbered with the traditions of the past, had little to recommend it. The agitation caused by the proposed reforms was

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eagerly seized upon by Farid Bey and his colleagues to start a counterblast against his rival, Sheikh Ali Youssef, who had been partially responsible for the protest mentioned above.

From party motives, Farid Bey proceeded to take advantage of the feelings of unrest in the minds of the young fanatics, by engineering their grievances to his own ends. Their subsequent demonstrations and processions were swelled by hundreds of Extremists, who found it no difficult matter to inflame their discontented minds, and to persuade them to join in actual hostilities against the Constitutional Reformers. Cleverly handled by these agents, they paraded the town, cheering the offices of the Extremist organs, howling execrations under the windows of the Moderates and the offices of *El Moayad*. Not content with mere noise, they proceeded to actual violence, and were not dispersed before various personal injuries had been sustained by the agency of stones and other missiles.

A circular issued by the Chancellor of the university requiring their immediate return to work on pain of losing their allowances, proved quite inadequate to turn them back from the path of reckless insubordination which they had chosen to tread.

Supplied with money, board and lodging by their sympathisers, they announced their intention of continuing their obdurate behaviour till their demands had been granted; even the unheard-of threat of locking the university gates against them failed to shake their determination.

The special meeting of the Superior Council under

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the presidency of the Khedive, with its special committee to inquire into the complaints and grievances of the strikers was only partially successful. The threatened prosecution before the Mouski Tribunal only resulted in the departure of a large number of the malcontents to the provinces, leaving their affairs in the hands of their committee, which, assisted by public sympathy, was advocating a still further stand.

The greater number of these students were the sons of the poor fellaheen of the country, their only claim to a university career being the committing to memory of a certain portion of the Koran. They were innocent of any knowledge of modern science or modern thought, and the curriculum of their college was confined strictly to the study of the Mohammedan religion, anything more being deemed not only superfluous but also pernicious. In many cases, these lads only entered the university in order to evade military service, and when it is remembered that there were some 19,000 of these uneducated, and mostly fanatical, students drawn not only from Egypt, but from far-distant Mohammedan countries, it will easily be realised what a fallow ground they formed in which unscrupulous agitators might sow the seeds of sedition.

The threats of punishment were followed by petitions and protests ; indignant telegrams were dispatched to the Sultan, the Grand Caliph of Islam, to the Khedive, and even to Sir Eldon Gorst—who had no control whatever over the matter—questioning the decision of the Superior Council; and though eventually a certain number were persuaded to resume work under the

favourable terms offered by the authorities, the most recalcitrant held out for many weeks.

Then the Chancellor—said to be in sympathy with the students—resigned, and the Director-General of the Wakfs,* Khalil Pasha Hamada, was given temporary control. His efforts to restore discipline, however, led to further recriminations. Fearful stories of floggings and brutality were bruited about with incredible effect.

The temper of that portion of the Egyptian population which must always be reckoned with in times of political agitation, seethed to boiling pitch. Mass meetings and demonstrations before the house of the superseded Chancellor showed the direction in which popular sentiment ran, and it was rumoured that the resignation of the Ministry was contemplated.

The so-called illegal acts of Khalil Pasha Hamada were the cause of his trial before the Native Parquet. Nationalists of all classes were against him, Farid heading protests to the Khedive, to Boutros Pasha Ghali—whose position as a Copt was a very delicate one—and even, by devious routes, to the Ottoman Parliament itself; but in spite of protests, bribed witnesses, and all the influences that could be bought,

* *Wakfs*, in the words of the English translator of the Egyptian Code, are “those things which are held in mortmain for the benefit of religious institutions, and of which the usufruct may in like manner be granted to individuals on conditions fixed by those who have constituted this kind of entail or by Government.” One of the chief Moslem lawyers has said, “When an estate is made Wakf, the property is vested in God alone, and the usufruct or yearly produce passes to the family of the founder, or to special legatees, and finally to religious institutions or charities.” The Wakf Administration is the centralisation of the management of Wakf property.

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begged, or intimidated, the finding of the court was a complete vindication of Hamada's actions, though the salutary lesson which the decision might have taught the strikers was completely negated by the free pardon ultimately extended to them.

The circumstances were significant, coming as they did after the display of lawlessness on the part of the students of the higher secular schools in Cairo, and were very symptomatic of the existing state of affairs. The most alarming feature of the time was the spirit of insubordination to all constituted authority fostered by the Nationalists of the *Lewa* type, and aided by the Party of the People, whose vilifications of the Khedive, the Ministers and the Government were becoming a menace to public safety. Unfortunately, there was but little doubt that there had been deplorable vacillation in the matter of the El Azhar strike, the Government having signally failed in the exercise of its authority, and been badly worsted by the Extremists, thus losing considerably in prestige.

As for the students themselves, it was many months before they properly settled down, and it is doubtful if the results of the virtually successful strike will ever be eradicated. Not only have the students continued to interest themselves in party politics, but it is evident that the concord which used to exist between them and their sheikhs has been rudely dispelled. There have been disputes over time-tables, and minor troubles in which the orders of the authorities have had to yield to the demands of the students, and in spite of the old tradition which regarded newspapers as anathema

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to all true students of the Koran, there has been a close connection and intercourse between the graduates and the offices of the vernacular Press.

One of the immediate results of the strike was the mission entrusted to ex-students to tour the provinces, with the object of spreading seditious propaganda with their religious tenets, and it is to the influence of these missionaries, inculcating politics together with the articles of the Moslem faith from the vantage ground of the Mosques, that many of the later strikes and insubordination must be attributed.

There were strikes at the Theological University at Tantah, and at the religious schools at Damietta and Dessouk. To the influence, too, of the Extremists must be ascribed the riots between the students of the Government schools at the football competitions at Port Said and Zagazig, the disgraceful attack upon the tram conductors by the students of the Saidieh Schools, the outbreak on the part of the students of the Higher Schools at the Agricultural Exhibition, with their excuse, "We shall do as we like, for this is our own country," and, to a certain degree, the attempt to embroil the Egyptian University in party politics, as well as the minor strikes among cabmen and others. No wonder that the moderate sections of the Press and the independent residents regarded the outlook as menacing, and looked to the future anxiously. Turbulence and lawlessness were allowed to continue without hindrance day after day, the united efforts of the Extremists and Party of the People exciting animosity against the Khedive and members of his

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family, and against the Government. Even the private lives of the Princesses were not immune from venomous suggestions. The effect of such taunts as these on the inflammable minds of the ignorant and impressionable pointed to irreparable disaster, and the policy of inaction on the part of the Government only increased the danger.

The great, overwhelming desire of the Extremists was, of course, to free the country from the British Occupation, and proclaim a Constitution for Egypt, either with or without the support of Turkey, and the attainment of their desire was rendered still more remote by Mr. Haldane increasing in numbers and efficiency the Army of Occupation. This action was ascribed by *El Lewa* to the necessity of keeping a strong contingent within touch of India, the country whose revolution against British control was, according to this prophetic journal, to be triumphantly concluded in the near future.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESS LAW

Increased Authority of the Khedive—Relaxation of the Control of the British Advisers and Inspectors—Prince Hussein Pasha Kamel appointed President of the Legislative Council—First Meeting of the Council—Dislike of Boutros Pasha Ghali—Inauguration of Port Sudan—Modification of the Press Law—Consternation in the Nationalist Camp—A Loophole in the Law—*El Lewa* and other Extremist Papers slip through—The Riot of April 1st—Imprisonment of Leaders—Sudden Departure of Farid Bey—Secession of Wagdi Bey—His Manifesto.

WHILE the influence of the Khedive, his Ministers, and the Government was being undermined by the tactics of the Extremists, various improvements and concessions were granted by the occupying Power. It was an open secret that the Khedive had been allowed an almost free hand in the construction of his Council of Ministers, consequent on the retirement of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, and that in consequence he wielded much more extensive authority over public affairs than he had done in Lord Cromer's time. That Mustapha Pasha Fehmi's successor, Boutros Pasha Ghali, should have been chosen from the Coptic minority of the population, and that he should have been a staunch ally of the English Occupation were doubtless among the many reasons for his falling under the ban of the Extremists, but otherwise he was a high-minded, capable Minister, and one well suited to the position he held. Among the other changes in the Government effected during the past

year were the relaxation of the control of the British Advisers and Inspectors, whereby the Ministers and mudirs were enabled to participate more effectively in the general and local administrations, and an increase of dignity and importance given to the Legislative Council by the attendance of the Ministers for the purpose of discussing measures submitted by that body. Moreover, the Legislative Council was further dignified by the appointment of Prince Hussein Pasha Kamel, son of the late Ismail Pasha and uncle of the present Khedive, as President, an appointment which was enthusiastically received, many people declaring that it would give new life and greater influence to the Council, and that it was the first step to making it a really constitutional assembly. So impressed were the members by the signal honour accorded them by the presence of this august prince, that at first they found it difficult to criticise or veto any suggestion made by him; but in spite of the Extremists' complaint that his appointment was made for the purpose of overawing the Council, he was eminently fitted by personal ability and family traditions to fill the post with dignity and success.

The first meeting of the Legislative Council, early in February, was followed a week later by the meeting of the General Assembly, when, among a number of other resolutions, it was decided that in future their proceedings should be made public—a decision which will call for further remark later. The usual resolution anent the granting of a Constitution was also passed, regardless of the presence of Prince Hussein and in spite of the emphatic declaration of Boutros Pasha

Ghali that the Government had no intention of granting any further concessions at the moment. This declaration drew an indignant protest from Yehia Pasha—"the Clemenceau of Egypt," according to his admirers, who gave him the title for having on two occasions stood out against the Ministry and so proved himself "one of the great men who will be able to rule the country in an exemplary manner."

Boutros Pasha Ghali, even thus early in his reign, had met difficulties in his position as Prime Minister, and the complaints of his Extremist detractors were even then beginning to bear fruit. There were rumours of serious differences between him and his colleagues on various subjects. He was accused of being responsible for the trouble at El Azhar, though it was known that he had contemplated resigning in consequence of it and that the Khedive had dealt with the matter personally. His action with regard to the Denishwai tribunal was always brought up against him; so was the part he had played in the Sudan Convention. When he was absent at the inauguration of the Esneh Barrage, his detractors hinted at other troubles; when he entertained English officials at his receptions, he was said to be currying favour with the enemies of his country; when he shared the carriage of his sovereign, the on-lookers marvelled that "Effendina" could bear the close proximity of a detested infidel.

His appearance with His Highness and suite at the official inauguration of Port Sudan would surely have led to further recriminations had it not been for the fact that the Khedive had personal control of the

invitations issued, and that none but the moderate members of the Press were favoured with them. This precaution was, perhaps, prompted by a long protest from Farid Bey blaming both the Khedive and the members of the Legislative Council for attending "where the Sovereign and his government officials will have to stand under the British flag, hoisted beside the Egyptian over the land which was conquered by the sons of Egypt in the time of Mohammed Ali." So strong, indeed, was the feeling of bitterness in connection with this incident of the Port Sudan inauguration that extra precautions had to be taken to ensure the safety of the Khedive, orders being sent to the native officials of the various localities *en route* between Cairo and the scene of the inauguration scrupulously to watch the line and keep strict control over suspicious characters.

It was at the time of the Port Sudan ceremony—the end of March, 1909—when the Khedive and his Ministers were absent from the capital and Sir Eldon Gorst was on a short tour in Syria, that a startling rumour was spread abroad that drastic measures were to be taken with regard to the liberty of the Press. At first thought to be but one of the many groundless reports so eagerly seized by unscrupulous agitators, it was confirmed by the formal announcement, emanating from the Council of Ministers, that a modification of the Press Law of 1881 had been enacted. This law provided that:

In the interests of order, morality, and religion the Government may suppress any paper on an order from

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the Minister of Interior after it has been twice reprimanded, or on a decision of the Council of Ministers without any previous reprimand, in which latter case the offending paper is liable also to a fine of from £E5 to £E20.

Promulgated by the late Tewfik Pasha, one of the mildest of men, this law came into force exactly a month before the opening of the first and only Egyptian Parliament. Then, as at the present time, the Press had been engaged in an anarchical campaign, and such a law had been deemed absolutely necessary to curb its excesses. It was passed before ever the hated English had entered into occupation of Egypt, and, indeed, was introduced during those halcyon days of freedom and independence so often regretted by the present agitators. It had fallen into disuse under the regime of Lord Cromer, in spite of appeals in 1902 and 1904 to the Government to re-enforce it. Lord Cromer, however, had always been against such restrictions of the Press, until the force of recent circumstances caused him to modify his opinions.

The modification of this law of 1881 was a provision that in no circumstances could the Government suppress a paper without obtaining the consent of the Council of Ministers, and it must be admitted that this much-discussed modification of 1909 contained no menace nor did it seriously affect the interests of either Press or public. Moreover, the constitution of the Ministry was such that there was little fear of their exerting their powers arbitrarily or capriciously. Indeed, there was reason to fear that they might err in the contrary

direction—some of them entertained Nationalist views—and by misguided moderation or misplaced leniency embolden the Extremists to repeat their former excesses. Yet at the announcement of the modification consternation reigned in the Extremist camp. It was rumoured that the Ministers in bulk were against it, and that a large number of Cairo lawyers were striking by way of protest. Extraordinary meetings of the Administrative Committee of the Nationalist Party and of other bodies were immediately called to discuss the situation. Protests of varying length were immediately dispatched by telegraph to the Khedive, to Boutros Pasha Ghali, to the Ministry of the Interior, and to the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Parliament, expressing the indignation of the patriots at a measure calculated to kill the liberty of the nation. The only answer to the message sent to the Porte was a resolution passed by the deputies advising the Sultan's Government to reinstate the old Press Law of their Empire and to suppress all newspapers criticising the work of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is not on record that the other vehement protests made by the Nationalists received any more sympathetic reply.

Not only were the bulk of the Extremist papers in arms against the measure, but many of the French papers also found cause for complaint. Even an English journal published a half-hearted protest in defence of the Nationalist offenders, who had been the cause of its revival. *El Lewa* and its kindred organs printed column upon column of furious diatribes against

the iniquities of the Government, collectively and individually, for the curtailment of its special privileges. They had at last a grievance against which they could show a united front, and they did not neglect the opportunity. Thus wrote Sheikh Shawish :

“ Oh, Pen ! Be as they make thee to be, either sleeping for the time being, or dead for ever. You leave behind you watching eyes that will not sleep and hands that cannot be chained ” ; an incitement to force which was as plain as the declaration in one of his speeches : “ We must attain by fire and sword what cannot be achieved by tongue and pen.”

A few days later another poem of a seditious nature appeared in *El Lewa*, of which the following is the translation :

Ready are we. The hearts of the people are burning and will explode on some future occasion. We will not continue in the state of misery designed for us. Those who submit are but asses and lifeless things. Patience under tyranny is so wretched that a free people could hardly endure it, even if they were buried alive. He who will not take measures in his own defence will perish under this flood of tyranny for ever. If they are putting a bridle on the freedom of the Press so that it may not divulge our pain and our anger, let it be known that this pressure will result in an explosion, a horror of upheaval which will cause some heads to be broken.

El Watan, the leading Coptic paper, ever loyal to the Government, was one of those that rejoiced at the firm stand at last taken by the Government, and looked upon the measure as the first step towards real reform. For years past it had maintained that the unbridled licence of the hostile Press would become a serious danger to the country, and that the incessant efforts

of the fanatical agitators were calculated to pave the way to a general rising. Current events amply justified its fears, for the country was in a deplorable condition of unrest, the result of the audacity of those who no longer feared the Government or respected the law—those, indeed, who regarded the law as a dead letter and the Government as a farce. This view of *El Watan* was fully confirmed by the *Egyptian Gazette*, which stated that the danger was far greater than ever had been known during the British Occupation, and that it was our fatal want of foresight and neglect of timely warnings which had made drastic measures of repression necessary. Our initial mistakes, said the *Gazette*, had been in the expectation of gratitude in return for favours and in our contemptuous belief that none of these parties was capable of fusion or cohesion. Consequently an enormous section of a once meek and subservient race had now grown sullen and discontented and were rallying round the standard of our enemies, while the deadly microbes of disloyalty to the reigning dynasty and fanatical animosity to the Occupation was permeating every part of the Egyptian social system.

The *Egyptian Gazette* also pointed out the one weak spot in the working of the Press Law, viz., that it only related to native Egyptians or those subject to local jurisdiction, a fact which practically rendered it powerless in the case of any paper that might secure foreign protection under the ægis of the Capitulations. This loophole was quickly made use of. We find the directors of *El Lewa* making arrangements to hand over the whole concern to Austrian and American hands—

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Shawish had long ere this taken advantage of his acquired French nationality—and various of the other Extremist papers followed the same course.

Meanwhile, there were monster gatherings and demonstrations, and wild rumours were spread abroad. The aim alike of demonstrations and rumours was to goad the credulous and superstitious populace into revolt against established authority. Hundreds of ignorant loafers, workless on account of the financial crisis, were ready and willing to profit by any general disturbance, so that the demonstrations were not only attended by thousands of real malcontents, but also by thousands who had little or no interest in the reason for the gathering. There were demonstrations in Ghezireh, and processions of all the rag-tag and bob-tail through the streets of Cairo to Abdin Square. At first fairly quiet and overawed by the police, later these demonstrators became openly seditious and riotous, yelling insults against the Khedive and all constitutional authorities. Then came the day (April 1st) when neither the mounted police nor soldiery were able to disperse the mob. It is significant that on that day not a solitary shoeblack could be found at his post. Chairs and tables from the neighbouring cafés were used as weapons, doors and windows were smashed, and there was indescribable disorder until the hose from the neighbouring central fire-station was brought into requisition, when the seething ardour of the mob was quickly put to rout by the judicious play of a stream of water. This was the occasion of the great oration of Ahmed Effendi Hilmi, editor of *El Kotr el Misri*,

who gave passionate vent to a curious mixture of politics and religion :

The integrity of Islam has been made a mock of and the theological students beaten. Who is able to suppress your liberty, you who number millions of people ? They [the Ministry, presumably] only number five persons. Will you submit to them and obey their commands ? They are fighting against Islam with tricks and artifices. . . .

The populace, for the most part ignorant of his meaning but loving invective, applauded rapturously at the speaker's allusions to the Prime Minister as a dog, and to Abdin Palace as the cemetery of the people. They boiled with virtuous indignation when the queries were hurled at them :

“ Do you fear Sir Eldon Gorst more than you fear God ? ” “ Are you readier to obey the commands of Sir Edward Grey than the commands of the Almighty ? ”

It was not the first time that Ahmed Effendi Hilmi had offended almost to the limits of endurance. It was but in February that he had been denounced by the Khedive's *Maïeh** for libel in his attack upon the Khedivate, his abuse of the system of the rights of succession, and his incitement of the nation to disobey and depose the reigning sovereign, with the result that, after various appeals and subtle evasions of the law, he received his punishment—twelve months imprisonment and the sequestration of his journal.

Various leaders of the agitators suffered imprisonment for the part they played in the Press riots, although

* The *Maïeh* of the Khedive is the local equivalent of the Lord Chamberlain's office.

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the sentences—two months and twenty days—can hardly be considered severe. There were rumours that the authorities were contemplating the advisability of instituting special legislation to deal with disturbances of the kind.

As to the rumours so diligently circulated by the inventive genius of *El Lewa*, they were without end. In one issue it stated that British rulers were accustomed purposely to introduce smallpox microbes into the food of the inhabitants of the British Colonies ; in another—contributed by Sheikh Shawish—that the visit of the Duke of Connaught was connected with the building of new forts and the restoration of others, so that neither Turkey, Germany nor Austria could find a way in to force the withdrawal of the Occupation. In support of the last mentioned rumour, special attention was drawn to the fact that activity had been shown of late within the walls of the old fort of Alexandria, which, as a matter of fact, was being demolished, not repaired.

Another rumour that gained some credence at this time was to the effect that the Government was endeavouring to secure evidence wherewith to justify the banishment of both Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish, and, by a singular coincidence, a few days after the pacific ceremonial at the inauguration of the Archæological Society's Congress, Farid Bey departed suddenly to Constantinople. Though his action was enveloped in secrecy and mystery, it was supposed that he was on a purely political mission, to establish cordial and intimate relations with the Committee of Union and Progress,

and by such means to get the ear of the Sultan and induce him to order the Khedive to grant the immediate introduction of a Parliamentary government and the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation. Seeing that the above-mentioned Society of Union and Progress had hitherto resisted all offers of friendship on the part of the Nationalists and openly rejected their methods, and that the Ottoman Government had even instituted rigorously repressive Press laws of its own, it was not very likely that Farid Bey would enjoy much success. Even among his own adherents there were many who were questioning his policy of hostility against the Khedive and his deviation from the programme of his predecessor, Mustapha Pasha Kamel. Among the latest to secede from his ranks was Wagdi Bey, editor of *El Dustoor*, an intimate friend of the late Kamel. Wagdi, it was said, had every desire to make himself leader of the party in place of Farid Bey, and his secession was attributed partly to pique at not being able to achieve his ambition, and partly at being offered no invitation to take part in the Nationalist Congress for discussing the general situation. On his secession he issued a manifesto, setting forth his policy, which included not only that of his late friend and leader, but also the following :

1. To induce the Khedive to lead the national movement.
2. To try to make Egyptian parties co-operate.
3. To cease describing patriots as traitors.
4. To give up public applause and cheers, and omit the shouts of "long live," and "down with."
5. Not to organise any demonstrations, unless the same be useful and approved by all parties.

CHAPTER IV

SIR ELDON GORST'S SECOND REPORT

HIS Views on the Question of Self-Government—The Principle on Trial—Criticism of the Legislative Council—Egypt not Ripe for Self-Government—Resignation of Sheikh El Bakri—Farid Bey's Campaign in Turkey and in England—The Troubles of the Extremists—*El Garida* Scandal—Its Change of Front—*El Moayad* banned in Turkey—The Deportation Commission—Its Shortcomings—The Suez Canal Concession.

EARLY in May, Sir Eldon Gorst's second Report was published, and was received, on the whole, with satisfaction. It was characterised by his usual perspicuity and conciseness, and dwelt with surprising candour on the causes of discontent, not only among the non-official, educated classes, but also among the English officials. It was also frank in the discussion of the hostility of the opposition Press, the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants of Egypt in favour of energetic measures, and the way in which the inaction of the authorities was regarded as a confession of weakness. It dwelt on the effect in Egypt of the revolution in Turkey, and especially on the lack of sympathy expressed by the Party of Young Turks for the Egyptian Nationalists. It spoke of the senseless agitations of the Extremists, which only acted as direct stumbling blocks in the way of progress towards self-government, and reiterated the reasons for reviving the Press Law. The fitness of the Egyptian people for

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self-government, said Sir Eldon, was already being tested, and, if the experiment justified it, due consideration of the advisability of a further advance would be given by His Majesty's Government.

The Report passed somewhat severe criticisms on the general attitude and the record of the Legislative Council, but declared that, on the whole, the most striking feature of the past year had been the progress made in the direction of giving satisfaction to the reasonable aspirations of the Egyptian people. In spite of this progress—perhaps on account of it—the spirit of insubordination to constituted authorities, abetted by the constant virulent and unfounded attacks upon the policy of the Government and its agents by sections of the vernacular Press, had been accompanied by the growth of a mischievous and reprehensible desire for notoriety in certain quarters, especially that attractive notoriety which, posing as patriotism, was always and unreasonably opposed to anything and everything emanating from the Government. For this state of affairs Sir Eldon was unable to enunciate a remedy beyond patiently waiting

. . . until the present excitable, undisciplined frame of mind, which seems to have infected a considerable proportion of the upper classes, has passed away. It may be hoped that in due course the disease will work itself out, and a return to common sense follow. In the meantime the only practical result of the agitation in which this very small minority of the whole population indulges, is to put back the clock, and to postpone the day when it will be possible to bestow upon the Egyptians a further instalment of autonomy.

With regard to the Legislative Council, Sir Eldon

Gorst had already given expression to his opinion that an indispensable preliminary to the consideration of the question of enlarging the sphere of both the Legislative Council and the General Assembly was that they should exercise wisely the functions which they already discharge, and thereby prove to the world at large that they were fit to be entrusted with more extended powers. In his previous Report, Sir Eldon had mentioned that the experience of recent years indicated that these bodies were moving in the right direction, and had on several occasions shown their capacity to play a useful part in the discussion of the legislative proposals of the Government. It was, therefore, with considerable disappointment that in his second Report he felt constrained to state that the endeavours and record of the Legislative Council during the last twelve months had not been of a nature to encourage the hopes of those who looked forward to its gradually acquiring more responsible functions. He stated that the recent proceedings in that assembly warranted the conclusion that it was losing ground, and that the part it played in the administrative system was less efficiently performed than hitherto.

Among his specific criticisms of the work of the Council, Sir Eldon Gorst expressed the opinion that much time had been wasted in arid discussions on the subject of a parliamentary government, that the discussion of the draft scheme of Provincial Councils had been unduly protracted, and that in the amendments suggested with regard to the new Pension Law nearly every one was made to procure more

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favourable conditions for the pensioner, instead of being aimed at the protection of the taxpayer.

The Report dwelt on the efforts taken by the Government, in spite of these discouraging results, to infuse greater vitality and utility into the discussions of the Council and to encourage the exercise of its consultative function. To this end, the members of the Cabinet had signified their intention, under the provisions of the Organic Law, of attending the debates of the Council, for the purpose of giving explanations on administrative matters and taking part in the discussions on legislation. Further, the old-standing grievance of the Council, that it had no jurisdiction on the subject of the regulations of the Education Department, had been removed by the official statement that all such regulations should be submitted to the Council before being finally and definitely confirmed by the Government. Finally, proof of the desire of the Government to increase the importance and usefulness of the Legislative Council was to be found in the recent election to the presidency of a prince of the reigning house, whose public spirit and devotion to the welfare of the country were universally recognised.

Sir Eldon's remarks upon the inefficiency of the Legislative Council caused the utmost excitement in political circles, and so much incensed Sheikh Said Tewfik el Bakri, a notable member of the Council, that he tendered his resignation on the plea that he no longer regarded it as sufficiently independent to represent the nation, its actions being so filtered and controlled by the authorities that he could not allow

himself to be held even partially responsible for anything it did.

The Sheikh's action provoked many comments. *El Moayad* approved his stand, and declared that if only all the other members of the Council would follow his important example the entire native Press would be with them in demanding the grant of a really representative institution. On the other hand, *El Lewa* was displeased with the Sheikh for having demeaned himself by noticing the comments of a person who was only a foreign Consul and had nothing officially to do with the Legislative Council. The discussion waged so hotly round the side issues of the question that the main point disappeared from view.

Sir Eldon Gorst's Report aroused much interest in London, as well as in Egypt, and though the great London papers expressed certain dissatisfaction and disappointment at the state of affairs which it disclosed, there was hardly sufficient evidence to warrant *El Lewa's* assertion that the condition of Egypt had reduced the British nation to a condition verging on panic.

Meanwhile, whatever the reasons that primarily took Farid Bey to Constantinople, he was evidently doing his best to ingratiate himself in influential quarters, not only in Turkey, but also in England. A lengthy letter to the *Daily News* proclaimed his particular views as to the spoiling of the Egyptians by its Government, and more especially as to the gagging of the native Press: "the closing of the safety valve through which the pent-up sentiments of the nation hitherto escaped, giving relief to the ailing bodies of the people." As the

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result of his interviews with certain Egyptian military men who had joined the Turkish army, he also wrote to *El Lewa*, recommending their example to all Egyptian officers on pension, so that they could practise tactics and render useful services to the Ottoman Empire, until Egypt had got rid of the Occupation and they could once more return to take their part in protecting the independence of their Fatherland. As to the party which he represented, the following article, taken from the columns of *El Watan*, will show how its policy was being affected by the trend of the times, even while the direction of its organ *El Lewa* was the subject of legal proceedings between the two brothers of the late Mustapha Pasha Kamel :

The Nationalist party is now in a state of transition and uncertainty which may end in its complete transformation or even dissolution. The change originated with the recent rupture between the Khedive and the leaders of the ultra Nationalist movement, a rupture which was the direct cause of the present campaign against the Khedive in the organs of the Extreme party. That campaign will perhaps come to an end after the recent decisions of the law courts in the last cases of sedition and *lèse-majesté* ; but the political change which gave birth to it is still in the preliminary stages of its existence. In our opinion, the change will ultimately lead to the disappearance of the party of which Mohammed Bey Farid is now the leader.

The extreme Nationalist party, as founded by Mustapha Kamel, was an Islamic institution, which had among its first principles blind loyalty to the Sultan and the Khedive. Under Farid Bey both potentates have been described as enemies of their country, and the allegiance of the party has been transferred to the opposite side. Farid Bey is now in Con-

stantinople, parading as the bosom friend of Ahmed Riza, President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, and supporter of the Young Turks. In his letters to *El Lewa* from Constantinople he never tires of denouncing the late Sultan and condemning his rule. He preaches the dogmas of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress in all their details, and advocates equality among Ottoman races and the adoption of certain measures which up to a recent date were considered by the party which follows him in Egypt as the antithesis of Islam. Of course, the conduct of Farid and *El Lewa* in this case is both logical and correct. As Constitutionalists and champions of Parliamentary institutions in Egypt, they advocate the cause of the reform party in Turkey. As the opponents of absolutism here they are showing enmity to despotism, even where the despot denounced is no less a person than the Sultan, whom they had always mentioned in terms of adoration and praise. And then the Society of Union and Progress has the power to help the Egyptian Nationalists in many ways. The Government of the Young Turks has already served Farid Bey and his party by retaining the present Cadi in his post against the wish of the ruling powers in Egypt. This Cadi is a man of strong will and many virtues, but he is, unfortunately, unfriendly to the highest authorities in this country, and is not unwilling to harass them at times. He could not remain in Egypt for any length of time were the authorities to work for his removal in earnest; but the party of *El Lewa* has achieved a success in his case so far, as a price of their allegiance to the cause of the victorious Society in the Turkish Empire.

In consequence of these arrangements *El Lewa* is writing now the best and the most sensible articles on the massacres and other questions of Turkey. It is even attacking *El Moayad* for its defence of Abdul Hamid and the Softas, or Mohammedan priests, who supported him in the last *coup d'état*. It approves the severity shown in dealing with these religious agitators. Its attitude, we repeat, is both logical

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and correct ; but it is neither Nationalism nor Mohammedanism as understood by the mass of the Nationalist party in this land. Indeed, the present attitude is entirely at variance with the spirit which has made *El Lewa* so popular among the Mohammedans of Egypt ; and the leaders of *El Lewa* party are now unconsciously drifting to the position which they endeavoured to allot to others in past years. They are becoming hostile to the people who have hitherto formed their party. These people heartily detest the Young Turks for their principles and treatment of the Sultan, who had always inspired the fanatical Mohammedan with feelings of veneration and attachment. The party of *El Lewa* cannot live on the present line of its leaders, and that wily rival who is the editor of *El Moayad* is regaining popularity and supplanting his antagonists in public favour by his bitter criticism of Turkish reformers, his apparent chagrin at the discomfiture of Abdul Hamid, and his defence of the rogues who planned the recent massacres in Syria and Anatolia. *El Moayad* is now voicing the sentiments of every Mohammedan in Egypt, and its success among a people of this nature is fully ensured.

El Lewa was not the only Nationalist organ to be torn by internal strife, for *El Garida* was much in the same position, certain of its shareholders having made application to the Cairo Mixed Tribunal, demanding the dissolution of the company for reasons which included the absorption of the company's capital in current expenses and the policy followed by its editors and leaders. This action was followed by sensational manifestos in the other vernacular papers, especially one by Hassan Bey Gamgoun, who laid stress on the last and most startling innovation of the editor, Loutfy Bey, in issuing invitations for a lecture in the offices of the paper by a Moslem lady on the subject of Woman's

Rights. For whatever other claims to progress and the liberty of the nation might be advocated, those which touched upon the subject of woman's rights were strictly taboo as inconsistent with Mohammedanism, if not actually pointing directly to perdition.

If the charges mentioned above were not sufficiently grave, there were worse to follow. The early policy of *El Garida* was to act as interpreter between the Government and people, and under the ægis of Lord Cromer, who was always sympathetic to the Party of the People, this meant the support of the constitutional authority of the Khedive and the British Occupation. The support of Lord Cromer's policy had remained even when the actions of the Khedive and his suite had been criticised. Departure from this policy was not observed till after the arrival of Sir Eldon Gorst, who was not inclined to follow the example of his predecessor with regard to the party. Henceforward its policy was entirely changed. Violent campaigns against the Occupation took the place of former support, and the party which had been formerly among the most obstinate detractors of Mustapha Pasha Kamel now brought its influence to the aid of his hot-headed successors, so that it would have been difficult to say which was the most pernicious in its effects on the community.

The opponent and rival of both these papers, *El Moayad* (Sheikh Ali Youssef), if gaining in favour in Egypt, was undoubtedly losing ground in Turkey, owing to its consistent support of the Abdul Hamid regime and its violent antagonism to the new Young Turk party. It was said that the Sheikh Ali Youssef was in close

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communication with Izzet Pasha. The most powerful Minister under the old regime, the latter was said to be financially interested in, if not practically controlling, the paper, with the result that the policy of hostility to the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress led to *El Moayad* being banned both in Turkey and in Syria, in which latter country Izzet Pasha still wielded enormous influence.

Towards the end of May another scheme, this time for the repression of crime, passed into law with the usual accompaniment of hysterical vituperation from the Press. For many months past, the increase of lawlessness and crime, not only in the provinces, but also in the towns, had become a menace to public security, and, owing to the facilities for evading justice, it had been found well nigh impossible to bring the worst criminals to book. Prison life held few horrors for them; in fact, it was almost popular, and the records of the year 1908 showed an increase of no less than 11,000 prisoners over those of the preceding year. So impossible was it to accommodate these applicants for punishment, that it was found necessary to release 1,700 of them by a so-called Act of Clemency, attributed to the Khedive before his departure to Europe. The necessity for a remedy became so apparent that the Deportation Commission was evolved.

Under this scheme, a man known to be an habitual criminal, and having been convicted of attempts against the lives and property of other people, could be placed for a maximum period of five years under police supervision and also be compelled to give a monetary

guarantee for future good behaviour. Should such a man be unable to furnish this necessary guarantee the mudir of his district could assign him a residence in a part of Egyptian territory provided by the Ministry of the Interior for that purpose, where he would be employed as an agricultural labourer in lieu of payment.

All decisions of the Deportation Commission should be without appeal, except in cases of judgment by default. The Ministry of Justice, however, on its own initiative, could revise the sentences of the Commission by a Special Committee, composed of the Ministry of Justice, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and Procureur-Général of the Native Tribunal.

Unfortunately, this Deportation Law did not prove such a success as was expected. Owing to its formulation, deportation was not the clear and direct penalty for certain offences, as it directed that after conviction the prisoner should pay a certain sum of money and remain for a certain time under the surveillance of the local police. The extreme penalty of deportation to one of the distant oases was only applicable when the sum of money was not forthcoming. When the law was first promulgated, it was thought that its practical result would be to enforce deportation upon all criminals, but in many cases fines of £700 to £800 were paid by notorious brigands who thereby were able to remain in their own villages under the very inefficient control of the local police.

It was also found extremely difficult to convict many of these notorious brigands and criminals, owing to the lack of evidence. The timid fellaheen had little or no

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confidence in a soft-hearted Government, and every reason to fear the vengeance of a villain who, perhaps, had committed innumerable crimes in his neighbourhood, and who would have no objection to committing a few more when the opportunity occurred.

Towards the end of May, too, the first rumour of the question of prolonging the concession to the Suez Canal Company was abroad: a question which, a few months later, was seriously to disturb the country, and which was one of several causes which led to the untoward fate of Boutros Pasha Ghali. At this first rumour, suspicions were aroused that the results of such a prolongation would be to the advantage of the company and to the detriment of Egypt. It was believed that the Anglo-French agreement contained some secret clauses connected with Egypt, and it was surmised that the extension of the concession involved some profitable arrangement in favour of the company, as there could be no other justification for such a sacrifice as it involved.* It was known that no less a sum than £16,000,000 had been sunk by the Egyptian Government in the Canal scheme, and yet, so far, Egypt had seen nothing of the vast profits of the undertaking. Small wonder that, on a cursory examination of the subject, the Egyptian patriots found cause for complaint.

* The Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez is *Egyptian*, not French, and this was decided by the Courts in France and in Egypt. The Board is, however, composed chiefly of Frenchmen, and the British Government is the most important shareholder.

CHAPTER V

THE MONTH OF ANNIVERSARIES

Session of the Legislative Council—Farcical Proceedings—Abaza Pasha's Refutation of the Consul-General's Criticisms of the Council—Committee formed to report on the Council—Report read and discussed *in camera*—Published in *Journal Officiel*—*El Lewa* and the Press Laws—Anniversaries of Massacre and Bombardment of Alexandria—Anniversary of Denishwai—Violence of *El Lewa* and *Misir el Fatat*—Indictment of Sheikh Shawish—An Emotional and Protracted Trial—The Verdict and Appeal—The Judgment Reversed.

THE first public session of the Legislative Council occupied the greater part of the month of June, affording thereby much entertainment to the lookers-on who, for the first time in the annals of the institution, were admitted to its galleries. Its proceedings during the first days of the session revealed a singular absence of the decorum which the Western idea deems incumbent upon such assemblies. The greater number of the members preserved an impassive and, in many cases, uninterested, attitude, leaving the discussions mainly to a small minority, who, as a rule, spoke in colloquial Arabic and from their seats, although, later in the session, they adopted the conventional attitude of speakers. The votes were recorded by a clerk, who asked each member in turn on which side he should record his opinions, the answers for the most part—at the commencement of the session—following the lead of the Minister who had taken part in the discussion.

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In the minds of most present, one of the outstanding features of the session was the refutation of Sir Eldon Gorst's criticisms of the past record of the Council. Ismail Pasha Abaza was known to have prepared an important speech on the subject, and on the first day's meeting was anxious to move an adjournment for the purpose of discussing it. Such an adjournment being declared to be against the rules of the Council, Abaza Pasha had to possess his soul in patience until the following day, when he made only a somewhat mild protest. In it, however, he proposed the election of a special committee to study and report on the failings of the Council as detailed by Sir Eldon Gorst, so that the world might know that his assertions as to the indolence and carelessness of the Council were not founded on facts. There was some difficulty about the formation of this committee, and a little heatedness engendered which led to a protest during discussion of quite another question—the disadvantages of public balloting. As for the august President, Prince Hussein, he undoubtedly showed signs of weariness from time to time, and politely refused to call members to order when three or four spoke simultaneously, though eventually he called upon the clerk to read certain articles of internal regulations as to manners of procedure, which were completely ignored by the speakers. In fact, no one seemed to pay any attention to anybody; even the clerk rose from his seat from time to time to argue certain points under discussion.

As for the business done: there were debates on many and various questions, such as the Deportation

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Law, length of sessions, Bourse Law, education schemes—chiefly religious—etc. ; but the two most important were those connected with the reform of the Provincial Councils and the committee's report on the Legislative Council.

We have not space here to enter fully into the question of the reforms of the Provincial Councils, important though they were as representing the first real step towards self-government in Egypt and "the fundamental basis of a representative system," as Sir Eldon Gorst declared them to be. The debate concerning these Councils was long and stormy, amendment after amendment being made in the proposed law.

The report of the special committee on Sir Eldon Gorst's Report was submitted to the Council towards the close of the session, its appearance being heralded by a rumour that the Prime Minister had evinced some misgiving as to its contents and had already conferred with Prince Hussein with the object of suppressing any unseemly expressions in it. Eventually it was moved that the said report should be read and discussed *in camera*, whereupon the Chamber was solemnly cleared of all strangers and Press representatives, and it was not until the following day that the much-talked-of report was made known to the public by means of the *Journal Officiel*. This report was convincing in some parts, but exceedingly weak in others, especially in its reasons concerning the delay in passing certain of its measures. It began by summarising the statements in Sir Eldon Gorst's Report, under four heads, as follows :—

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1. That the work of the Legislative Council during the last twelve months was not of a nature to strengthen the hopes of those who wished to see its powers enlarged. It had practically gone backward in the transaction of public business.

2. That it lost a long time in the abortive discussion of constitutional systems when it might have used that time for more practical work.

3. That it showed great neglect, procrastination and want of system in its work.

4. That certain Bills (enumerated in the Report of Sir Eldon Gorst) were unduly, and without reason, delayed for several months.

The following summary of the answers contained in the Special Committee's Report is quoted from the *Egyptian Gazette* of June 29th :

On the first of these statements the answer of the Legislative Council is logical and clear. It is the only strong point in all this long report. The committee makes a list of the work done by the Council in 1906 and 1907, years in which the British Agent extolled the work of the Council, and that done in 1908 which caused the unfavourable comments of Sir Eldon Gorst. From these lists it appears that the Legislative Council passed, in 1906, only 22 articles (8 Bills), in 1907 passed 84 articles (11 Bills), while in 1908 the articles discussed and passed were 263 (9 Bills). In the first of these three years, they modified 6 clauses, of which the Government accepted 4, in the second they modified 15 clauses, of which 6 were accepted, and in the third they modified 77 clauses, of which 53 were accepted by the Government.

On the second point the answer of the Legislative Council is a series of phrases and repetitions of the assertion that the discussion of a Constitution for Egypt is the noblest work of the Council, which hopes by constantly recurring to this

subject to gain some day for Egypt a constitutional form of Government.

On the third and fourth points the committee of the Council enumerates the causes of delay in passing certain Bills mentioned by Sir Eldon Gorst, viz., the Provincial Councils Bill, the Mehkemeh reforms, a Bill dealing with experts in the Native Tribunals, and the Pension Law.

Among their reasons for the delay the members of the Legislative Council state that during certain months of the year there were no meetings of the Council ; that on another occasion the members had to attend the meetings of the General Assembly ; that during the month of February, 1908, they followed the Khedive to Upper Egypt to see a great engineering work ; that in a certain month the heat was intense ; that at times the heads of public departments were abroad on leave and there was no use in doing work which was to be transmitted to them ; that there were other subjects before the Council waiting for discussion ; that in certain months the Council was busily engaged in claiming Parliamentary institutions.

Some four months had elapsed since the revival of the Press Law, and with one or two exceptions the vernacular papers had managed to evade its penalties. *El Lewa*, as we know, had been placed under the nominal direction of Dr. M. Rifaat, an American citizen, in the hope that the Government would thus be unable to apply the new law. It transpired, however, that Dr. Rifaat was primarily an Ottoman subject, who had adopted his foreign nationality without the consent of his Government. Hence he had lost his right to permanent residence in an Ottoman land, and in June was incontinently banished from the country, leaving Sheikh Shawish to face the results of various seditious statements concerning the Khedive and his arrival in

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Constantinople. Naturally, *El Lewa* was very angry at the summary treatment to which its temporary editor had been subjected, but it was rendered more angry still by the persistent rumours that, in addition to the expulsion of the editor, the paper itself was to be suppressed by an order of the Council of Ministers. Both Farid Bey—lately returned from Constantinople—and Sheikh Shawish denied these rumours, although, on the other hand, it was stated that Boutros Pasha Ghali was determined to bring the new law into operation against the *Lewa*, but was so strongly opposed by Mohammed Pasha Said and Said Pasha Zaghloul—both Nationalist in sympathy—that he was obliged to desist until the Khedive returned from Turkey. *El Lewa* vehemently declared that the whole story was the fabrication of a Coptic rival :

To say that the Government has suppressed *El Lewa* is a gross insult to the former. . . . If it did so, not only the shareholders in the company, but the whole nation would rise to defend the journal which represents them. *El Lewa* is the official journal of the Nationalist party—the greatest party in Egypt—and if the authorities were to attack this party it would make an enemy of the entire nation.

It was also confidently announced by the Nationalists that if the Government dared to lay a finger on *El Lewa*, two ministers—Mohammed Pasha Said and Said Pasha Zaghloul—would at once resign, and so put Boutros Pasha Ghali in another awkward position and increase the friction between him and the Moslem members of the Cabinet.

Two eventful anniversaries in June brought matters to a head, not only with regard to *El Lewa*, but also

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Misr el Fatat, which was said to be in danger of losing its German proprietor, Mr. August Cohn, in something after the same manner that *El Lewa* had lost the services of Dr. Rifaat. The former gentleman, in fact, severed his connection with *Misr el Fatat* a few weeks later, declining to bear further responsibility for its publication, in consequence of a communication from the Ministry of the Interior. The *Misr el Fatat* was adept at filling its columns with highly seasoned garbage for the delectation of its readers, but it outdid itself on the occasion of the anniversary of the Alexandria riots of June 11th, 1882, appearing with columns edged with mourning borders and with the following heavily leaded headlines :

“The 11th June, the anniversary of the crime which the English committed against Egypt! Remember it and never forget, Egyptians !”

June 11th, 1882, marked the massacre of the European residents in Alexandria, and not the bombardment, which did not take place until a month later. We can hardly suppose, however, that it was this massacre of Europeans that called forth the two columns of bombastic abuse such as appeared under the above headlines and concluded as follows :

By Allah, neither the day when Allah called his Prophet to him after fulfilling his mission, nor the day when Omar Ibn el Khaltab was attacked and wounded by Abou Loulouat, nor the day when the swords of the Prophet's disciples fell upon Othman Ibn Affan, nor the day when Ali Ibn Ali Taleb was murdered with the sword of Ibn Melgen, nor any other black day which has marked the world with tyranny was more violent, more appalling, more evil, more

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atrocious than the day when the English took the first step towards the occupation of this land.

So much for June 11th; but on the occasion of the anniversary of the Denishwai incident both *Misr el Fatat* and *El Lewa* started off at break-neck speed again. The likeness of Boutros Pasha Ghali figured on the top of the page in the former paper, followed by a lengthy article written round the Denishwai atrocities by the late Mustapha Pasha Kamel. Sheikh Shawish wrote a long article on the same subject in *El Lewa*—which, if report speaks truly, was approved before publication by Farid Bey and the lawyers of his party—reminding his readers of the wicked acts of all those who took part in the trial, especially Boutros Pasha Ghali, the Prime Minister, and Helbawi Bey. Not content with this anniversary article, he regarded the occasion as a fitting one for the translation of a very inflammatory speech made by one of the leaders in the American War of Independence, advocating war to the knife. This translation, headed “Freedom or Death!” was inserted with the expressed intention of the translator to show how easily the English could be got rid of when they *possess* a country, and hence how much more easily they might be got rid of when they only occupied a country and had no legal status in it. This article was followed by others, one of which commemorated the great revolution of the French nation, stating that “the Egyptians have to await the day when their legal and noble struggle shall bear fruit; that day is no doubt forthcoming.” Following hard on the heels of these seditious vapourings

came others commemorating the bombardment of Alexandria :

When the Arabi revolution took place, the English nation was preparing to open its mouth to swallow up Egypt, which is situated in the road to the British dominions in the Orient, and which is the key of the African Empire ; but it concealed its evil intention when Tewfik Pasha asked her to help him against the revolutionary party. Tewfik Pasha was then afraid that he might be compelled to abdicate the Khedivate if he did not answer the nation's demands, which were at that time right. Had Tewfik known that the English would waste the reserve funds and rob Egypt of the kingdom of the Sudan which they conquered with our lives and re-established over our heads and had its ground tinged with the blood of our dear children ; had he known that the English would send our troops to the most gloomy spots of the Sudan in order to employ them in uprooting the trees of forests and erecting buildings and fighting wild beasts and going on expeditions in the wilderness and collecting moneys for the Occupationists ; had he known that the English would prohibit the hashish trade, by the law, but allow a number of their officers to transport the same drug to Egypt on board their men-of-war ; had Tewfik known that any of these things would occur, he would never have cast himself and his children after him into such troubles, but would have preferred to expose himself to any event that might have come from his own nation.

The Denishwai anniversary was further emphasised by the announcement of a play under the same title, which was advertised by the *Lewa* to take place at one of the local theatres. Long before its production, however, the tide of well-merited retribution was flowing in the direction of the popular martyr who had



Photo - U.S. Army.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION

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exploited it. Mohammed Farid Bey, being in Constantinople at the head of a congratulatory Nationalist deputation, the Tunisian editor was made the scapegoat of the party—a position he claimed to be honoured to occupy—and haled before the Cairo Parquet to answer for his misdeeds. The inquiry resulted in his trial at the Abdin Native Court for having insulted both Boutros Pasha Ghali and Fathi Pasha Zaghloul as president and member of the Denishwai special court respectively, and for libelling Mohammed Bey Youssef, the native advocate who took part in the defence at the same trial. Further actions for libel were brought against him by Mohammed Bey Youssef and by his old rival, Sheikh Ali Youssef, editor of *El Moayad*.

The trial was sensational and emotional, the court throughout the proceedings being besieged by crowds of sympathisers of the defendant, whose case was conducted by his eloquent friends, Loutfy Bey and Shimi Bey. The moving speeches and subtle deductions with which they sought to prove the integrity of their leader frequently moved the latter to tears. For over a month the trial lingered on, the evidence pointing first to one verdict then to the other; but popular feeling in favour of the defendant never waned. Onlookers awaited the result with great anxiety, and the anxious feeling was intensified when the verdict, which was practically an acquittal, was pronounced.

Two days later, Sheikh Shawish, confident in the protection of friends in the Cabinet, and more than ever assured of his own invulnerability, was again

penning strong statements regarding the Prime Minister—Boutros Pasha Ghali—and others connected with the Government.

However, the Parquet General lodged an appeal against the judgment, and Mohammed Bey Youssef's claim of £E.10,000 was yet unsatisfied, so towards the end of August the idol of the discontented masses was again tried for his various misdemeanours before the Cairo Assize Court, where the former acquittal was reversed and a sentence of three months' imprisonment, with fines and damages amounting to £E.70, was passed. When one remembers that Ahmed Hilmi, editor of *El Kotr el Misri*, for an offence no more heinous, was undergoing a sentence of twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour, that passed on Sheikh Shawish seems to err on the side of leniency. Nevertheless, his admirers appeared to regard it as evidence that their hero was prepared to court martyrdom in the Nationalist cause. His high patriotism and dauntless courage formed a subject for popular admiration; wonderful panegyrics filled the columns of the papers, and huge demonstrations were organised to mark the progress made in the cause of true patriotism. A wonderful gold medal, commemorating the occasion, was prepared for the decoration of the new Joseph when he should be released from jail.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONALISTS AND BOUTROS PASHA GHALI

Assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie—Approval of the Extremists—*El Lewa* in Trouble Again—Apparent Apathy of the Home Government—Dislike of Boutros Pasha Ghali—Nationalists' Change of Policy towards the Khedive—Growth of Hostile Feeling against Boutros—Anniversary of the Inauguration of the Occupation—"The Geneva Congress"—Mr. Keir Hardie's Good Advice—Poor Results of the Congress.

DURING these anxious times, when the air was filled with a complexity of emotions aroused by seditious orations, inflammatory outpourings in the Press, fierce dissensions between rival parties and rival religions, the reports of congratulatory deputations to the new Sultan, Mohammed V., and the attendant Ottoman festivities, and above all with the increasing hopes of an excitable populace of a great Nationalist victory and the speedy termination of the British Occupation, came the news of the assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie by the Indian student, Dhingra. The Extremist papers in Egypt seized upon the occasion to further their ends, attempting to justify the crime, extolling the courage of the criminal, and likening his fate to that of a martyr in a holy cause.

The following extract from a poem which appeared in *El Lewa* shows the attitude of the Extremists towards this terrible tragedy :

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Oh, Hero of India, there is some hidden suffering within my soul, racked with death. I desired to show it on the day of your death, but objection might have been raised by the authorities. Yet the time will come when "it" will explain itself and the unconscious people will then understand that we are not slumbering.

A fulsome panegyric appeared in the same paper :

To-day Dhingra receives death. To-day he attains what he hoped for and desired. To-day he departs from this transitory world to the eternal one. To-day expires that great spirit which welcomed death for the love of home. To-day is the end of that young man's life in the world of vanity. To-day fades that fresh flower. To-day hearts beat with pity for him. To-day the pulse beats quicker with grief. To-day the English will wreak vengeance to calm their excitement.

To-day India puts on the garment of mourning for the loss of her son. To-day the fire of hatred is kindled in the hearts of the Indians against the English, and continues to burn. To-day those people will double their fight for their independence. To-day their words will agree and hearts unite together. To-day they will swear and take oath that they will fight against their enemies until they expel them from their country. To-day the words of Egypt's poet will be re-echoed in India : "The people that aspires to a grand life has to pass over a field of blood to its end."

To-day the Government of plunder will break down. To-day the Government of pillage and usurpation will be demolished. Salam Aleik (*Peace be on thee*), oh, Dhingra! Salam Aleik in the gloomy tomb. Salam Aleik for ever as long as you are mentioned and remembered. Salam Aleik, alive and dead.

An important result of this misdirected sympathy was an unsympathetic warning from the Ministry of the Interior that fresh trouble was in store for the

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editor of the offending paper. Of no avail was the plea of Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel that *El Lewa* was under the protection of a foreigner and so exempt from the jurisdiction of the Press Law, and after an extraordinary meeting of the executive committee of the Nationalist party, the offenders agreed to make the best of a bad position, and the Government's threat to use force if necessary, by ranging themselves with the world's martyrs to the cause of liberty.

The paper's comment on the warning was as follows :

It is to be remembered that the murderer is Dhingra, an Indian student ; and the murdered man, Sir Curzon Wylie—an English gentleman ; and herein lies the secret of the warning.

In other words : had the victim been non-English, and the criminal non-Indian, and the crime having no relation to the Indian Nationalist movement, the *Lewa* would never have received any notice, even if it were to fill its columns with panegyrics for the author of the crime. But it is the Englishman who always intervenes in our affairs and spoils them. The Englishman is the cause of our sorrows and misery ; the Englishman is our lack of ease, our calamity, our mishap, and our snare.

To listen to half the stories and rumours of the day ; to wade through a tithe of the astonishing lies and extravagances published assiduously throughout the country (such as the importing of poisoned flour, the institution of compulsory cremation regardless of religious customs, the immediate declaration of the Dustoor, and a thousand others equally devoid of foundation) was to make one wonder at the amazing

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inaction of the home authorities, who could suffer the loss to British prestige, and even endure the ill-advised remarks of reckless British sympathisers with the malcontents, without seeming to stir a finger to stem the tide of disaffection.

Everyone on the spot realised that the British ascendancy which characterised the Cromerian regime was fast disappearing, and that the only excuse for the present policy in Egypt was that it was proving to the world the absolute incapacity of the country for self-government. Even if one could have believed such Machiavelian tactics were deliberately employed, they were hardly consoling to those who had to pursue their avocations amid surroundings which daily were assuming more volcanic tendencies.

It was hard, and manifestly unfair, to lay the blame entirely upon the shoulders of Sir Eldon Gorst, even though it was difficult to approve or account for many of his actions ; but had the Foreign Secretary realised the exigencies of the situation we might have been spared much of the trouble and bitter humiliation which has been our lot.

It is useless to pretend that Sir Eldon Gorst was much more popular with his countrymen than with the natives ; and the reasons for his own personal failure, and the failure of the system he represented, were revealed in the home papers of the autumn of this year 1909, notably in the *Empire Review* and in *Truth*, although the letter which appeared in *The Outlook* was probably more representative of the feeling of Englishmen on the spot.

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The ill-feeling that was directed against Boutros Pasha Ghali, the Copt Prime Minister and one of the few native officials whose integrity was beyond reproach, grew in intensity during 1909. His religion, his connection with the Denishwai incident and the Sudan Convention, and his support of the Occupation, were the weapons with which he was invariably assailed, and, as time went on, we find even the most hated rivals among the Nationalist parties forgetting their differences in combining against him—the scapegoat for all their grievances. Sheikh Shawish's trial and imprisonment were attributed to his agency, and when Chimi Bey and Sheikh Ali Youssef joined hands in an amicable interview, resolving to unite in protestations of loyalty to the Khedive, there was little doubt but that their united front was a shelter from which all Mohammedan Nationalists could join in a new campaign against Boutros Pasha and redouble their efforts against the British rule. This change of policy towards the Khedive was clearly noticeable, in spite of that prince's assertion made in Constantinople, whither he had gone to pay his respects to the new Sultan, that he knew of no party representing the Egyptians worthy of the title of Nationalists. Notwithstanding this frank disavowal of the party, Chimi Bey saw fit to eat his words and deny his many, and glaringly offensive and disloyal, remarks towards his sovereign, though other people not gifted with so convenient a memory had no difficulty in reminding him of them. But since the relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had been so friendly, and the

Nationalist deputation to Turkey had also gained welcome support, according to their own report, it followed that they had to reconsider their position as loyal subjects—a position perhaps made more easy by the news of the prospective Khedivial pilgrimage to Mecca.

As for Boutros Pasha Ghali, Nationalist opinion was unanimous. He must be got rid of somehow. Under cover of a simple expedient for ridding the Ministry of him, and the country of the Occupation at the same time, *El Lewa* suggested that a council of the Ministry should meet at once under the presidency of the Khedive, and decide then and there to give the country the Constitution and independence it desired. If Boutros deserved his name and position, it was for him to solve the difficulty thus, without consulting the convenience of England; and if he could not do this, he had better resign. His enemies were never tired of reminding him of being a Copt and a Christian. They told him that they had acquiesced in his appointment because of their devotion to their noble and tolerant faith. Nevertheless they clamoured for his resignation.

Indeed, the Prime Minister's position was becoming most unenviable. The fanatical element was against him, and the Nationalist organs were constantly endeavouring to encompass his downfall, pestering him with hostile movements and intrigues. Now that the acrimonious criticisms lately directed against the Khedive were turned upon him, the feeling against him grew in strength and bitterness. Even in the Ministry itself enmity against him was apparent, and

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it was rumoured that one of the reasons for the change of Chimi Bey's attitude towards the Khedive was in the hope of persuading the latter to join in the movement against the Copt.

Unfortunately, Boutros had also alienated himself to some extent from his co-religionists. The necessity for holding his position without obtruding his own religious belief had gained for him the reputation of being a backslider. He had already been criticised for abstaining from interference in the Legislative Council with regard to religious measures unpalatable to the Copts, and when the disputes between the rival factions of the Coptic Church reached their climax he had refused to work for their conciliation.

September is the month memorable in Egyptian annals as having witnessed the inauguration of the British Occupation, a fact *El Lewa* has not been slow to take advantage of. The beginning of the month, in 1909, was heralded by an amazing effusion in its columns from the pen of a patriotic advocate of Assiout :

Thanks, foreign Occupation, for the lessons in true patriotism which thou givest us.

I call God and the angels to witness that thou art the most expert professor that has ever taught the practical science of the manner of arriving at the throne of the Angel of Liberty.

May God reward thee for us with his best reward. Thou provest each day, by undeniable proofs, that thou hast but one end : that of blasting us ; but one determination : that of destroying us ; but one effort : that of ruining the beautiful country which is ours.

Hail! then, profitable enemy! Hail! just tyrant! Hail! liberating oppressor! Hail! Haste thou to prepare us to enjoy our true life.

Egyptians! You see with your eyes, you hear with your ears, you feel in your hearts. Are you satisfied with this state? This Occupation, by its happy intention of initiating you into self-government, has rendered you the most humble, the most abject of nations.

It has impoverished you.

It has taken away from you several of your brethren in whom you had full confidence and on whom you based your best hopes.

What has it left you? Nothing except our hearts that in our bosoms burn with the desire to surmount the obstacles, whatever they may be; to arrive at the full powers of these imprescriptible rights for which the desire trembles in our veins with the blood that gives us life.

And you, traitors, know well that for each individual that the devil takes away from us, the Lord God will give us a thousand. Work out the list of your iniquities. We will pursue our path of glory: a path which for all peoples striving for their independence and their honour bristles with thorns and leads by dungeons, by tortures, and by martyrdom to immortal splendours.

The hateful day, September 14th, was commemorated by many of the vernacular papers—*El Lewa*, of course, included—by deep mourning edges around their columns, and admonitions to their readers to “put on mourning, refrain from amusements, do everything to show grief for your independence lost on that unfortunate day; so that the whole world may see the loathing of the English, and realise that if the Egyptians are not strong enough to exert their will to-day, they will be so to-morrow.” The leading

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article in *El Lexa* was headed, "To commemorate the appalling day, mourn! mourn! Oh Nation!" Another article talked of the day when "this land was polluted with the English, putrefied with their crimes, tainted with their atrocities as they suppressed our Dustoor, muzzled our mouths, tied our tongues, burned our people alive, hanged our innocent relatives, and perpetrated other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble, the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down."

Not only were the English accused of many political crimes, but were said to have never ceased to plunder, usurp, kill, and hang; and to complete the day's celebrations, telegrams were despatched to the Grand Vizier, the members of the Geneva Congress, and to Mr. Asquith, that to the last-mentioned reading as follows:

Six thousand Egyptians have assembled here and asked me to inform your Excellency, in the name of the whole Egyptian nation, of our great indignation and strong protest against the duration of the British Occupation, which attitude contradicts the clear promises of the English Government and its oath upon the Crown and Parliament. It has become to the interest of the British Occupation to withdraw in order to gain our friendship instead of our increasing hatred and indignation at what is absolutely useless for the British Government.

ALI FEHMI KAMEL, *Vice-Pres. Nat. Party.*

The Geneva Congress, alluded to above, was, in the first instance, composed of a few Egyptian students who were completing their studies at Lausanne, Geneva, and London. There was no organisation

worthy of the name, and until 1909 no propaganda beyond the sending of a few telegrams—such as the heart of modern Young Egypt loves—to various ministers and officials at home and in Egypt. The dignity of the appellation “Congress” gave it an importance it in no wise possessed in its early days; but the efforts of its members have succeeded in making it known to the European Press. Its manifesto, published early in May, 1909, was as follows :

Fellow Citizens : The situation of our country is critical in the extreme. It behoves us to defend her interests and to deliver her from the shameful protectorate exercised by Great Britain. Whatever your political and religious convictions, you will unite with us in testifying an unshaken loyalty to Egypt. . . . Aided by you, we shall be all the stronger in our endeavour to shake off the despotic yoke. You will help us in revealing to Europe the execrable oppression of which we are the victims. Long live Free Egypt ! Long live Egypt for the Egyptians.

Having thus started the career of their “Congress,” these ambitious young students issued circulars to the Press—circulars which bore as a postscript an intimation that anonymous contributions could be read before the Congress if the author had serious reasons for wishing to withhold his name. English and Irish deputies had promised to be present, said the circular, and as a proof of the solid business to be transacted, the members of the Congress gave a preliminary banquet in Paris, which was followed by congratulatory toasts and speeches. Owing to the injudicious advertisement given to the Congress by the news-

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papers, which, ignorant of the real facts, took the afore-mentioned manifesto and circular as proofs of an established organisation instead of a gathering of a dozen or so half-fledged students, the Congress began to assume quite important proportions. Some half-dozen English Members of Parliament, a couple of Irish leaders, and a few French Deputies promised to be present at its meetings. Representatives of *El Lewa*, *El Garida*, and *El Moayad* were to attend, and though the attitude of these young Congressmen, and the demands they intended making, were practically enveloped in mystery, there was but little doubt as to the advice they would receive from their Egyptian sympathisers. Those in England laid weight on the impressive significance of the occasion, when "the voice of young Egypt, the voices of the multitude of educated Egyptians who, having been brought up in Continental and English Universities, and imbibed European science at its sources, are now attempting to apply the scientific, political, and social theories acquired to their national life at home, and to grapple with the fundamental problem of regaining their national rights and political freedom."

With such glowing anticipations, it behoved the little band of Congressmen to arrange a fitting propaganda. The preliminary agenda, published early in September, fixed the duration of the Congress for three days, with two sittings of three hours daily and with various festivities and hospitality to be arranged by the special committee formed to look after the comfort of the expected guests.

The following questions were to be studied in detail by five active committees :

1. A practical method of popularising Nationalist ideas among the people.

2. The most useful methods for spreading constitutional and political education.

3. The most practical methods for establishing free and public schools, independent of the Anglo-Egyptian Government.

4. The most effective measures to be taken for the abrogation of the decree recently issued against the liberty of the Press and the Tribune.

5. The best measures to be taken against the new law concerning persons put under police supervision.

These questions in no way exhausted the list of subjects arranged for discussion. Among the others were the awakening of the East and the comparison between the Egyptian and Irish Questions.

The lofty aspirations of the manifesto and programme of the Congress were prejudiced by the violence of the speeches and the rancour of political feeling displayed in them. In alluding to the subject of the Congress we find nearly every paper, with the exception of those intimately connected with the Extremist cause, advocating more pacific and intellectual methods.

One of the most important speeches during the session was that of Mr. Keir Hardie, M.P., which, though it displayed a merely academic, and in many respects insufficient, acquaintance with the facts of modern Egyptian history, yet gave some excellent advice as to the best ways of obtaining a recognition of legiti-

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mate grievances. Indeed, his words on this score were so eminently practical and full of common sense—qualities seldom receiving due recognition from Egyptian patriots—that one is surprised to find that his remarks were received with expressions of approbation. On the subject of violent methods, Mr. Hardie's advice was as necessary as it was sound :

My second observation applies to the form of your propaganda. I know it is hard, when the heart is hot with indignation, to keep the tongue or pen tied to the language of moderation. Violent language, however, does not always connote either strength of conviction or a strong case. Be careful of your facts, and put your case so as to give the least possible offence to the feelings of individuals. It is the system which needs altering, and abuse of Anglo-Egyptian officials only plays into the hands of your opponents, and alienates public opinion in Great Britain. The Denishwai horror, for example, was a judicial crime of the most revolting kind, for which there can be no defence—(cheers)—but that was but an incident not likely to be repeated, and which, when the facts filtered through, met with universal reprobation in Great Britain. To harp upon that as though it were an everyday occurrence does not strengthen your case, and is apt to prejudice those who might otherwise be on your side.

My last point in this connection is: Beware of secret organisations—(cheers)—or all thoughts of an armed uprising for the overthrow of British authority. Every patriotic movement which indulges in secret forms of organisation places itself in the power of the Government. Such organisations are sure to be honeycombed by spies and traitors and *agents provocateurs*. The experience of Ireland in former times, and of Russia at present, is all the proof needed on this score. Work openly and in the light of day for the creation of public opinion in Egypt and Great

Britain, and have no fear of the result. I agree with Sir Eldon Gorst in this : that it is only by proving your fitness that you are going to get rid of foreign intervention and win Egypt for the Egyptians. No surer way of doing this exists than by keeping your movement honest, and by making it strong and respected. (Cheers).

The practical results of the Congress were not very substantial : a telegram to the Khedive requesting him to grant the Constitution and protesting against the new Press Laws ; a telegram to the House of Commons reminding it of its promises anent the evacuation of Egypt ; and the receipt of a telegram from certain officers of the Egyptian army with regard to that army and the Soudan. There was an undivided opinion among thoughtful people that, whatever its grievances, young Egypt had not yet discovered a proper method of disposing of them. There was an equally decided determination in the mind of young Egypt to go its own headstrong way regardless of its advisers.

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CHAPTER VII

THE SUEZ CANAL CONCESSION

The "Young Egyptian Party"—Its Appeal to the British Parliament and People—Jealousy of other Parties—Farid Bey and Turkey—The Grand Vizier's Manifesto—Amazement of the Extremists—Farid accuses the Grand Vizier—Proposed Extension of Canal Concession—Nationalist Opposition—Meeting of the General Assembly—The Khedive's Speech—The King's Birthday—Session of the Legislative Council—Release of Sheikh Shawish—The Troubles of *El Dustoor*.

AFTER the difficult task of endeavouring to disentangle the complications of the anti-British policy, it is refreshing to turn to the propaganda of the "Young Egyptian Party," founded by the energetic Idris Bey Ragheb. The following is the text of the appeal issued by this party to the Parliament and people of Great Britain :

A regrettable misunderstanding, which has existed for several years in Great Britain, has given rise, until now, to a certain atmosphere of mistrust of and antipathy to the Egyptian people.

The general British opinion seems to be that there is only one party in Egypt, and that one an anti-English party, including, more or less openly and under different designations, the whole population of the country.

Prepossessed by this idea, Englishmen are apt to accuse the Egyptians, and with apparent reason, of ignoring the benefits they have derived from the British Occupation, and of being, in consequence, unworthy of the interest and esteem of civilised nations.

This misunderstanding has produced, especially within the last three years, results which have been prejudicial to the interests of both countries. For in proportion as the idea is propagated in Europe of the unpopularity of the English influence among the inhabitants of the Nile Valley, there will be found, as heretofore, "fishers in troubled waters," who will endeavour to profit by the situation for their own benefit, at the expense of both nations.

In the same manner, any report as to the instability of the existing Government in Egypt is often sufficient to create a panic in the minds of foreign capitalists, and to arouse chronic perturbations which affect the future prosperity of the country.

It therefore is manifest that the only means of putting an end to the misunderstanding is to make plain to Englishmen the real sentiments the majority of Egyptians entertain towards them, and, on the other hand, to show to the people of Egypt that Great Britain is always ready to listen to the just complaints of weaker nations, if they prove by their actions and by the noble aspirations which they profess that they are worthy of its friendship.

It is with this end in view that the "Young Egyptian Party" has been formed. The great development which this association has attained since its establishment proves that it has responded to the urgent need of the country and to the wishes of the great mass of the Egyptian population.

We all appreciate the value of the work accomplished by England during the last twenty-seven years, and we are grateful for the many services she has rendered to us, and for those further ones she is willing to grant. It is unnecessary to enumerate all the reforms she has introduced in the different branches of Egypt's local administration; it is sufficient to say that nearly all have been reorganised.

Nevertheless, there remains one omission, to supply which would perfect this monument of constructive skill.

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Although the Anglo-Egyptian Government has constructed the vast irrigation works and canals, has built lines of railway, and has reorganised the services of the administration and the finances, it has somewhat neglected the moral side of its civilising mission. It has not yet sufficiently reformed the retrograde system of education now prevailing. It has not endowed the country with any representative institution which would prepare citizens for public responsibilities, and for future generations to take in hand the direction of public affairs.

Nevertheless, the advantages which result from the British Occupation, such as justice, security, and good example, have indirectly supplied this omission, so that the Egyptian people now find themselves as if involuntarily drawn into the current of intellectual speculation and of political emancipation, which agitate in a special manner the classic lands of slavery and ignorance. It would be as absurd to ignore this phenomenon as it would be unjust and imprudent to despise it.

We recognise, however, that the circumstances which have brought about the sudden changes from one extreme to the other in Teheran and Stamboul, do not exist in Cairo, and we are far from falling into the error of those who appeal to these events in order to justify their unbounded ambition and perilous requirements.

Egypt has no need of a revolution, because she has no oppressor; but she requires evolution because she has a guardian.

Lord Cromer, Lord Milner, Sir Auckland Colvin, and other authorities who have had personal experience in Egypt, have expressed the opinion that it would be preferable to allow another generation to pass before endowing the country with a Constitution. Generally speaking, we share their opinion, but upon condition that in the meantime a transitory system be established between the pro-consular government of the present and the representative one of the future.

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This would offer the threefold advantage of tranquillising the public mind by destroying the basis of the present agitation and reviving the confidence of foreign capitalists in the future of the country; it would further avoid the danger of the next generation being suddenly invested with sovereign power without understanding its mechanism or the responsibilities which it entails.

But in order to justify their abstention from taking such an initiative, Englishmen have confined themselves hitherto to pointing out the inability of their detractors to produce a definite programme or any kind of constitutional project. The opponents of the British Occupation, instead of accepting the challenge, only persist in the cry of "Evacuate the country; that is all we wish!"

Under these conditions it is necessary to discover a suitable means to satisfy all parties concerned, and to inspire with confidence all who are interested by guaranteeing the *status quo*, and preparing at the same time the coming generation for a Parliamentary regime. This becomes a sacred duty for all true patriots.

We believe we are assisting in this discovery of an efficient remedy and in fulfilling this patriotic debt by submitting to the discussion of the British Parliament and people the project of an Egyptian Constitution which we have elaborated to this end.

It will be readily understood that it has been our object to protect and guarantee the existing order of things, and to regulate their different relations in order that, without unnecessary shock or discomfort, the transitory Parliament, the establishment of which we suggest, may become at the end of twenty years the integral expression of the social position, the sentiments and the wishes of all the inhabitants of the country.

The whole world will then judge whether or not we have gained the necessary aptitude for assuming the direction of our own destinies.

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In the meantime, we make an urgent appeal to the patriotism of all Egyptians, to the good wishes of all friends of Egypt, and to the united influence of all who are concerned in the prosperity of the country, to join their efforts to ours in order to ensure the success of this enterprise of conciliation and peace.

President : IDRIS RAGHEB.

Vice-Presidents : DR. ABBAS HILMI AND HUSSEIN ABEDIN.

Secretary-General : YOUSSEF EL MOUELHY.

Foreign Secretary : NEGUIB AZOURY.

The formation of this party caused annoyance to the members of the other political organisations, all of which claimed to be the real, genuine Nationalist party. *El Lewa* expressed astonishment that any Egyptian could be so base as to initiate a party which should glory in subjection and prefer to be governed by strangers who rained down calamities and misfortunes. *Misr el Fatat* was indignant at the report that it was to become the organ of the new party, although apparently the chairman of the company which owned the paper had for some time acted as secretary to the Young Egyptians. The Constitutional Reformers were even more indignant when Idris Bey Ragheb announced that the title of the new party was to be changed from "Young Egyptian" to that of "The Constitutional Party."

In view of the facts that Farid Bey had been making overtures to the new Government in Turkey, had headed the Nationalist deputation to congratulate the new Sultan on his accession, that his party had effected a complete *volte face* in favour of the Khedive, that

in his efforts at getting himself and his party recognised by the Porte he had even made overtures in the direction of the once despised Syrians, and seeing that he had lost no opportunity of advertising his signal success and friendly relations with the Porte in the columns of *El Lewa*, even to the extent of inviting subscriptions for the increase of the Turkish fleet, we can guess the disappointment he must have felt on the publication of the following manifesto by the Grand Vizier early in October :

We have no relation with the Egyptian Nationalist party, and we do not desire to have any. We have no observation to make on the Egyptian situation, which we find good as it is. If it comes to change according to the desires of the Egyptians, we naturally shall not complain, but for ourselves we shall do nothing to modify what may be there.

This calamity fell among the Extremists like a bomb. At first they refused to give it credence. There must have been a mistake in its transcription—the omission of some significant word or phrase. But when Sheikh Ali Youssef published various other statements by high Ottoman officials, the amazement of the Extremists was turned to fury. Protests were sent to the Imperial High Ottoman Commissioner, to the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople, and to the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika, and when these proved of no avail Farid unburdened himself in print in an article in *Les Nouvelles* :

All this astonishes me the more because Hilmi Pasha declared to me, when he received me as leader of the Nationalist party sent in July last to take part in the Constitutional

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festivities, that the Ottoman Government would never forget Egypt, and that it would do nothing in the way of recognising the present state of affairs or making it worse. Only, he said, the Government is not sufficiently strong to take part in the Egyptian question, though it will certainly open it when it is strong enough. If Hilmi Pasha desires to deny his own words, I shall call attention to the fact that the delegation of which I was the head was composed of ten members, all of them still living.

It was unfortunate for Farid's reputation that he should have threatened to produce witnesses to prove his words. Almost as if in answer to his article, a denunciation of him appeared in an Arabic journal in Constantinople. In the form of an open letter addressed to the Egyptian Procureur-Général, the writer accused the whilom leader of Egypt's liberties of having taken part in the libellous attacks made against the Khedive for which Ahmed Hilmi, of *El Kotr el Misri*, was even then suffering imprisonment, and requested the Parquet to take action for such participation and also for inducing the Press to attack the Government with a view to disturbing the country. The writer also expressed his ability to furnish distinct proofs of Farid's complicity if they were needed. It would have been wiser for Farid to remember that the old adage of Greek meeting Greek is equally applicable when the combatants are of Turkish nationality.

It has already been mentioned in these pages that the extension of the Suez Canal Concession, which would otherwise expire in 1968, had aroused popular feeling owing to its apparent sacrifice of Egypt's interests. *El Lewa* voiced the general opinion when it

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declared that if there was one hope which Egyptians loved to cherish it was that the Suez Canal, with all its benefits, would once more be in their possession.

The proposal for an extension was prompted by Great Britain's determination not to strengthen her position by proclaiming a protectorate, and in the face of the ever-growing opposition it was considered necessary for Britain to make provision for the future and render as secure as possible the enormous interest she had in the Canal Company. With the Canal on one side, and the Sudan on the other, Egypt could be efficiently controlled, and under existing circumstances it was considered unwise to relax this control, or even to contemplate any concession which might militate too strongly against the occupying Power. Moreover, though the extension would continue the existing control of the Canal till the year 2008, certain profits were to accrue to Egypt after the year 1921, and these profits were to be graduated on a progressive scale until 1968, after which date Egypt's share of the profit was to be 50 per cent., so that the country would gain considerably by the transaction. Moreover, it was stated specifically that Great Britain had no ulterior interest to serve in advising the Egyptian Government to prolong the concession, for the reservations concerning the neutralisation of the Canal, made at the Convention of the Powers at Constantinople in 1888, had been done away with by the declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco signed in London in April, 1904. However, statements, official or other-

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wise, were powerless to allay the suspicions of the Egyptians, fearful lest their vital interests should be sacrificed.

There were meetings and discussions towards the end of October among the members of the Legislative Council, and it was decided to convene a great meeting composed of themselves and those of the General Assembly, Provincial Councils and Municipalities, and others. As a matter of fact, the Legislative Council had no *locus standi* in the matter; but it was considered that their intervention was absolutely necessary to prevent the interests of the country from being bartered away. Nothing very original transpired during this extraordinary meeting, which was concluded by the sending of telegrams to the Khedive, Sir Eldon Gorst (who was on a tour in the Sudan at the time), and the Ministers, urging them to do nothing till after the special meeting of the General Assembly, and not to move in the matter till its advice was taken. *El Lewa* addressed a letter to Boutros Pasha Ghali, promising to forget the past if he would amend his ways and approach the matter as an Egyptian rather than an Englishman, and defend the Canal. "Thus you shall be the friend of the people, and thus shall you avoid the condemnation of history."

The terms of the Convention, which had been embodied in the Report by the Financial Adviser and approved by the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company, and which only awaited the ratification of the shareholders, were submitted to the Ministers with an express request from the Khedive that

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they should be studied very carefully. The main points of this Convention were :

1. The concession which expires in 1968 is extended to December 31st, 2008.

2. During the extended period the Government will receive half the net annual revenue of the Company, but the share of the latter must in no case be less than 50,000,000 francs.

3. The Company will pay to the Government a sum of four million Egyptian pounds in four equal instalments at the end of 1910, and the following three years respectively.

4. The Government will receive a percentage on the Company's net revenue between the years 1921 and 1968, progressing from 4 to 12 per cent.

5. The Government will be represented on the Board of Administration of the Company from 1969 by not more than three members.

6. The Company will henceforward carry out at its own charge the maintenance of the southern access to the canal.

It will also undertake at its own charge to the extent of £E.90,000 the work of deepening the entrance to the harbour of Suez which is in course of execution by the Government.

At the subsequent meeting of the Ministers at the residence of the Premier it was decided to summon a General Assembly in the near future with regard to the subject. This decision, which was absolutely super-erogatory—seeing that the functions of the Assembly were in no wise legislative and that its only power was of a negative kind and in respect of the promulgation of new taxes—was considered in official circles as being a singularly ill-advised action on the part of the Government and its English advisers. Its only

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palliation lay in the tremendous outcry among the Nationalists, and the fact that by placing the matter before the Assembly the Government and the advisers might avoid the unpopularity which would otherwise fall upon them. But even if the Assembly rejected the scheme its decision would not be final unless the Government supported it; and if this support were given and the Nationalist wish to obtain the reversion of the Canal in 1968 thus acceded to, the result, so far as the British Occupation is concerned, would be much the same, as it would be impossible to entrust to Egypt such momentous duties as the guardianship of the Canal involves.

The discussions and altercations on the subject were endless. Never was public opinion so stirred. Thousands of protests and telegrams were despatched to Boutros and the other Ministers; various newspapers published special editions on the subject; and the columns of the vernacular Press teemed with reckless comments on the burning question of the day. In one issue of *El Lewa* the loss to Egypt if the concession were prolonged was estimated at £12,000,000, in another £93,440,000, and in a third it rose to the alarming figure of £650,000,000 !

One paper stated that the members of the General Assembly were going very carefully into all the details and studying all the documents relating to the subject, and that they were meditating certain modifications before leaving it to the Government to decide whether they would force it through in its original form or not. It was also stated that the Assembly

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was forming four separate committees to deal with the question in its financial, political, social and legal aspects.

Before leaving Ras el Tin Palace for his winter resort in Cairo, early in November, the Khedive, also, expressed himself in a speech which was declared to be the most important declaration of his policy that had been made since Lord Cromer's departure :

In referring the projected extension of the concession to the Public Assembly, myself and my Government have endeavoured to lay down the principle of consulting the country on all important matters. Under the circumstances the Assembly ought to consider the question in a wise manner and not allow sentiment to overrule the real interests of the country. By so doing it will provide a fresh proof of the nation's capacity to consider matters of capital importance with precision and foresight. This would be an important step having a great bearing on the future. I am much pleased with the solidarity shown by political parties and all classes of society in this matter. I should be much more pleased to see the nation give proof of complete capacity to take part with the Government in controlling the affairs of the country."

These words seem to suggest that his Highness was in sympathy with the constitutionalist policy, and gave some excuse for *El Garida's* deduction that the speech was the first step towards the granting of the Dustoor. Certainly the very optimistic view of his people's capacity for self-government was well calculated to encourage them in further efforts to obtain it.

For many weeks longer the discussion waxed and waned until the matter was settled in the early days of the following year.

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H.H. the Khedive returned to Cairo on November 4th, enthusiastic crowds joining in the "friendly demonstration" arranged in his honour by the Alexandria Nationalists as he left the Ras el Tin Palace, and greeting him with shouts of gratitude for his action with regard to the Suez Canal question. The Cairo streets were also gay with decorations and filled with spectators, though no organised demonstration of welcome had been arranged. Doubtless his approaching departure for Mecca added to the Khedive's popularity at the time, for the ceremonies connected with the departure of the Holy Carpet—Cairo's annual tribute to the holy of holies at Mecca—was notable for the fact that the number of attendant pilgrims was to be swelled by the presence of the sovereign, his mother, their joint escort, some notables, and Hafiz Awad, the late editor of the now defunct *El Minbar*, and the special correspondent to the *Times* for the occasion.

The Legislative Council met again on November 15th, and among notable incidents of the session was one of no little importance in showing the extraordinary attitude of certain of its members towards anything emanating from the Government. Among the early proceedings was the reading of a letter from the Council of Ministers containing an announcement from the Government offering the members certain privileges as to asking questions. There were, naturally, some restrictions and limitations attached to these privileges, which were intended to be another step towards self-government. For instance, questions had

to be submitted five days before the answer was required. The President had the right to modify or reject any question which he deemed mischievous or otherwise undesirable ; the Minister interrogated might refuse an answer if it were against public interest to give one ; the questions were not to lead to anything in the way of debate, and such questions were to be recorded in the minutes. These restrictions were proper and necessary, and it was difficult to understand the rancour aroused by them.

According to Ismail Pasha Abaza, the Government's offer was a pretence and a sham, was of no constitutional value, and was so hampered with conditions as to be practically useless. He condemned the conditions, declaring that referring to the functions of the President to be an insult to the intelligence of the members, and that which left the answer practically to the initiative of the Minister altogether odious. It was in vain that Zaghloul and, a few days later, the Prime Minister tried to convince the Council of the absence of ulterior motive. The Opposition, headed by Abaza Pasha, would have none of it unless the offending conditions were removed. Everything that emanated from the Government and was not framed as a law and promulgated by Khedivial decree was to be received with distrust and suspicion.

At a later meeting the question was revived, the Prime Minister doing his best to explain the motives of the Government, the conditions under which the offer was made, and the intention of the Government not to modify it.

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Even then Abaza Pasha remained obdurate, still questioning the motives of the increased facilities and their usefulness, and when, after a considerable amount of discussion and more or less heated arguments, the privileges were finally accepted, it was only by a majority of two votes.

Out of gratitude to Abaza Pasha and Yehia Pasha for their opposition, the students of the Khedivial Law School, and a certain number of other Extremists sent congratulatory telegrams to them. The affair earned for Boutros Pasha his customary meed of abuse. *El Lewa* expressed itself as disgusted with the manner in which he carried the Council with him, behaving like an autocrat, "not persuading the members, but misleading and bullying them." "Had he not been there," the writer complained, "the members would have taken his arguments at their true worth."

Apart from this discussion and another with regard to the annual Budget, which called forth much angry argument on the subject of the expenses of the Sudan, it must be allowed that this session of the Legislative Council was responsible for many useful resolutions and energetic reforms, especially those in connection with the reorganisation of the Mehkemeh Courts (Moslem Law Courts), which afforded a pleasing proof that Sir Eldon Gorst's criticisms had not been without their use.

November 22nd saw the release of Sheikh Shawish from prison. Floods of telegrams awaited his return to liberty. Congratulations rained thick upon him. According to the accounts of his sympathisers, count-

less thousands held out hands of welcome to him, and demonstrations were arranged in his honour.

Shepherd's Hotel had the distinction of spreading before him the first really delectable meal he had partaken of for three long months. Surrounded by his worshippers, he was regaled with all the usual afternoon-tea delicacies of the season, the narrow streets outside being so congested by the mob that it was with difficulty that the Khedivial carriage and its mounted escort could find a way through. Within the portals of the hotel there were speeches by Farid Bey (in charge of the entertainment), by Chimi Bey and Loutfy Bey, and then the hero of the day was invested with the much-discussed gold medal. Emotion overcame him at such signal honour; words were hard to come by, and at last the patriot, forgetting all the catch-words of the land of his adoption, had to fall back upon something that sounded like English, and apparently referred to someone who expected every man to do his duty. The context being obscured by emotion, we can only suppose that he adapted Nelson's famous signal to suit the circumstances of the country whose cause he had espoused.

Towards the end of the year was recorded an episode in the career of *El Dustoor* which illustrates the extraordinary vicissitudes under which Egyptian journals existed. Started three years before by Wagdi Mohammed Farid Bey, a "true Moslem" and a learned and, to the best of his abilities, a broad-minded patriot, *El Dustoor*, with its Panislamic tendencies, had aspired to a foremost place among the Extremist section of

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the Cairo Press—a Press which was represented by no less than thirteen daily European papers and twelve Arabic ones. It was Wagdi Bey's great ambition to succeed to Mustapha Pasha Kamel's position as leader of that section, but, owing chiefly to the financial prosperity of Mohammed Farid Bey, he had to content himself with a secondary place. As time went on, the receipts of his paper fell so considerably that he had at last to dismiss the greater number of his employés and practically produce his paper single-handed. There were times when his principles would not allow him to follow blindly in the steps of Farid. For some few months he was actively hostile to the policy enunciated by the latter, declaring that he no longer was an apostle of the creed of Mustapha Kamel. This accounted for his supplementing the title of *El Dusstoor* with the words, "The Organ of the Nationalists who Keep to the Original Principles of the Nationalist party." Not being able to eject Farid from his position, Wagdi had eventually returned to the fold of the Extremists. The time came, however, when he could struggle no longer against the tide of his financial misfortunes, and on December 9th he issued a solemn farewell to his readers, confessing that he was "very tired" of the unequal strain. Among the reasons he gave for his failure, he stated that out of the twelve millions of Egypt's native population there were scarcely ten thousand who were intelligent readers, and out of this number there were comparatively few who cared for the Press as European readers do.

Among his contemporaries, Wagdi Mohammed Bey stands out as a man honest and high-minded, not seeking self-advancement for its own ends, not harbouring resentment against more successful rivals, but preaching always the necessity for union, and acting as mediator between quarrelsome sections of the Nationalists, and even tacitly encouraging the claims of those whose religious belief was far removed from his own.

In these circumstances it is pleasing to note that the pathetic statement in his farewell issue fell on sympathetic ears, and that, when his decision became known, he was besieged by willing volunteers from the members of his staff, who offered to continue their labours without pecuniary reward and for the good of the cause alone. Moved by such proofs of devotion to his country, as well as to himself, and after a hesitation of twenty-four hours, Wagdi Bey decided that it was his plain duty not to stand between his colleagues and the patriotic action which they desired to take ; and so, after a couple of days, *El Dustoor* once more issued from the press.

PART V.—1910

CHAPTER I

THE ASSEMBLY AND THE CONCESSION

Auspicious Opening of the Year—Return of the Khedive from Mecca—Interview in the *Temps*—Legislative Council's Obstinacy—Draft of proposed New Canal Convention—Considered by the Council of Ministers under Presidency of the Khedive—Terms of the Convention—The Council's Amendments—The Attitude of the Khedive—Convocation of the General Assembly—Resignation of Prince Hussein—Meeting of General Assembly—The Khedive's Speech.

THE fateful year 1910 opened with some incidents which seemed to hold out hope that more generous impulses would govern the political activities of the various parties in Egypt. Sheikh Ali Youssef's oration in connection with the Hegira New Year was remarkable for its advocacy of unity and brotherly love in the campaign of social progress; on the same occasion congratulatory compliments passed between Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish and Morcos Effendi Hanna, a notable Copt; and on the Khedive's Accession Day the notables of both the native and European populations were regaled with a gorgeous entertainment at the Prime Minister's beautiful villa.

The return of the royal pilgrims towards the end of January afforded opportunities for impressive demonstrations of loyal welcome. Gala decorations and enormous crowds marked the occasion, and both in

Alexandria and in Cairo the rejoicings were of a nature to blind the eyes of the casual observer to the unrest that lay beneath the surface, even though among the ebullitions of feeling there might have been discerned a note of dissatisfaction that the blessed pilgrim should be in danger of contamination from his close association with his infidel Prime Minister.

That the Extremists, however, were active in their mischievous tactics was evident at their so-called Nationalist Congress, which was held early in January under the auspices of Mohammed Farid Bey and with the support of Ahmed Bey Loutfy, Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, M. Gervaise Courtellement (the French traveller, journalist, and convert to Islam), and others—not to mention the congratulatory letter forwarded by Mr. W. S. Blunt. This Congress resulted, as usual, in the sending of various explanatory and dictatorial telegrams to various European statesmen; and it was rumoured that as a direct consequence of its proceedings British warships were anxiously patrolling Egyptian seas, and that the Duke of Connaught was even then hastening to Cairo to negotiate with the titular leader of the Extremist party for the evacuation of the British troops.

An interesting contrast to these wild rumours is to be found in M. Jean Rodes's interview with the Khedive, which was published in the *Temps*. Needless to say, there is no mention of the republican designs which certain Extremists asserted that he entertained, but there is a repudiation of all charges of being anti-constitutional.

"I have always worked," said the Khedive, "on

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behalf of the progress and modernisation of my country. Unfortunately, however, there are some over-eager people who have thrown back Egypt's normal evolution by their too impetuous and noisy demands. Nevertheless, this forward movement is going on slowly and prudently. If we have not changed the Organic Law of our representative system, we have at least increased the importance of the Legislative Council, to which all laws and educational regulations are submitted. The meetings are public, and for some time past the Ministers have attended and the members can question them on everything. We have also created provincial councils. The rest will come in time."

"Am I to conclude from this that you are a partisan of the Constitution?" M. Rodes asked his Highness.

"Of course," the Khedive replied; "how could it be otherwise? I was brought up in Europe amidst constitutional nations. How can I then be looked upon as an anti-constitutional person? These are the exaggerations of the over-eager people, whom I spoke about just now, and of their newspapers, who are attacking me, you understand, by very modern, too modern, means. Have I not been represented as an anti-patriot, as a man who would almost have sold his country, when it was I who was the first to speak of patriotism in this country? You understand that at the bottom I see nothing very serious in all these attacks on me. As regards the masses of the people, by the way they greeted me on my return from Mecca you see that I can always count on their affection, just as they themselves can count on my devotion."

Meanwhile the Legislative Council pursued the uneven tenor of its way. The ill-fated institution greeted every concession with suspicion, obstinately preferred its old, unwieldy methods to those which would assist its progress, and devoted its time and attention to personal concerns rather than to its proper duties. Strenuous efforts were made to exclude the public and reporters from the meetings, lest certain members might be held up to ridicule. So violent and critical had become the attitude of some members to the Ministers of the Khedive, that the latter, stung to the quick by the senseless opposition, had temporarily withdrawn their presence from the meetings.

Thus the Legislative Council, which was to prove to the civilised world the fitness of Egypt for constitutional government, showed how little able it was to recognise its responsibilities.

The great struggle of the moment was that with regard to the prolongation of the Suez Canal concession—a struggle to which we have already referred in previous chapters, and which plunged the country into a chaos of disorder and brought it to the brink of revolution before it was finally decided.

The Paris correspondent of the *Financial Times*, during the month of January, gave a succinct account of the initial proceedings of the campaign in the local native Press directed against the Government in order to compel the publication of the text of the proposals of the Canal Company. This forcing of the hand of the Government by means of public opinion constituted a notable success for the Nationalist Party:

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a success it was quick to push further. Having once scored, the campaign was then directed against the suggested prolongation, and again the Government made the fatal mistake of acceding to Nationalist importunities by giving a solemn promise that no assent should be given to the scheme until it had been submitted to the consideration of the General Assembly, the most representative of Egyptian national institutions. By this promise the Assembly was given a function in the affairs of the nation which the Organic Law had never contemplated, and which was afterwards put forward by the Extremists as an outward and visible sign of the power they wielded. From that time onward all their efforts were bent on influencing or coercing the members of the Assembly into believing that the question of the Suez Canal Convention was only another base subterfuge on the part of the hated Occupationists to rob the country of its legitimate rights. And thus the very concession made by the Government, and supported presumably by the British Consul-General, which was to conciliate the Egyptian people, led to such fierce recriminations, violent denunciations, and actual crime, that it will be many years before the country recovers from the act.

During the absence of the Khedive on his pilgrimage, the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company had already entered into fresh negotiations, and a new Convention had been drawn up and submitted to the Government. This Convention was considered at a subsequent Council of Ministers, held under the presidency of the Khedive soon after his

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return, but in spite of his practical approval of the scheme it was then and there decided to reject it unless certain modifications were agreed to.

We give below a summary of this draft Convention and the modifications proposed by the Council of Ministers :

Art. I.—The concession of the Suez Canal Company, which expires on the 17th November, 1968, is renewed for another period ending the 31st December, 2008.

Art. II.—The annual net revenue of the Canal from the 1st January, 1969, up to 31st December, 2008, will be divided in equal parts between the Government and the Company on the following conditions :

(1) In case the annual net revenue is less than one hundred million francs the Company will take fifty million francs and the Government the remaining amount.

(2) In case the annual net revenue does not exceed fifty million francs it will be allotted in its entirety to the Company.

(3) The Government will forgo the 15 per cent of the receipts allotted to the Egyptian State by Art. LXIII of the Convention in force.

Art. III.—The Company will pay to the Government four million Egyptian pounds in four equal instalments payable on the 15th December, 1910, and the same date in the following three years.

Art. IV.—The Company will pay to the Government the following percentage of the net revenue from the year 1921 up to the end of 1968 :—

From 1921 to 1930	.	.	4 per cent.
„ 1931 „ 1940	.	.	6 „ „
„ 1941 „ 1950	.	.	8 „ „
„ 1951 „ 1960	.	.	10 „ „
„ 1961 „ 1968	.	.	12 „ „

This share of the Government will be calculated in the

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same way as the dividend of the shareholders and paid on the same dates as fixed for the payment of the dividends,

The Company benefiting by the surrendered 15 per cent share of the Government up to the 17th November, 1968, will in no way be affected by the engagements undertaken by the Suez Canal Company as per this article and the preceding one.

Art. V.—In calculating the share of the Government after the year 1968, according to Art. II of this Convention, only the amounts due for interest and amortisation of loans contracted for improvement works undertaken in the Canal and the harbours connected with it will be taken account of.

The share of the Government will be calculated on the same principles as the dividend of shareholders unless the application of the conditions stipulated in the preceding paragraph entail a different procedure.

In any case, the Government share will be paid on the dates fixed for the payment of dividends.

Art. VI.—The system of dividing the revenue in equal parts between the Government and the Company will apply to the balance of the Company's capital on the expiration of the concession and the reversion of the Canal to the Government according to the conditions laid down in the Convention of the 5th January, 1856.

Art. VII.—The Government may be represented on the board of administration of the Company from the beginning of the year 1969 by three members.

Art. VIII.—The Government undertakes to pay all pensions and indemnities which may be due to the staff of the Company on the expiration of the concession according to the Company's regulations, of which a copy has been delivered to the Government.

Art. IX.—The Company undertakes to carry out at its expense all repairs and improvements which it may deem necessary in the southern entrance of the Canal. It will also take on its charge up to a maximum of £E.90,000 the

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dredging operations undertaken by the Government in the harbour of Suez with the object of deepening the pass leading to the Canal.

Art. X.—The renewal of the concession provided for in this Convention will not be affected by previous conventions concluded between the Government and the Company in regard to the duration of the concession.

Art. XI.—This Convention will not become binding until it has been approved by the General Assembly of the shareholders of the Company.

The proposed modifications were as follows :

(1) That the net revenue of the enterprise be divided in equal parts between the Government and the Company irrespective of its amount.

(2) That this partition of the revenue should take effect from the 17th November, 1968, instead of the 1st January, 1969.

(3) That Art. VIII, which lays down that the Government should pay the pensions due to the staff of the Company on the expiration of the concession, be eliminated.

As the Company undertakes to defray the £E.90,000 provided for in Art. IX, in return for the Government paying the pensions of its staff, the Council of Ministers is disposed to relieve the Company of this engagement.

In regard to the lands which will be reclaimed from the sea at Port Said on certain works being undertaken by the Company, the Council is not disposed to agree to the Company becoming sole owners of these lands, but will consent to their being transferred to the Common Property Service.

As the disapproval of the Khedive was afterwards advanced by certain of the Extremists as a reason why the Assembly should veto the scheme, the opinions expressed by his Highness at the interview with

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M. Rodes, from which we have already quoted, are of peculiar interest :

I hope that this scheme for renewing the concession will succeed, and with the hundred million francs that the Government will receive we will be able to do some useful work, for there are still many improvements to accomplish. However, I have great hopes that we will get to the end of our task with the help of the country which is aiding us so much. The presence amongst us of its representative, Sir Eldon Gorst, is a sure guarantee. I have already worked for a long time with him when he was Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior and afterwards Financial Adviser. We have therefore the habit of working together, and this, with our mutual esteem and sympathy, greatly facilitates our common task.

Following on the meeting of the Council of Ministers came the Khedivial Decree convoking the General Assembly for February 9th and following days, and the intervening space of time was characterised by excited, and not always instructive, discussion on the burning subject. As might be expected, the Extremists lost no opportunity of impressing upon the public in general and the members of the General Assembly in particular that the scheme was only another plot to rob Egypt of her heritage, and that on patriotic grounds it should be summarily rejected despite any financial advantages that might accrue. Demonstrations were organised and public meetings held so that the members might be induced to recognise their duty to their country, and *El Lewa* recommended that "every Egyptian possessing the faculty of oratory"—which, by the way, nearly every Egyptian is confident that he does possess—"must

address a speech to all natives round him, in towns and villages, explaining to them the importance of the Suez Canal and the harmful nature of the scheme for extending the concession, so that the whole nation may understand this vital question."

Among the specific objections to the Convention put forward by *El Lewa* we need only mention two: that as all the leading supporters of the measure were foreigners, they need not therefore be considered, and that the Khedive's opposition to it had already been publicly announced! Mixed with violent dissertations on the subject, the columns of the Extremist organ were largely composed of personal abuse of certain members of the Legislative Council—abuse so intolerable that for some time the question of refusing to admit its correspondent to the Council's meetings was considered. This abuse was directed chiefly against Prince Hussein, President of the Council and uncle to the Khedive. The Prince's reputation for holding temperate views on the subjects which moved the Extremists to unbridled passion did not endear him to the latter. On this occasion they almost surpassed themselves, not only by stigmatising the Prince as an alien and foreign intruder, and by requesting him to resign his official position, but also in arrogating to themselves the monopoly of patriotism, and that despite the fact that there was scarcely one of their leaders who could claim to be a pure-bred Egyptian. When, a few weeks later, owing to ill-health, Prince Hussein Kamel tendered his resignation, it can be imagined how these "patriots" gloried in what they assumed was the result of their demands.

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On February 9th the specially convened meeting of the General Assembly was formally opened by the Khedive in person. In honour of the momentous occasion in its history, the approaches to the Council rooms were decorated with special splendour, and groups of notables were ranged upon the steps to receive the sovereign and his escort. Thanks to the activity of the police, the demonstration arranged by the Extremists was kept within orderly limits, and the crowds of students and loafers were rigorously excluded from the precincts of Abdin Square. Neglecting no opportunities of prejudicing the public against the measure under consideration, Farid Bey had published an open letter addressed to the members of the Assembly, in which he hinted that the Khedive was really opposed to the Government scheme. That the suggestion was utterly at variance with the facts is shown by the following speech which his Highness made at this opening ceremony :

GENTLEMEN,

We greet you and express our satisfaction at seeing you assembled here to-day.

We have called you together to ask your advice upon a prospective agreement with the Suez Canal Company.

The Company had, in fact, presented to our Government a year ago certain proposals relating to an extension of its concession ; negotiations were entered into and resulted, after long discussion, in a project for an arrangement.

As you have been able to gather, our Government is unanimous in considering this project to be acceptable provided that certain modifications, of which you have already received notice, are agreed to by the Company.

It is for this purpose that we have called you together.

It is your duty, therefore, to examine whether it would be advantageous to prolong the concession of the Canal for a period of forty years, on the basis of an equal partition of the profits during this period between the Government and the Company.

In return for this share in the profits which would be thus granted for the new period, the Company would pay to the Egyptian Treasury graduated sums of money throughout the sixty years yet to run of the present concession.

This return, from the financial point of view, has been minutely investigated by experts of the highest competence ; their opinion is that if the aforementioned modifications are accepted, the advantages assured to Egypt are not only amply satisfactory for the country, but also reach the furthest limit that can reasonably be demanded from the Company.

This question, as you know, is not one of those with regard to which, by the terms of the Organic Law, the Government is bound to take the opinion of the General Assembly.

Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers, in view of the exceptional importance of this matter, both to the present generation and to the generations to come, has decided to take no final decision before knowing if the General Assembly is favourable to an extension.

Our Ministers will give you all necessary explanations in regard to the matter before you.

We are convinced that each one of you recognises the responsibility which attaches to you before the country in the examination of a project so important as this.

We pray the Almighty to guide our efforts for the good of the country.

Not only in this opening address, but also afterwards, in the subsequent interview with the President and members of the Assembly at Abdin Palace, the Khedive made it clear that the Government was not

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in any way bound to accept the ruling of the Assembly, and that it behoved the notables to think long and earnestly before forming an opinion. At the same time, his Highness left little room for doubt as to his own approval of the scheme, a fact which must have been little to the liking of the Extremists, who had so persistently declared that he disapproved and used the mis-statement as an argument in urging the country to reject the scheme.

Many had been the private conferences held by notable members of the Assembly before its formal sittings, and among its first movements was the appointment of a special committee for studying and reporting on the important question. Discussions and protests arose on the selection of this committee, and four of the most expert, enlightened, and moderate members of it saw fit to resign their seats immediately after their election, thus leaving the important duty to a body of fifteen, none of whom was well known to the public or notable for exceptional ability in either political or financial matters.

Then came an angry discussion as to whether the Government meant to accept the decision of the Assembly as binding—a discussion which Boutros Pasha Ghali declined to enter into save in the terms of the Khedivial speech. For many days a wordy warfare raged in the columns of the Press as to the probable results of the report of the committee. By it Egypt was to prove to the civilised world that her sons were even more capable of ruling themselves than many other nations who enjoyed self-government. According

to the hopes of the Extremists, Egypt was about to protect herself from the exploitation of her birthrights by foreigners. The members of the committee of the Assembly, mainly omdehs and landowners, were scarcely fitted for the task allotted to them. Sincerity and an honest desire to act for the best doubtless actuated them, but their obvious and obstinate determination to act according to their limited understanding had been one of the main causes which led to the resignation of the four members who had sufficient intelligence to understand the proposed new Convention.

The meetings of this committee, held in secret, were not such as to reassure the minds of the thinking public; and even though their deliberations were attended by certain Government functionaries to assist them with information and explanations, their demand for conditions and modifications far more stringent than those framed by the Government precluded the possibility of their cogitation being brought to any useful conclusion. From the questions said to have been put to the officials, it may be deduced that the proposal for the extension of the Suez Canal Concession was regarded by the committee only as a scheme to benefit the shareholders and mulct the Egyptians of their rights. Since the experts who advised the extension were employés of the Occupation Government, and Englishmen, then the measure must be both vicious and mischievous. And so the Assembly approached the rejection of the scheme, and prepared to experience the agreeable sensation of teaching a lesson to the British advisers and the Prime Minister.

CHAPTER II

ASSASSINATION OF THE PREMIER

Causes of the Crime—State Funeral—Wardani—Nationalists' Disavowals of Responsibility—Their Obvious Satisfaction—The New Premier, Mohammed Pasha Said—His Nationalist Sympathies—Secret Societies—"The Mutual Brotherhood"—Discovery of Incriminating Documents—Suspension of Suspected Officials—Idolising Wardani—The Trial—The Prisoner Pleads Guilty—Sentenced to Death—Sympathisers' Hopes of Reprieve—Appeal at the Court of Cassation—The Appeal Quashed—The Execution—Wardani's Curious Will.

IN the midst of the agitation occasioned by the proposed Canal Convention, occurred the brutal and wanton tragedy which robbed Egypt of one of her most upright and far-seeing sons. The violent crime of his assassination was the last, lamentable piece of evidence needed to prove not only the inability of the bulk of the nation to realise its responsibilities, but also the futility of the methods adopted by the occupying Power to cope with the Nationalist unrest.

The tragic death of Boutros Pasha Ghali is too recent for the details to need recapitulation here. His assassination that sunny, Sunday morning (February 20th), during the height of the social season, when Cairo, and Egypt generally, was thronged by cosmopolitan crowds of pleasure-seekers, struck a note of grim horror which was swiftly communicated to every corner of the civilised world, while the State funeral the following day, with military escort and official and

religious entourage, was a wholesome reminder that, in spite of the boastings and vituperations of specious malcontents, and in spite of our misguided policy of *laissez-faire*, there was an armed force in the country that could be depended upon in the event of the turbulent spirits proving a menace to public safety.

As to the direct causes of the murder of the Premier, we have shown in previous pages how popular feeling had been maliciously directed against him; how his religion, his attitude with regard to the Sudan Convention, the Denishwai affair, and, latterly, his support of the Suez Canal Convention, had all been used as weapons against him, and how, for several years past, the Extremist leaders and organs had done their utmost to incite the inflammable minds of their followers to acts of violence. No opportunity had been lost to arouse feelings of bitter animosity against authority; and though, hitherto, assassination from political motives had been practically unknown in Egypt, murder and violent assaults had grown so common that it was surprising that some such tragedy had not happened before. Daring and dramatic revolutionary schemes had become familiar subjects in hot-headed political circles; threatening letters were the daily portion of certain high officials and notables, and it was discovered that Boutros Pasha Ghali was not the only one whose removal by forcible means was contemplated.

There are some thoughtful Europeans who find extenuation of the murder in the fact that the appointment of a Copt—one of the hated minority of native Christians—to the highest official position in the country

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showed a signal want of foresight on the part of the authorities, and could not fail to be considered an intolerable insult by the bulk of the nation who, as Mohammedans, had always regarded the Copts as beneath contempt. Boutros Pasha Ghali also had always been in avowed sympathy with the Occupationists, an attitude which had rendered him still more despicable in the eyes of the soi-disant patriots; and it must be remembered that, life being held but lightly in the East, the crime of assassination is not regarded with such unqualified abhorrence as it is among Western peoples.

As for Wardani, the instrument of the crime, he was but a typical representative of the rising generation. He had received a fair education in Egypt and Switzerland, and had battered on the specious literature of the native political Press. Of fair intelligence, but of moody and introspective nature, with a natural leaning towards fanaticism, and a decided distrust and hatred of the Occupation and all in sympathy with it, who can blame him if he hoped to gain patriotic fame and immortal honour such as had been paid to the so-called "courageous Indian hero," Dinghra, only a few months earlier?

It was in vain that *El Lewa* and kindred papers endeavoured to shield themselves from blame by declaring that never had they included murder among the means by which their ends were to be attained. Their excuses notwithstanding, the tendency of their dangerous policy had been all too apparent, and it was significant that, after the tragic event, the grief of the Coptic community was considerably dwarfed by the

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expressions of satisfaction made by other sections of the community at the removal of the Minister who was deemed to be the stumbling-block in the way towards their ambitions.

Thus not only did the rift between the Mohammedans and Copts grow rapidly wider, but also the hopes of the Extremists waxed proportionately high when it became known that the Minister appointed in the place of the murdered man was of avowed Nationalist views and an adherent of the principles expounded by the late Mustapha Pasha Kamel. A lawyer by profession, Mohammed Pasha Said had, for the past two years, acted as Minister of the Interior in the cabinet of Boutros Pasha Ghali, and on more than one occasion his views had collided seriously with those of the Prime Minister; indeed, his resignation had more than once seemed inevitable. While Minister of the Interior, it was said that with the concurrence of his adviser, Chitty Bey, he had always favoured the appointment of those whose political convictions coincided with his own, a policy which he appears not to have abandoned as Premier. His new appointment was regarded by many as an attempt to conciliate the Extremist party—the party which was morally responsible for the assassination of his predecessor. It will be gathered that in these circumstances the appointment of Mohammed Pasha Said was singularly ill-advised, as it was regarded, naturally enough, as another triumph for the Extremist cause, and another sign of weakness on the part of that Government which had acquiesced in, if not encouraged, the appointment.



Photo: Hiesinger, Cairo.

MOHAMMED PASHA SAID

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As is well known, Wardani was arrested *in flagrante delicto*. Many other arrests were made within the next few hours, and there were sensational discoveries regarding various secret societies and revolutionary programmes. The existence of such societies, especially among the Extremists, had long been suspected, even though Farid Bey had publicly disclaimed knowledge of them.

The secret society of which Wardani was a prominent member was entitled "The Mutual Brotherhood," and it was clearly proved that its programme advocated violence and the smuggling of arms. Although it was not found possible to bring to book any of the suspects as accessories to the murder of Boutros Pasha Ghali, they were shown to be members of the above-mentioned society.

The aims of "The Mutual Brotherhood" society are revealed in no uncertain light in the following literal translation of a letter received by Ahmed Fouad, a student of the Cairo Medical College and one of those accused of complicity in the crime, from a student at Lyons. The original of this letter is in the possession of the Cairo Parquet :

DEAR FRIEND,—*Salaam aleik wa rahmet Allah!* I have just received your letter, which I expected with impatience, and found it to contain the expression of your high spirit and firm energy, which introduced into my soul fresh activity and added fuel to that fire burning in my heart, the fire of revenge for the fatherland that has been disappointed by its own people, enslaved by a cruel enemy and oppressed by an unjust governor. I thank Allah who gave me such friends as you, who never hesitate to sacrifice their lives for saving their country. Thank Him for having enabled them to

possess knowledges and thus have their work based on wisdom and reasoning which lead to success.

Yes, the time for action has already come. It came long ago, but we neglected it as we allowed nonsense to prevail over us, and did not awake from our slumber until we were caught by the enemy. Now sincerity is required for carrying out the work and achieving it as early as possible. The means of action, however violent they may be, will be nobler for us than this deadly silence and cowardice.

Of course the necessary plans must be made and a programme drawn up to be executed, but this must not be the main attack. Terrorism by itself does no good unless it be backed by a certain force which could profit from the sacrifice. Otherwise it would be mere rashness for people to rush in and sacrifice their lives before taking the necessary measures to make the nation appreciate their action when the country becomes in a position to profit by what they have done.

Accordingly, I tell you, dear friend, that I shall be happy to execute your plan, of which I myself frequently thought before. I shall make great preparations for it, doing my best to profit by my existence here, by thoroughly studying the work in order to furnish you with all details later on.

Nevertheless, I see that these measures require greater preparations. A great zeal should be formed in the country. The easiest way leading to that end is, firstly, to induce our young men to carry and use weapons; and this can be effected by creating public establishments ostensibly as clubs for athletic sports, which could, later on, be gradually changed into places for knightly exercises and for practising the use of firearms.

I had already spoken to my brother Amin on this subject, prior to my departure from Egypt, but have not yet heard how this suggestion was dealt with at your meetings. Secondly, some of you should enter the army with a view to sowing the seeds of patriotism among the officers and men. Effort must be made to get as many educated youths,

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such as physicians and officers of the Military School, admitted to the army, so that this small army might side with us and not against us. If we perform this action, which is simple in comparison with the other great efforts required for importing arms and distributing the same among the people of the towns and villages, we can say that we have succeeded in preparing our work. In that case we would have the right to resort to violence, having behind us the people, who appreciate our sacrifice, and be ready to profit by it.

It would be utterly wrong to risk starting terrorism without these preparations, and in this case we must remain silent and organise no hostile demonstrations, so that we may mislead the enemy and give him to understand that the Nationalist developments are reduced. In the meantime we shall be able to arrange our scheme, prepare our forces and show our hand only when we are strong enough to be safe from failure.

This is my opinion. I unfold it to you in the hope that it will meet with your approval. Let me hear from you always, and accept my best salaams.

(Signed) MOHAMMED KAMAL.

Lyons, April 24, 1909.

Among the arrests arising out of the murder of Boutros Pasha was that of Hassan Marai, a notorious Nationalist who was responsible for the production on the stage of a tragedy dealing with the Denishwai affair, and whose picture of Wardani, entitled "The Hero of Patriotism," had sold by thousands. Among the incriminating documents found in his possession were some referring to secret arming and preliminary plans for a general rising. That these documents were not to be lightly ignored was shown later by the discovery of detailed plots for massacres to take place either in July

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or September—months of fateful import in the recent history of Egypt.

These suspected accomplices of Wardani were composed chiefly of students and Government servants, and although acquitted of complicity in the crime, those holding official positions were suspended from service. The situation thus created became so grave that, at one stage, a ministerial crisis seemed likely to be precipitated. The Ministry of Public Works was quite unable to evolve a satisfactory elucidation, for though the British advisers and superior officials strongly deprecated the proposal to allow the offending officials to resume work, the whole force of Egyptian Nationalism was clamouring for the abrogation of the order of suspension. There was a violent campaign in the Press, and when the question was submitted to the Council of Ministers there was divided opinion even there.

The trial of Wardani was preceded by a long inquiry by the Procureur-Général—himself an eye-witness of the deed—in the course of which a mass of evidence was collected, revealing the propaganda of the Society of Mutual Brotherhood, and its plots for ridding Egypt of the Occupationists. It was discovered, too, that this society was responsible for many of the threatening letters which had darkened the lives of high officials during the preceding months.

In the meanwhile, Wardani, the thin, sallow, dejected-looking young chemist, with protruding ears and wide mouth, had become the popular hero and the idol of the Mohammedan masses. His portrait, and

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pictures of the murder, found a ready sale ; his virtues were declaimed in prose and verse ; his delicate health—he was said to be consumptive—was held by the Extremist papers as an excuse for his crime. He was universally honoured with the title of “Effendi” ; the charge of bankruptcy—his business had never proved lucrative—was withdrawn, and Helbawi Bey, of the Party of the People, Government prosecutor in the Denishwai case, and once the close friend of Boutros Pasha Ghali, went so far as to offer his services as counsel for the defence. As a political prisoner, Wardani was granted special privileges.

Before the Procureur-Général the assassin adopted a policy of silence, refusing to incriminate any of the other suspects, and only declaring that his action was premeditated and the result of his own convictions. As before related, the charge against the suspects, among whom were students, an advocate, a professor, and three engineers, was not substantiated, so Wardani was left to stand alone at the trial, which was fixed for April 21st, more than two months after the death of his victim.

As the day approached, the efforts of the Nationalist Press on behalf of the prisoner were redoubled. Precautions had to be taken by the authorities in Alexandria as well as Cairo, with a view to the prevention of violent demonstrations and the preservation of order. All cases on the list for trial at the Cairo Native Tribunal preceding that of Wardani were postponed, and the empty rooms locked and sealed. The morning of the 21st found the adjoining streets and squares guarded

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by police. Admission to the court was only by ticket, for which there had been an enormous demand from all classes of the population. Thanks to the excellence of these arrangements, there was no untoward demonstration at the beginning of the trial, although at times the crowd outside had to be dispersed. The next day a detachment of British troops and the fire-hose were employed to clear a path for the notables through the hooting mob.

Within the court the prisoner stood, pale but emotionless, in the dock. Mohammed Farid Bey was present, and other notable figures were the President of the Court—Judge Dilberoglu—Amin Ali Bey, Abdul Hamid Bey, and the Procureur-Général, Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha. On the prisoner pleading guilty, medical evidence was brought to prove that death had resulted from the injuries and attendant shock, and had been in no way accelerated by the subsequent operation, as had been suggested by counsel for the defence. Other evidence proved that the crime was premeditated, that Wardani was known to hold revolutionary views, and was the founder of the Young Egypt Society. He was said to have suffered from cerebral trouble and typhoid fever, which might have affected his brain and nerves; he was a silent man, eccentric, and, in some opinions, abnormal. On the score of mental derangement, a special committee of doctors was appointed to draw up a medical report as to his condition. Doctors Nolan, Madden and Ali Labib Bey were among those selected. Dr. Nolan and Ali Labib Bey, however, declined to serve on the committee, and eventually Doctors Hamilton

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and Bahgat Wahbi—a former correspondent of *El Lewa*—took their places.

The astrological horoscope of the prisoner published in one of the papers, and afterwards prohibited by the police, stated that the final judgment would be of use in strengthening the Nationalist movement. Four long and tedious months separated the death of the late Prime Minister from the punishment of his assassin. The latter, at the end of the long trial, was sentenced to death; the sentence, however, was questioned by the Ecclesiastical Courts, the Fetwa of the Grand Mufti deciding that it was invalid on the following grounds, logical enough to Mohammedans, though unconvincing to the Western mind:

1. The accused is stated to have slain his victim with a revolver. As there is no mention of such a weapon in the Sheriat, it is not a crime which can be dealt with by us.

2. That a Moslem slaying a pagan does not render himself liable to the death penalty.

3. That the next-of-kin of the deceased had not joined in the prosecution of the accused.

Though the Fetwa's decision had no effect in reducing the sentence of the Assize Court, it strengthened popular belief that a reprieve was possible, if not probable. The appeal of the prisoner to the Court of Cassation for a retrial of the case was hailed, by the crowds who accorded hero-worship to the young chemist, with hopes of a subsequent acquittal. Innumerable were the incidents testifying to the place he held in popular esteem; most significant of these was the public declaration of an official of the Ministry of the Interior

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a Moawen of Assiout, who declared that if Wardani was condemned to death, two million persons with fifty thousand fire-arms, were ready to avenge the assassin, even if they were not able to prevent his execution, and that whosoever might stand in their way would be treated as was Boutros. Significant also is the fact that, under the authority of Mohammed Pasha Said, this Moawen was punished only by being transferred to Damietta.

A few days before the meeting of the Court of Cassation there happened to pass through the streets, *en route* for the Gouvernorat, a delegation of Jews to demand the reinstatement of a co-religionist. The knowledge that a delegation was seeking justice or clemency for someone gave rise to a rumour that Wardani was to be released. In a few minutes hundreds of uproarious sympathisers followed in the wake of the delegation, with cries of "Long live Wardani." The courtyard of the Gouvernorat was filled by the crowd, and only with difficulty was it cleared by the police.

The presence of Judge Bond at the Court of Cassation was held by Wardani as a cause for objection on two grounds :

(a) That Judge Bond had adopted the method of the Assize Court in closing the Cassation Court to the public and admitting persons by ticket only. This method of the Assize Court formed the main cause for appeal from its judgment to the Cassation Court, and the defence urged that its adoption where Judge Bond was going to preside implied approval or prejudgment against the appeal.

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(b) That Judge Bond was a member of the Special Court of Denishwai. As Wardani mentioned among his reasons for assassinating Boutros Pasha the fact that the late Premier was a member of that court, it was argued that Judge Bond was bound to feel prejudiced against the prisoner.

The objection was rejected before the opening of the court (June 11th).

The following were the main points in Wardani's petition :

(a) That the trial in the Assize Court was not fully public according to the spirit of the law.

(b) That the defence was not allowed to dwell on certain points in its case (*e.g.* political questions).

(c) That the interpreters employed by the Assize Court were not duly sworn.

(d) That full discussion of the medical evidence was not allowed.

The result of the appeal was a foregone conclusion, and little, if any, surprise was felt when the judges decided, not only that the original verdict must stand, but also that the petitioner should be fined £24 for having petitioned the authorities on frivolous grounds.

It was necessary that a fortnight should elapse after the finding of the Court of Cassation before sentence could be executed. In the interval the Khedivial authority could be exercised to grant a reprieve, but this authority the Regent was not prepared to exert, and early on the morning of Tuesday, June 28th, Wardani paid the penalty of his crime. The date of his execution was not made public, and his body was

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conveyed secretly to the cemetery. Although public sympathy and excitement had dwindled from the fiercest heat to languid resignation as the long weeks of the trial slowly passed, Wardani's death implanted his name in the memory of thousands as that of a patriot and martyr. When it was known that he had been executed, many women as well as men donned mourning. Signs of public mourning were not wanting in the streets; visits of condolence were paid to the home of his relatives, where paid mourners continued their dirges, and the Fiki intoned passages from the Koran in the customary manner. The regulation marquee and lights outside the door, however, were forbidden by the authorities.

In addition to their mourning badges, the students of the higher schools, encouraged probably by those who had been Wardani's accomplices, arranged a pilgrim demonstration to the grave; but, though certain inflammatory speeches were made, the police prevented any serious disturbances. The papers, on the whole, preserved a discreet and remarkable silence on the subject, some of them even imploring their readers to forget both the assassin and his crime, and all the feelings of hatred and fanaticism unhappily aroused thereby.

Wardani's will, which was drawn up after the sentence of death had been passed upon him, showed his extraordinary inability to realise his position, or the extent to which he had been deceived by those who had made a tool of him. More curious still, in the light of his known insolvency, is the bequest of his imaginary income for various charitable and educa-

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tional purposes in Egypt. He expressed a desire that a committee, under the presidency of Maître Omar Bey Loutfy, should exploit his dispensary in Abdir Street, and that one-fifth of the revenue should be given towards the founding of a boarding school for girls, one-fifth to the Society for the Protection of Children, one-fifth to the Open-air Schools for poor children, one-fifth to the pupil missions of the Egyptian University, and the remaining fifth to his mother and sister. Two-thirds of this last fifth part he desired to be allotted to his mother, and the remaining third to his sister. On the death of his mother, her share was to be paid into the Deutsche-Orient Bank for his own account, so that he might have some ready money in case, some day, he should be released from prison.

There, plainly, lies the reason for his calmness at the trial and after conviction. The doomed assassin firmly believed the promises that his Nationalist friends would assuredly secure his reprieve, and that public subscriptions would be instituted in order that the whole nation might do him honour.

Thus was closed a tragic episode in the history of modern Egypt. The isolation of the assassin's tomb has been rigorously enforced, and efforts have been made to prevent the perpetuation of Wardani's name in connection with the little pharmacy he managed with such poor success.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENTS IN SELF-GOVERNMENT.

The Suez Canal Convention and the General Assembly—Objections to the Proposed Extension—The Decision—The Legislative Council and the Three Bills—The Press Bill—The Schools Discipline Bill—The Political Conspiracies Bill—Rejection of One and Mutilation of the Others—The Government's Action—A Firm Hand Again.

THE committee of the National Assembly spent the greater part of March weighing the merits and demerits of the Suez Canal Convention, with the assistance of the official memorandum compiled by a high official of the Ministry of Finance—Mr. de Rocca Serra, a most distinguished lawyer and chief legal adviser to the Government. This able argument in support of the extension contained the opinions of great statesmen and diplomats as to the expediency of granting it.

Unfortunately the members of the committee were not swayed by logical argument. Long before they had been elected on the committee they had shown suspicion of the Government, and had looked to the Nationalist papers for a lead. Secret meetings had been held, and even before they knew the details of the scheme they had pledged themselves to reject it. When the committee was elected those of its members who might have been trusted to act on their own convictions saw fit to resign their seats. In view of the

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final composition of the committee its decision became a foregone conclusion.

Those who had the fortune, or misfortune, to be present at the reading of the wearisome and complicated report which was the result of those weeks spent in studying the question found little to reward their patience. The arguments were of the sort which had grown stale in the columns of the anti-Occupationist papers since the beginning of the campaign. The summary contained severe criticisms of the Government for the careless preparation of the scheme and its lack of details. The committee also registered the opinion that the whole project had been conceived and dealt with in a haste unprecedented in public projects of this nature, and showed no signs of careful study or documentary evidence. Furthermore, there was no necessity for any hurry, seeing that there was still a period of sixty years before the concession expired. The committee's reasons for objecting to the scheme, which had been accepted unanimously by the Khedive and his Ministers, were as follows:

1. The General Assembly cannot in the public interest accept the measure even as amended by the Egyptian Government. This is supported by figures and calculations set forth in detail in the first part of the report.

2. It has been found by careful calculation that Egypt would lose enormously by this scheme. The committee estimate the loss to Egypt at more than £130,000,000, taking the figures of the Financial Adviser as the basis of their calculation.

3. The fears which the Government entertain about the future of the Canal and the transport dues were the Canal

to revert to Egypt are imaginary and unreal. Even were such anticipated dangers to be considered actual they could be averted by mutual arrangement before their occurrence. The Company will become more amenable to reasonable bargaining from year to year, especially as no other Power besides Egypt will in future have a voice in the settlement of the Suez Canal questions. Egypt can easily find many international companies who will be ready to come to terms with her in the working of the Suez Canal.

4. There is absolutely no financial necessity at the present moment for the proposed arrangement through which Egypt is bound to lose so enormously. The time is still so long and the date at which the present concession expires so distant, that the present generation would not be justified in sanctioning the scheme unless it was indisputably advantageous to coming generations, a condition which is not provided for in the present scheme.

5. The benefits of the scheme could only be considered apparent were the following considerations taken into account : (1) That no loss be entailed upon Egypt. (2) That the funds available from this source be used on projects of real benefit to posterity, and that the nation be able to practise real control over its finances.

6. As the loss to Egypt in this matter is so apparent, and as the nation has not been allowed yet to take part in the management of its own affairs, financial and internal, and as the proposal is made so long in advance and no sound judgment can be made at such an early date, the committee has unanimously decided to reject the measure.

The report completely ignores the most important argument that was put forward by the Government, viz. the unlikelihood that the Canal, when it does revert automatically to the nation, will be worth as much as it is at present, and the transparent injustice of depriving this generation of all share in its present

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success in order to confer a somewhat doubtful blessing upon posterity.

The subsequent proceedings of the National Assembly reveal the methods of this most representative of Egyptian institutions. During a discussion on the report, on March 15th, it was proposed by the President that the aforementioned report should be printed and circulated before it was read at the public meeting, so as to allow the members time to study it before recording their votes. Objection was taken to this course on the ground that the rules of the Assembly did not admit of such procedure. It was then suggested, and supported by the Government, that a modification of these rules might be made on this occasion, but the majority were obdurately against it, in spite of the arguments of the President, the Minister of Justice, and others. From the attitude of the majority it was evident that publicity was no part of its programme, and that it was determined to read the report and take the decision of the Assembly at one meeting. By adopting this course, there could be no criticism in the papers, or enlightenment of members, beforehand.

So far there had been no specific declaration on the part of the Government as to whether the determination of the General Assembly should be held as binding; but at the meeting of that body on April 4th the Prime Minister, Mohammed Pasha Said, detailed the extension scheme and the various proposals, modifications, memoranda, and reports which had been made upon it, and declared that, owing to its exceptional importance, the Government had decided to take an exceptional

step and make the decision of the Assembly final and binding. Enthusiastic plaudits greeted the announcement of the Premier. At the same time, however, Mohammed Pasha Said dwelt on the advisability of accepting the Company's proposals, and Said Pasha Zaghloul also expounded, in a long and detailed speech, the merits of the scheme and how it was a purely financial one, and should not be hampered by political considerations.

The effect of accepting the Assembly's decision was at once apparent. In spite of the assertion that the case was exceptional and in no way to be regarded as a precedent, Nationalists of every shade of opinion jumped to the conclusion, that, if the Egyptians were to be entrusted with so momentous a decision, others of less grave import should also be submitted to them. The following is the opinion of *El Moayad*, the organ of the Moderates :

If it is the belief of the Government that it is to the country's interest to grant such a representative body as the General Assembly the right of giving a final decision in such a great question as that of the Suez Canal Convention, the same body should possess the same power in discussing minor questions. Consequently we are now in a position to cherish our hopes that we have drawn nearer to the attainment of our aspirations. We hope the time is not far off when our hopes will be realised and the country secure the safety of its future, which may Allah make a happy one ! Amen.

El Lewa was even more explicit as to the duty of the Government :

As for the nation's opinion, it differs from that of the Ministry in connection with the Suez Canal question. The

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Egyptian desires nothing, so far as this question is concerned, except the entire rejection of the scheme. Now comes the question of constitutional government. Well, we have already proved our fitness for it, and the Government has no proof to offer that the Dustoor should not be granted until the requested reform has been achieved. We wish the Government would cease to play with the nation in this matter and promulgate the Dustoor in the near future, during the season of the constitutional fêtes.

Concession after concession had fallen to the clamouring of the Nationalists, and, having at last tasted the sweets of successful defiance of the Government, independence appeared to be within their grasp. At last they had proved their worth to the world; they had revolted against the judgment of their rulers; their rulers had tacitly permitted the revolt. Surely the granting of the Dustoor would be the next step in the march of progress.

The submitting to the National Assembly the proposals for the extension of the Canal Concession was a most unfortunate experiment—unfortunate for British prestige as for the possibility of Egyptian self-government. It must be regarded as one of the fatal mistakes of our policy in the Near East.

There still remained an opportunity to show if the Egyptian people might be regarded as fit for self-government. This opportunity lay with the Legislative Council. Three Bills, of peculiar importance in the existing circumstances, were submitted to the consideration of the Council by the Government during the month of May. Of these Bills, one which dealt with more stringent regulation of Press offences, and was

directed against those contumacious organs morally responsible for the assassination of Boutros Pasha Ghali, was contemptuously disposed of on the motion of Abaza Pasha, on the ground that it was an infringement of the liberty of the Egyptian Press which, he declared, called for no regulations of any sort.

The second Bill was entitled the Schools Discipline Bill. It was framed to prevent students in Government schools taking part in political agitation, or aiding and abetting seditious newspapers. It was considerably mutilated by the committee of the Council before it was put to the vote. The committee's modifications were calculated to lighten the penalties and narrow the scope of the law. They recommended the transfer of contumacious students to other schools—where they might be expected to foment fresh troubles—instead of dismissing or otherwise punishing them, and excluded the primary schools from the application of the proposed new Act. The committee also suggested that there was no necessity for special legislation, as the laws already in force were sufficient for the purpose, a view which was supported by many of the members, including Abaza Pasha. Finally the measure was passed in its mutilated form.

The most important of these three measures, however, was the Political Conspiracies Bill. It suffered so much at the hands of the committee that when, as finally amended, it was hurriedly rushed through the Council, it bore little or no resemblance to its original form. By these amendments the Bill could only be applied to a body of conspirators more than five in

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number, who were plotting against the Government or its officials, and who contemplated at least two crimes at the same time ! The possibility of the usefulness of the Bill was thus reduced to a minimum.

In spite of the jubilations of the Press, which may be taken as representative of the rejoicings of the Extremists, the Government determined to exert their long withheld authority. Their intentions in regard to the Schools Discipline Bill were not then definitely announced, but according to the decision of the Ministry of Public Education, dated the 4th June, the headmasters of combined boarding and day schools were to have the right to inflict, on their own authority without consulting the Minister, the punishment of expelling a scholar as a boarder and accepting him only as a day pupil. The headmasters of such schools were, however, in all cases where such punishments were inflicted, to send a full and circumstantial report to the Minister explaining their reasons for putting this right into execution.

A few weeks later, July 2nd, the Bill appeared in its final form. It provided that any boy whose conduct marks at the time of the annual school examination do not total twenty but whose other marks, in the written and oral examinations, are satisfactory should be promoted to the class immediately above, but if at the expiration of another six months, or at the end of the scholastic year, his conduct marks still do not total twenty then he should be expelled from the school and not be allowed to join another Government school of the same category. This regulation referred to boys over

the age of twelve years. If a boy should fail to pass his examination and his conduct marks are below twenty, he was to be kept in the same class, but subject to the regulation of expulsion as set out above. It will be noticed that the amendment of the Legislative Council permitting a boy expelled under this Bill to enter at another school of the same category is specifically rejected, thus making it useless for secondary school boys (to whom, on account of the age limit, this measure specially applies) to attempt to recover themselves by entering at a primary school and working their way up again.

This summary action was followed by the official intimation—published in the Egyptian papers on July 15th—that the Council of Ministers had decided to pass the Press Bill in its original form, ignoring its rejection by the Legislative Council.

At the same time it became public knowledge that the Ministry of Justice had written an official letter to the Council of Ministers, regretting that it could not accept the Conspiracies Bill in the form suggested by the Legislative Council, firstly owing to the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of many of the clauses as amended, and secondly, because, as amended, the Bill offered no effective guarantees against political conspiracies of the kind against which the Bill was directed. The Ministry of Justice accepted one only of the suggestions of the Legislative Council, namely, an amendment providing that a mere case of threatening shall not be dealt with under this Bill unless the threat is being conveyed by one or more

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persons from others. The Council of Ministers accordingly passed the Bill, with this one amendment.

Thus, in its efforts to show its independence, the Legislative Council only succeeded in over-reaching itself, and the firm attitude taken by the Government with regard to these measures was the first step in a right direction that it had taken for many months.

CHAPTER IV

MR. ROOSEVELT IN EGYPT

Mr. Roosevelt at Khartoum—Invitations from Egypt—Interest of the Nationalists—The Ex-President's Speech at the Khartoum Club—Sound Advice to Egyptian Army Officers—Nationalist Anger—The Approaching Address at the National University—Nationalists warn the Ex-President—Demonstration before Shepheard's Hotel—Mr. Roosevelt leaves Egypt.

WHEN vague reports of the prowess of a certain mighty hunter away in the heart of Central Africa began to filter through to Egypt, how little did any of us expect the sturdy, vigorous onslaught which that hunter was to make upon the Egyptian problem! Theodore Roosevelt, ex-President of the United States, has never shown himself amenable to convention, and it is doubtful whether Egypt, in the whole course of her long history, has ever received a more tempestuous intellectual shaking up than when she harboured within her borders that champion of moral and political integrity.

Fresh from eighteen months' sport in the heart of Africa, Colonel Roosevelt returned to civilisation bubbling over with a wholesome energy. Anxious to make the acquaintance of this ex-President of a republic which was held by many to be a model for their constitutional ambitions, the Egyptians had already contemplated doing him signal honour during his visit. Long before he arrived in Khartoum the authorities of the National University—an institution

which, by the way, had so far done little to justify its existence—extended an invitation to him to deliver a lecture there during his stay in Cairo, an invitation which he had gladly accepted, as he accepted many others which threatened, by their numbers, to fill every moment of his time.

His arrival at Khartoum in the middle of March was quickly followed by various acts which awoke the Nationalists to the possibility that the ex-President might not prove so sympathetic to their ambitions as they had anticipated. Among his visits to the different places of interest round about Khartoum was one to the Club, where he delivered a speech to the Egyptian officers. On the wall, till a few hours previously, had hung the portrait of the late leader of the Nationalists, Mustapha Pasha Kamel. There had been, and still was, a certain amount of seditious feeling among the troops of the Egyptian army ; a pamphlet had been distributed by a discontented native officer making certain allegations against his superior officers and criticising the action of the Sirdar in neglecting the demands of other malcontents, and the Extremists had done their best to add fuel to this feeling of resentment. As news travels fast in the East, rumours of this disaffection must doubtless have reached the ears of Mr. Roosevelt, who, when addressing the officers, took the opportunity of speaking a few straight words to them on the necessity of steering clear of politics and preserving their loyalty to the flag under which they served. He also spoke of the Sudan, and the improvements and progress that country owed to the British

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rule there, which gave dire offence to the Egyptian Nationalists, who had vaguely hoped for support from the ex-President of republican America.

In answer to this Khartoum speech both Sheikh Ali Youssef and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish inveighed against the temerity of the man who dared to extol British government and impugn the Nationalist aims.

Meanwhile the doughty ex-President went his way, oblivious of the obloquy which was being showered upon him. Filled with content at being surrounded once more by friends and relations, and enjoying every minute of his time, his days were spent between seeing the sights of Egypt, receiving his countrymen, and acceding to all the invitations, private and public, which were offered him. He was received with great urbanity by the Khedive; all the high officials and notables did him honour; he was pleased to receive entertainment at the hands of the Syrians, who considered themselves under a deep debt of gratitude to him on account of his protection of their countrymen.

The day before the promised address at the University, Mr. Roosevelt welcomed a posse of the different editors and journalists of Cairo, when he showed himself genuinely interested in their attitude, and explained away certain misconstructions which had been placed upon his addresses given in the Sudan. It was a noteworthy fact that though Sheikh Ali Youssef, the leader of the Moderates and the editor of *El Garida*, was present at this interview, none of the more uncompromising Extremists was there.

More than one notable had warned Mr. Roosevelt

not to touch upon the subject of the assassination of the Prime Minister, but this warning in no way weakened the American's determination to speak from the fullness of his heart on the subject he had chosen. The speech is too well known to need recapitulation here. Full of practical wisdom and sound, uncompromising advice, it was even less to the liking of the Nationalists than they had anticipated.

It was not long before the excited native politicians were metaphorically clamouring for the blood of this rash person who dared to insinuate that the country was not yet fitted for self-government. Extraordinary meetings were held by the *Exécutif* Committee of the Extremist party and that of the Party of the People, by way of counterblasts to the speech at the University; formal protests were framed and forwarded, and for the remainder of this visit—and indeed for many weeks afterwards—the name of Mr. Roosevelt was seldom mentioned without the accompaniment of violent vituperations. The streets and cafés literally seethed with excitement the remaining days of his visit, while the correspondents of the vernacular papers found wide scope for their varied and choice fancy for invective. After one speech by Ali Bey Fehmi, his audience of several hundred men and youths, armed for the greater part with sugar-canes, rushed to Sheppard's Hotel, outside which they amused themselves and the occupants of the broad veranda, by alternately chewing sugar and yelling "Down with Roosevelt!" "The Constitution for ever!" and other illuminating expressions of their sentiments. Unfortunately their

efforts never reached the ears of Mr. Roosevelt, for he and his party were being entertained by their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess Eitel Friedrich in another quarter of the town. The "Sugar-cane Demonstration" was barren of result with the exception of the amusement it afforded to the cosmopolitan audience on the veranda, who sat at their ease and watched it, as they watch other inexplicable phases of native life in Cairo.

The Copts, however, were full of gratitude to Mr. Roosevelt for his timely warnings and downright expression of opinions; and what with their demonstrations of gratitude and the Nationalist demonstrations of anger the departure of the ex-President of the United States from the shores of Egypt was a striking termination to his African experiences.

CHAPTER V

DARK PROSPECTS

Criticisms of Sir Eldon Gorst—Championed by *El Lewa*—Mr. Hamilton Fyfe and the *Daily Mail*—The Annual Report—Consternation among the Extremists—Severe Criticism in *Blackwood's Magazine*—Rumours of Consul-General's Resignation—Sir Eldon's Visit to England—The Extremists' New Official Organ—Moelhi Bey's Attacks upon Farid Bey.

AT the time the General Assembly was to have recorded its decision regarding the Suez Canal Convention Sir Eldon Gorst was away on a shooting trip in the Fayoum. Wiseacres shook their heads and remembered other momentous occasions when the Consul-General had been absent from the capital. The French Press commented upon the circumstance : “ *De la sorte Sir Eldon ne peut pas être accusé de peser sur les déterminations des ministres égyptiens* ” ; the English Press also spoke freely, and none too kindly, of this policy of effacement, while the *Daily Mail* and the *Saturday Review* published severe criticisms.

A curious result of the adverse comments of the home papers was the championing of Sir Eldon in the columns of *El Lewa*. It may be that so incongruous a situation was caused by *El Lewa* smarting from criticisms passed upon itself and its party by a correspondent of one of these journals. The correspondent in question was Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, of the *Daily Mail*, who, from the standpoint of a brief sojourn in Egypt, had contributed

to his paper some picturesque impressions of Cairo and the Egyptian situation. His views appearing in the columns of the most widely circulated Conservative paper of the times, were believed by *El Lewa* to be actuated by the policy of the paper and to form part of the great conspiracy to damage the cause of the Liberal Government. Thus *El Lewa* deduced that Mr. Fyfe's mission "is to wage a political campaign against Sir Eldon, who is in absolute harmony with Mr. Asquith on the policy to be pursued in Egypt, a policy of conciliation and concession," and that "through the instrumentality of Mr. Fyfe the Opposition in England is trying to fight the Prime Minister of England through Sir Eldon Gorst."

As the time drew near for the appearance of Sir Eldon's annual Report, there was much speculation as to what lines he would pursue in summarising the events of the year. Being assured in his own mind that this Report would contain many distasteful things, Abaza Pasha—leader of the Opposition in the Assembly—had already called together a committee of writers and thinkers to reply to its criticism and to publish the results of their cogitations broadcast. Indeed, it was rumoured that the greater part of the reply was already printed and circulated before the appearance of the Report, which fully realised Abaza's anticipations.

Whoever might criticise the actual personal policy of the British Consul-General, no one could deny either his exceptional ability or his knowledge of Egypt and the Egyptians as displayed in these annual surveys of the situation.

With reference to the report of the committee of the General Assembly on the Suez Canal project, Sir Eldon Gorst wrote that :

Neither the tone of this document nor the arguments adduced in support of its conclusion can be said to have justified the hope that the scheme would be examined with an open mind, and the chief feature by which the report is characterised is an entire lack of confidence in the intentions and good faith of the Government.

The moral responsibility for the murder of Boutros Pasha Ghali Sir Eldon attributed to the leaders of the Nationalist Party; and as regards any extension of the powers of the Legislative Council, stated that :

The Government have gone as far as is possible in the direction of giving every facility to the Legislative Council to utilise the powers which they now possess, and no extension of functions is desirable until the proceedings of the Council show that such a course can be adopted without danger to the well-being of the community.

Sir Eldon Gorst enumerated the reforms introduced into the department of the Interior during the year. He pointed out that, since the new Police Supervision Law was passed, serious crime had been reduced by 27 per cent., and stated his belief "that there is already proof of permanent improvement in the state of public security and of the general administration in the provinces." In conclusion, the Report pointed out the difficulties of the present situation, due in great measure to "the general want of confidence in the intentions of the occupying Power which prevails amongst the unofficial upper and middle classes, and causes every

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proposal brought forward by the Government to be viewed in a hostile spirit," and adds the opinion of the writer that :

In spite of these difficulties, the only sound course is to persevere on the lines already laid down, namely, that British intervention in the affairs of Egypt is directed to the sole end of introducing and maintaining good administration, and gradually educating and accustoming the Egyptians to carry this on themselves.

With regard to the abuse of the liberty of the Press Sir Eldon stated :

During 1909 the Press Law, which had been revived in the early part of the year, was applied with great, perhaps too great, moderation. Warnings were not successful in preventing the extreme Nationalist journals from continuing to pour odium and contempt on the authorities, and the Government may perhaps be blamed for not having used more freely the powers which they possessed to put a stop to these abuses. The ministers against whom the diatribes of the Nationalist writers were chiefly directed were reluctant to utilise the law to repress personal attacks upon themselves, and they preferred to take up the attitude of treating unfounded and libellous accusations with silent contempt. Sad experience has, however, now shown that this attitude does not suffice in Egypt. It is possible, though not, I fear, probable, that those who have been engaged for the last few years in stirring up the evil passions of the ignorant and credulous may at last perceive that they are playing with fire, and endeavour to mend their ways. If this should not turn out to be the case, it will become necessary to apply the Press Law with greater severity than heretofore. No obligation of Government is more imperative than to protect efficiently the lives and reputations of those who devote themselves to the service of their country.

The tenor of this Report, with its practical confession of failure, laid its author open to criticism—more especially from the Conservative papers. The *Daily Mail* had questioned his fitness for his post earlier in the year, and declared that he was largely responsible for the present state of affairs. The *Daily Express* had also devoted space to the same subject, and the *Daily Telegraph* openly spoke of the possibility of the Consul-General's resignation. We have already spoken of other criticisms of a similar character, but perhaps none of them was so plainly spoken as that which appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* of June, 1910, in which the writer dwelt upon the fallacies and weaknesses of the present rule in Egypt and their results, and the seeming ineptitude of the British Agent, whose only reason for continuing the inglorious tenancy of his position was the unshaken confidence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

It is not possible that all the articles which appeared on the subject of Sir Eldon's shortcomings could have been actuated by personal antipathy, or that they should all have been due to that vast political conspiracy on the part of the Opposition, as Mr. J. M. Robertson in the *Daily Chronicle*, as well as *El Lewa*, had suggested. Even Sir Edward Grey's able defence in his memorable speech did not exonerate the Consul-General. With his knowledge of things and natures Egyptian, the latter must long ago have realised the impossibility of preparing a people to do what they never could nor ever wanted to do—to govern themselves—and yet he permitted concession

after concession until discontent was rife, confidence in England lost, and the evacuation of the occupying Power regarded as the next step in the programme.

Rumours of resignation were daily hinted; Farid Bey telegraphed from Paris that Lord Selborne had already been nominated Sir Eldon's successor, and the official denial of these rumours had little effect in either Nationalist or other circles. It would, indeed, have been difficult to find anyone capable or willing to undertake the ungrateful office unless, indeed, an entirely new policy were sanctioned; and the Liberal Government, through Sir Edward Grey, having expressed its complete confidence in Sir Eldon Gorst, would scarcely contemplate replacing him because of the outcries of the Conservative papers. On July 2nd Sir Eldon returned to England for the summer months, many people firmly convinced that he would never return to the British Agency.

As the policy of the Extremists gained in popular favour practically every section of the moderate party grew weaker. The popularity of the titular leaders, Mohammed Farid Bey and Ali Fehmi Kamel, however, waned, and disaster overtook their official organs one by one.

Early in the year, Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, director of *El Lerwa* Company, had become involved in a serious lawsuit brought against him by his relations and co-heirs of the late Mustapha Pasha Kamel. Consequently the affairs of the company and the control of the paper passed into the hands of Youssef Bey Moelhi, chief director of *Misr el Fatat*, a paper whose language and

revolutionary character were every whit as violent as those of *El Lewa*.

Ali Bey Fehmi Kamel, Shimi Bey, Omar Bey Sultan, and various other notable Extremists, still remained faithful for a time to the original official organ of the party. Sheikh Abdul Shawish wavered for a few days, and then returned to his allegiance to his leader Farid Bey, and joined him in his new venture, *El Alam*, which was promoted to the title of official organ on the definite secession of Farid from *El Lewa*.

In reply to Farid Bey's action *El Lewa* began a series of attacks, advising him to resign from the presidency of the party if he would preserve his dignity and conceal his errors, and inquiring about the subscriptions collected for the statue of Mustapha Kamel and the Kuttab of Denishwai. The sum collected for the latter object amounted to £E829, £E200 and 550 milliemes having been subscribed by English Liberals, £E259 by the students of the Government Schools, and the rest by other Nationalists. What, asked *El Lewa*, had been done with this money ?

The fact that *El Alam* received the necessary licence from the authorities was hailed with great rejoicings by Farid's followers as another triumph in the Nationalist cause. But their triumph was short-lived, for when it was discovered that, though ostensibly under the control of Ismail Effendi Hafiz, an expert in the Native Tribunals, *El Alam* was but the mouthpiece of Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish, then the Egyptian Government, influenced maybe by the British Agency, took the decisive step of muzzling it for two months for going

“beyond the bounds of moderation” in its writings, abusing the Government, and making “attacks on the British Empire and the subjects thereof in Egypt,” etc.

The inglorious career of *El Alam* being thus peremptorily interrupted after some twelve issues, the Extremists proceeded to negotiations with the proprietor of *El Ibtidal*, a weekly journal, and after certain qualms of conscience, the latter consented to the issue of a daily, under the same title, as the official organ of the Extremists, by which the latter hoped still to defy the Government. Its life, however, was shorter than its predecessor, and summary justice fell upon the next exponent of patriotic liberty, *El Adl*. Eventually *El Shaab* was acquired, and finally licensed as the “organ of the National party,” and thereby the Extremists forced home the unpalatable lesson of the virtues of importunity. To add to their triumph, the staff of censors to the Press Bureau was, at about this time, enriched by the appointment of two well-known enemies of the Occupation—Mohammed Effendi Massoud, editor of *El Lewa*, and M. Achille Sekaly, editor of *Les Pyramides*. To comment upon the making of such appointments in the circumstances which then existed is futile.

Such was the exuberantly disorderly state of affairs in the early days of the summer, not only in the capital but also in the provinces, that the safety of the European residents was endangered. Sedition in the army was rapidly spreading, and the knowledge of it becoming public property—thanks to the columns of the Extremist Press—disorganisation prevailed in almost every department in the Ministry of the Interior; public

functionaries were known to be fomenting religious animosity, disgraceful outrages, assaults, and thefts were condoned if not encouraged, and seditious and inflammatory demonstrations were of common occurrence. So prevalent was the general belief that the days of the Occupation were numbered, that servants openly defied their employers, revolutionary sentiments were sung in the streets, and it is on record that the subscriptions due to certain charitable institutions were withheld, despite the fact that they were international in working, because they were originally started by individuals of British nationality. We have been assured on high authority that behind these superficial signs of the times were organisations of grave import, that actual arrangements for a general massacre were being made, that the doctrines inculcated by the Society of Mutual Brotherhood and others of the same sort were being put into practice, and that it was only due to the warnings of Mr. Roosevelt and the stand eventually taken by Sir Edward Grey, that Egypt was spared a repetition of the disastrous experience of 1881. Personally we do not believe that, had affairs resulted in the massacre which was contemplated, it would ever have reached such formidable proportions as that of Arabi's time; but it was an undoubted danger, and would have had a disastrous effect upon the future of the country.

CHAPTER VI

THE GUILDHALL SPEECH.

Mr. Roosevelt at the Guildhall—More "Straight Talk"—Satisfaction of Anglo-Egyptians—Anger of the Nationalist Press—Debate in the House of Commons—Sir Edward Grey's Speech—"To continue the British Occupation of Egypt"—The Government's determination to protect Egyptian Officials—Effect of the Speech upon the Extremists—Recrudescence of Moderate Views.

THE 1st of June, 1910, will always be known in the annals of modern Egypt as the day on which ex-President Roosevelt, enjoying the hospitality of the Guildhall, publicly criticised Great Britain's policy in Egypt. For months past those within the country had been conscious of the trouble which must accrue from that fatal policy. Protest after protest had been forwarded to the home authorities and to the English Press, and yet, for some inexplicable reason, the authorities had seemed to close their ears to the warning until it was voiced again by a man whose reputation as a statesman and experience as the first citizen of a great republic commanded attention. However violent his breach of the rules of etiquette on that memorable occasion at the Guildhall, and however humiliating his words may have been to the country he addressed, it says much for Mr. Roosevelt's tact and common sense that the English bore him no resentment for his fearless enunciation of hard facts. Indeed, all who have interests in Egypt feel only that they owe the great American a debt of

gratitude for his fearless championing of the cause of a practical and practicable administration of the country.

The full text of his speech is too lengthy for reproduction here ; but its chief points in regard to Egypt may be summed up as follows :

1. That the position of England in Egypt is that of guardian in the interests of civilisation.

2. That the present condition of the country is a menace both to the British Empire and to civilisation.

3. That our errors lie rather in having done too much than too little in the interests of the native population, and that dangerous results are likely to follow any appearance of weakness, timidity, or sentimentality.

4. The absence of even a primary sense of justice in the attitude of the Nationalist Party—as proved by the assassination of the late Prime Minister—without which there was no chance for the most simple form of self-government.

5. The duty of those responsible to the Government for order to see that measures were taken to ensure that end.

6. England interfered in Egypt twenty-eight years ago, and her assistance was absolutely necessary.

7. The necessity for England to choose now whether or not it was her duty to continue her guardianship.

8. The impossibility of permitting self-government to any country which could countenance assassination as a corner stone in such constitutional edifice.

9. The benefit to the Egyptian people of the British control ; the impossibility of Egypt ever being indepen-

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dent of any outside control, and the speaker's supposition that England would retain her position.

It is unnecessary to dilate upon the criticisms, adverse and laudatory, in the English Press, but those emanating from the Egyptian vernacular papers are so naïvely illustrative of the shallowness of the native mind that reference to them cannot be omitted. The incoherencies of Sheikh Ali Youssef, who laid claim to moderate views, but had run foul of those of Mr. Roosevelt, even before his arrival in Cairo, would be amusing were they not the words of one of the leaders of a race which claims fitness for self-government :

Mr. Roosevelt is persuading England to rule Egypt oppressively, void of any sympathy, for he believes that severity and injustice will do Egypt good. We were mistaken to describe him as the best representative of America. He has turned out to be a man from Hell, who deserves to be known to posterity as the bloody man of America, for he means to destroy Egypt cruelly and tyrannically. . . . We might add that if Mr. Roosevelt proved himself by his address in Egypt to be without any sense of propriety, he has shown himself in England to be rash and high-headed, to such an extent that the Americans have a right to demand that his mental condition should be inquired into. By his unwise, audacious, insolent and tyrannical language he has brought shame upon America. We believe that England is wiser than to be persuaded by the foolishness of such a man, who has tried to make himself superior to every human capacity, giving empty lessons to the great nations of the world.

Misr el Fatah's comments are no more worthy. It says :

Had we known that Roosevelt grows soft by a delicious dinner we would have prepared banquets for him at every

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corner of our country, of the like of which perhaps he might never have dreamed. We thought him a lover of freedom and never knew that he would sacrifice it for a meal that turns shortly to nothingness.

El Alam, the official Extremist organ, declared that :

In his latest speech Roosevelt has shown how a statesman may commit political suicide for the sake of popular applause. He announces his judgment that England should maintain her guardianship over Egypt as though he were the Almighty Controller of the destinies of nations, the absolute governor who has the power to decide a people's fate ; as if he were Napoleon at the height of his power, or a mediæval Pope in all his dignity ! He has tried to assist England in her plots against Egypt, because Egypt has estimated his abilities and treated him as he deserves. We cannot see why Roosevelt should be so spiteful to us. Is it because we ventured to disagree with him and did not call his name holy ? Or is it because, having lost his Presidency, he is trying to secure a post as Governor in one of the English Colonies ? Or is it because he is one of those fanatics who entertain the unjust idea that the Anglo-Saxon race should govern the whole world ? Or is it because he enjoys oppression and despotism after his experience as President ? Or is it because we are Moslems and Orientals ? His words would not move us in the least, even if he were a great Czar, the Abdul Hamid of the West ! How ignorant you are, Roosevelt ! We leave you to choke with your own venom. We march forward, peacefully and unmoved.

The speech of Mr. Roosevelt was still fresh in the memory of the public when the great debate on the Egyptian question took place in the House of Commons, on June 18th. It was during this debate that Sir Edward Grey made the notable speech in which he

proclaimed the decision of the Government to continue the British Occupation of Egypt. Sir Edward practically endorsed all Mr. Roosevelt's statements with the exception of that regarding the excessive complacency towards the opponents of the Occupation having endangered our work in Egypt. He also did not agree with the view that the policy encouraging self-government was responsible for undermining the authority of the Government or encouraging disturbances, both of which statements, in the opinion of many, laid him open to the charge of incomplete knowledge of the subject. But while entirely approving Sir Eldon Gorst's action as carrying out the trend of policy laid down by the home Government, Sir Edward was firm in declaring that the British Occupation must continue, and that in case of further disturbances or violence such as had cost the late Prime Minister his life, measures would be taken to protect Egyptians administering Egypt in consultation with the home Government, even to the extent of dealing with such offences through the Army of Occupation.

It is needless here to dilate on the further discussions at this debate, or on the speeches of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Baird, Mr. J. M. Robertson, Mr. Kettle, Mr. Dillon, Sir J. Dalziel, etc., all of which were reported fully at the time, but which had little practical bearing on the subject of the moment—the continuance of the Occupation. This, however, was explicitly dealt with in Sir Edward Grey's second important speech, on July 22nd, when, while discussing the subjects of the Suez Canal Convention, Press Law, cotton growing, etc., he

reiterated his statement that the Government had no intention of evacuating the country, and if there had been any doubt as to whether we were weakening in our intention to retain responsibility in Egypt, it was the first duty of any British Government to remove it.

These declarations, reproduced in special supplement form by the Cairo *Bourse Egyptienne*, caused consternation among its readers. According to the *Egyptian Gazette* :

The copies were bought up eagerly, chiefly by students and others who were able to translate into Arabic for the benefit of their friends. People had been expecting Reuter's telegram with anxiety, as references to it had already been made in the messages of the previous day. It was interesting to watch the faces of these students—the backbone of the Nationalist Party—as it slowly dawned upon them that England was so dissatisfied with the state of affairs out here that she was seriously contemplating the possibility of having to hand over the administration of justice in certain cases to the special courts of the Army of Occupation; that both the Opposition and Ministerial spokesmen accepted as a matter of course the utter unfitness of Egypt for self-government, that Mr. Balfour's advocacy of "benevolent despotism" was tacitly accepted by Sir Edward Grey. Disappointment and consternation were displayed on all sides. Indeed, the amazement of these young "patriots" whenever anyone ventures to disagree with them is one of the most notable features of their curious mental outlook in these matters. Mr. Roosevelt astonished them by his outspoken disapproval of political assassination; but apparently they are more than astonished, they are absolutely thunderstruck, to find that the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain agrees with him. The groups of listeners, assembled round each reader when the telegram arrived, dispersed very quietly when the

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contents were known, and with such celerity that one would have thought that the emissaries of tyrant England were already on their track.

The sudden and unexpected blasting of their hopes seemed to paralyse the Extremist party. They appeared to be incapable of making the inapt or inept rejoinder which one had learnt to expect from them in answer to every Government statement. The effect of Sir Edward Grey's declarations, indeed, was the sudden rallying of Moderate opinions, and protests against the proceedings of the agitators which had made such declarations necessary.

Thus *El Ahram* said :

The one thing wanted is that agitation and disturbance should cease. Egyptians must understand that England is responsible for what happens here, and that it is useless to attack subordinates here for carrying out orders given in London ; that the Constitution is an absolute impossibility so long as ignorant people continue to make a noise and behave as though Egyptians and English were bitter enemies. Therefore agitation is useless. We have to gain the confidence of Europe and maintain good relations with England. And to do that we must, above all things, keep quiet.

El Watan, a Coptic journal, was more emphatic :

We know who is the criminal against Egypt and who compelled the Occupation to change the former policy of kindness and consideration. There is no nation in the world more patient than the English, for they have borne with the foolishness of these mobs (the Extremists) for the last quarter of a century. But the limit of patience has been reached, and the time has come to teach these ignorant people how to behave themselves ; if Egypt were controlled by any other nation but the English the prisons would long ago have been

full of them. . . . Can we blame the Liberals if even they decided to act more firmly after conciliation has been tried in vain for twenty-eight years? Egyptians have the right to curse and to insult this Party of ignoramuses who have brought us to this present pass. We cannot blame the Occupation for adopting a sterner policy; the reason is to be found in the appearance of disgraceful publications such as the poems of Nassim, extracts from which appeared in the *Egyptian Gazette* and which we may be sure will be copied by English papers, showing to the world the foolishness of the Nationalist Party which pretends to represent the Egyptian nation.

Sir E. Grey's declarations will have an excellent effect in restoring the confidence of financiers in Egypt's future, and, perhaps, in inducing the Extremists to keep quiet.

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CHAPTER VII

SECESSIONS FROM THE EXTREMISTS.

The Leaderless Extremists—Farid Bey in France—Rumoured determination of Sheikh Shawish to settle in England—Sheikh Ali Effendi Ghayatti—His Seditious Poems—Summoned before the Governor of Cairo—Flight to Turkey—Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish charged with Complicity—Ahmed Effendi Nassim—More Seditious Poems—Mohammed Bey Anis' Change of Front—Split in the Extremist Camp.

THE situation of the Extremists was such as they had never been in before. Not only had the speech of Sir Edward Grey left them in a dilemma, but they knew not where to turn for guidance. Mohammed Farid Bey was in France, and there were rumours that Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish was contemplating withdrawing his presence to live in England. It was said that he purposed publishing there a paper in the Egyptian Nationalist interest.

The characteristic fickleness of the Egyptian people had already led to the fading of the memory of Wardani from their minds. During the month of July the assassin's place as popular hero was taken by one Sheikh Ali Effendi Ghayatti, whose escapades relieved the tedium of the summer.

This young poet, belonging to the holy order of Sheikhs, had at one time been an ardent supporter of English rule, and had been a voluminous contributor

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to the local papers. Like many another, his political views were of the weathercock order, and whatever the reason of his defection he certainly showed his earnestness by the extreme violence of his attacks against the existing Government. He became an enthusiastic admirer of the doctrines of the late Mustapha Pasha Kamel, adopted Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish as his counsellors and guides, and transferred his allegiance from the moderate papers to the columns of *El Alam*, to the manifest advantage of the latter. Eventually the attention of the authorities was drawn, by *El Moayad*, to the publication of a book of poems, entitled "Wataniety," of which the young Sheikh was the author, and which contained eulogistic introductions by both Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish. In addition to the revolutionary and sanguinary sentiments of these poems, the eloquent eulogies of his masters and of Dingra and Wardani, denunciations of Boutros Pasha and the Occupation, threats against the Khedive, the call to patriotism, and other samples of the Nationalistic stock-in-trade, Ghayatti confirmed the fact, generally refuted hitherto, that the Extremist cause was essentially Mohammedan, and had among its articles of faith one which bound its members to spread the religion of the Koran and faithfully to serve the same. Under the signature of "A Soldier of the Nationalist Party," Ghayatti offered his life and poetry to his country, promising to change the modern history of Egypt in a manner to make those giants of tyranny and injustice, the English, kneel down in respect and fear and give victory to his Motherland :

The Nile may be proud of its sons, for there are many among them silent on its banks in contemplation who will on the morrow break their silence in action. And the morrow is near ; it will come soon.

So seditious were these poems considered that, on the information accorded by *El Moayad*, the promising young patriot was summoned to appear before the Governor of Cairo and warned to hold himself henceforward under the orders of the Parquet, while immediate efforts were taken to search out copies of the offending publication. But Ghayatti, though nominally a soldier of the Nationalist cause, had no mind to become a martyr, and no sooner was the warning issued than he disappeared from view. With the assistance of money from his friends and the substitution of Europeanised Effendi garments in the place of his Sheikh's flowing robes, he escaped the vigilance of the police, fled to Damietta and thence to Constantinople, where he could afford to snap his fingers at Egyptian justice.

According to the newly enforced regulations with regard to the Press Law, not only Ghayatti, but also his coadjutors, were held liable for the seditious publication, and in consequence of their laudatory introductions both Mohammed Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish were formally charged with complicity. The former, still in Europe, saw no reason for appearing to answer the charge, and at the initial inquiry Sheikh Shawish disclaimed responsibility on the excuse that he had signed the introduction without reading it. He also pleaded that he was not responsible for the adver-

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tisements of the afore-mentioned book of poems in *El Alam*, or any notices of it which were not over his signature.

Eventually four persons were committed for trial before the Assize Court : Sheikh Ali Ghayatti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, editor of *El Alam*, Sheikh Mohammed Kozwini and Elias Effendi Diab, librarian. The case against Mohammed Farid Bey was to be postponed till he returned from Europe, though if he delayed his return into the autumn, steps would be taken to judge him in default.

The charges preferred against these persons were :

- (a) Direct incitement to murder.
- (b) Libelling the Khedive.
- (c) Seditious agitation.
- (d) Incitement to criminal acts.
- (e) Insulting the Minister of Justice.
- (f) Insulting the Ministry and the Courts of Law.

After an interval of curiously ineffective search, Ghayatti was at last run to earth by one of the correspondents of *El Mokattam*, at Constantinople. He declared that his poems were written as a protest against the disastrous change of policy recently instituted by the Egyptian Government ; and though he quite anticipated a triumphant acquittal, preferred not to be present at the trial. He alluded also to the success of his book in the sale of 1,600 copies, and contemplated going on from Constantinople to some rich and fashionable friend in Germany, who had promised to render assistance in translating the work for the European market.

Ghayatti was not the only poet to abscond for fear of retribution following on the heels of his muse. Ahmed Effendi Nassim, also an erstwhile admirer of Lord Cromer, had seen fit to enter the lists of Extremist patriotism. Though the Government saw no reason for prosecuting Nassim, his bloodthirsty imbecilities appeared in every paper of extreme views and, if we know anything of native character, must have been particularly satisfying to their readers. We give below an example of his style of alluding to the English. In a poem dealing with the English in Egypt, he says :

Had I the power I would have allowed the sword to slash
their bodies and so relieved the devil of his work in snatching
away their souls. *Had I the power again I would not rest
until I saw their blood shed and flowing.*

Though Farid Bey and Sheikh Shawish still retained a large band of followers, there was no doubt that the uncompromising attitude of the home Government was having its result in making the saner element of the population think whether any ultimate good could ever accrue from violent Extremist opposition. Many influential Nationalists had bitterly realised that Farid Bey was not the man to save the situation, and that it was futile to continue the Extremist motto of eternal hatred to the English, and the Extremist object of forcing the evacuation of the country, when Sir Edward Grey had so emphatically declared the intention of the English nation to continue the Occupation.

Such reasons had evidently entered into the calculations of Mohammed Bey Anis, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Extremist party, and well known at one

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time for his uncompromising views. Much to the surprise of his party, then, must have been his letter, published in *El Ahram* in the early part of July, wherein he stated opinions which had led him to reverse his former policy. He stated that there was practically no hope to be expected from Turkey, in spite of all the advances to the Young Turks and the installation of Farid Bey in the realms of political Freemasonry, and no help from France, even with Farid Bey on the spot. In the face of such lack of sympathy the only friends to be really counted on were the English Liberals who had already worked various reforms in the country, and helped the Nationalists against the Imperial despots, as in the Denishwai affair. He therefore advised that his party should cease rioting and demonstrating, should cultivate good relations with the Liberal party, and should suggest to Farid Bey the resignation of his leadership. Naturally these opinions were not allowed to pass uncriticised by those whose cherished programme would have been completely upset by them. A correspondent to *Misr el Fatat* accused Anis Bey of aspiring to the leadership of the Nationalist party, but the latter repudiated the insinuation that his suggestions were actuated by personal ambition.

However much the Extremists might rave over his defection, call upon him to resign his place on the Nationalist committee, and accuse him of many and divers ulterior motives, there were many who gave him credit for his upright and sensible view of affairs, and many who were anxious to sever their connection with Farid and Co. Notable among these

was Mohammed Bey Rashad, an intelligent and respected member of Cairo society, a judge of the Cairo Convention Tribunal, and member of the Egyptian Bar; and there was no doubt that his views were shared by others too numerous to mention. An Alexandria Nationalist journal, *Wadi el Nil*, summed up these views clearly :

If we examine for a moment the aid which Egypt has been able to obtain from European Governments we see at once that it is nothing upon which we can congratulate ourselves, for each of these Governments has its own special object in view. Let us look at each case separately. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire, from which we were expecting so much, has been the very foremost in advising us to keep silent, and for reasons which are well known and which Anis Bey has already pointed out. Secondly, France, as we all know, has entered into an alliance with England, and can no longer interfere in Egypt or listen to our complaints because she has to respect that alliance and has friendship with England. Thirdly, Germany is bound to follow, and shows every intention of following, the policy laid down for her by Bismarck when he declared that nothing would induce him to sacrifice a single German soldier in solving the Egyptian question; though this does not prevent the Germans from giving us innocent pleasure by means of their newspapers, and making us vague promises through the mouths of their consuls. Fourthly, Austria is allied to Germany, and is also fully occupied with her internal troubles and her predominant interest in the disturbed Balkan states. Fifthly, Italy will cling at all costs to her alliance with Great Britain and will follow British policy for her own benefit. Sixthly, Russia has been so crippled by Japan and has lost so much influence in Europe that all thought of attacking England through India or Egypt is gone; for she must now look after her own

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affairs. So that of these six Governments, which alone have sufficient influence to interfere in the affairs of Egypt, not one can help us now.

Finally, turning to our own affairs, we find ourselves divided into two camps, the followers of *El Lewa* and the followers of *El Alam*. What we have got to do then is to cultivate good relations with English Liberals, to adopt their policy and increase their influence in this country, to improve ourselves in local government, and to stop rioting and agitating, so as to show foreigners that we are ready for and worthy of self-government.

The result of this split in the Extremist camp was the subsequent move to form a new party on the lines formulated by Anis Bey, which party was to embrace Mohammedans, Copts, Syrians, Armenians and Ottoman Greek subjects, with Vice-Presidents representing each of these nationalities. The programme of this party was very similar to that formed some months earlier by Idris Bey Raghib, and which was based on a quotation from Lord Cromer's speech before the Eighty Club in London (December, 1908). High-minded and public-spirited as had been the tenets of Idris Bey Raghib as formulated at the inauguration of his Constitutional Party, his practice had not seemed always to agree with his sentiments; and his organ, *L'Egypte*, was one of those believed to be subsidised by the Extremist Party to further their aims. *L'Egypte*, it is true, was not the only one among the local European papers whose singular and marked sympathy with the Extremist cause had aroused comment. A curious fact, however, was that the twin sheets, English and French, of *L'Egypte* offered entirely different policies to their

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readers, the former being pro-English, while the latter was furiously Anglophobe in its tendencies.

Should the movement initiated by Anis Bey be successful, the sinking of religious antagonism will be one of its most beneficial results. Its success at this time, however, appeared far off. Mr. W. S. Blunt did not help the movement by his declaration that Sir Eldon Gorst had favoured the native Christians at the expense of the Mohammedans.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION.

Trial of Sheikh Ghayatti and his Accomplices—The Sentences—Trial of Mohammed Bey Wahid—His Sentence and Appeal—Poverty of Nationalist Party—More Defections—The Paris Congress—Appeal for Funds—Rumoured Occupationist Plot—French Government's Action—The Congress meets at Brussels—The Khedive and Abaza Pasha—Rumoured Impending Downfall of the Ministry—Proposal to increase the Number of English Teachers—Nationalist Outcry—More Rumours of Impending Changes.

EARLY in August—the month of evil omen, so far as Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish was concerned—his trial with Sheikh Ghayatti and his accomplices was begun by the Assize Court. Ghayatti remained in Constantinople, whence, from time to time, he launched forth protests against *El Akhbar* for insulting him, against *El Moayad* for having betrayed him, and against the Occupation for having visited his sins on the heads of his partners :

If I had known it I would have written against them not with a pen but with a sword, not with ink but with blood, and not upon paper but upon the heads of those enemies of mine.

Sheikh Shawish, Sheikh Koswani—of Persian race and connected with the Panislamic movement—and Elias Effendi Diab (a young Syrian) took their places in the crowded and very stuffy court on August 6th to answer for their misdeeds, there being many who

were of the opinion that the Tunisian Sheikh was the principal reason for the trial. Koswani and Diab were, indeed, only charged with secreting copies of the confiscated book, and were bound over. Ghayatti, judged by default, was sentenced to a year's imprisonment with hard labour, a sentence which afforded him material for further articles and letters, and which doubtless stood him in good stead during his connection with the new paper, *Dar el Khilafah*; and Sheikh Shawish was committed to prison for three months, which prevented him from carrying out his plans for visiting England and the Press Conference, and must in many other ways have seriously interfered with his programme. Opinions on the verdict were of varied character. *El Alam*—Shawish's own journal—naturally compared him with Kossuth, O'Connell, Parnell, Garibaldi, Mazzini, Mirabeau, Victor Hugo, and other eminent persons. The *Journal du Caire* alluded to the case as inaugurating "the regime of oppression which Sir Edward Grey has just laid down for Egypt." On the other hand, *El Watan* voiced the thoughts of many:

It is surely time that the Nationalist Party began to understand what must be the result of its present campaign. Time after time when it puts forward its claim to represent the Egyptian nation leading men come forward and object. The party is composed of schoolboys, led by men of no social standing whatever, and at last people are beginning to realise its mistakes. We heard its own Vice-President, Ali Bey Kamel, lecture against Mr. Roosevelt in language of exaggerated violence; but since then we have seen what the same gentleman wrote about the imprisonment of Sheikh

Shawish, and the change in his tone is remarkable. On the first occasion he was in a state of high excitement ; on the second he was even calm enough to descend to argument, and his expressions were less violent. This shows that the agitation is decreasing in force, for even the leader is trying to moderate his tone.

Another case tried the same week, and which raised a most interesting legal point with regard to the actual status of the Khedive, was that which centred upon Mohammed Bey Wahid, the leader of the Egyptian Liberal Party, who had but lately reiterated his loyalty to the British representative in Egypt. The charge brought against him was the publication of an article in connection with the proposed statue in memory of the late Ismail Pasha, and which was said to be insulting to the memory of the late Khedive, as it was also to his descendants, especially the present holder of the title and Prince Hussein. The article in question, which had been published in February, drew a comparison between the political situation in the time of Lord Cromer and that of his successor, and the Government was criticised for appointing as President of a representative assembly a member of the Khedivial family, Prince Hussein Kamel. In no part of this article was any allusion made to the *person* of the Khedive, or to any member of his family. Thus a paragraph ran : "During Lord Cromer's time, the Maieh (Khedivial Court) lowered its voice, while that of the people was raised." And again : "When Great Britain, through Lord Cromer, gave a little authority to the Khedivial Maieh, the Maieh struck a heavy

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blow at the people by appointing Prince Hussein Kamel as president of a representative assembly." The editor and acting manager of the paper—*El Akhbar*—containing the article were also indicted. The court of first instance having sentenced Wahid Bey to four months' imprisonment, he resolved to carry the matter to the Court of Appeal.

During the hearing of the appeal, Wahid Bey defended himself in a remarkably able manner without the aid of counsel, but it was Maître Marcos Effendi Hanna, a pronounced Extremist, though a Copt, who, in defending the editor of *El Akhbar*, enunciated the novel opinion that the Khedive was, according to law, a public functionary, and might therefore be criticised in the columns of the Press. This view was not accepted by the court, and consequently it refused to reverse the judgment passed by the court of first instance, though reducing the sentence by two months.

With Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish living in seclusion at the expense of the Government, and Farid Bey, in voluntary exile, endeavouring to beat up sympathy for his cause in Stockholm, in London, and in Paris, the Extremists were as a flock without a shepherd, and their affairs were in a parlous state. The circulation of their official organ, *El Alam*, deprived of the services of its most brilliant contributor, was dwindling day by day. From the pathetic tales published in the other vernacular organs, the exchequer of the party was beginning to feel the pinch of poverty. Perhaps its former wealthy adherents had grown tired of pouring their money into the coffers of a seemingly

hopeless cause. Perhaps, also, the rumour of a new Nationalist paper of moderate opinions was engaging their attention.

Nevertheless, the leader of the impecunious cause was touring Europe, and the Extremists had but lately boasted that they had subsidised every European paper in Egypt with the exception of three.

Not content with their own troubles, the Extremists continued to seek others. They fretted over the new paper, which was said to be substantially backed by influential Mohammedan members of the society they wished to call their own. They shrieked triumphantly when humiliation was forced upon Sheikh Ali Youssef and *El Moayad* from Turkish quarters; they screamed with rage when *El Mourshid*, an American missionary review, published an unfortunate article attacking the Moslem religion, even though the society to which it belonged made immediate and voluntary reparation for its misdeed. They found yet another target for abuse in the visit of Kyriakos Mikhail, the young Coptic journalist, to London, where he was endeavouring to seek redress for certain grievances of his people.

The so-called Nationalist Congress, which was officially announced to take place in Paris during the month of September, was primarily the private effort of Farid Bey, Sheikh Shawish, and their immediate followers. It had no real connection with the members of the Geneva Conference, though it is difficult to see where their aims differed. However, the official announcement of this Paris Congress was followed by the enunciation of its object ;

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To group the largest possible number of Egyptians with a number of responsible Europeans chosen among those who have worked upon or are interested in Oriental questions from the economic or political point of view, and particularly the Egyptian question, with a view to discussing the political, judicial, administrative, and disciplinary situation in Egypt, and to make known the political and financial situation, as well as the attitude of the present Government and the state of its finances. Europe may thus form an exact idea of our situation, and appreciate impartially the work of the Occupation in our country. She will then perceive the falseness of the statements made to blacken the name of Egypt in Europe and to put financiers on guard against us and our country. She will see that we are a calm and peaceable people, respecting the rights of strangers and capable of governing ourselves.

An administrative and a preparatory committee were elected, Mohammed Farid Bey acting as President, with the support of Mr. W. S. Blunt and the probable acquisition of Sheikh Ghayatti as General Secretary. Two Agents-General were also appointed to Cairo, one to receive moral and intellectual support, and the other to guard the important matter of material funds.

The subjects to be discussed at the congress, which was to be held from September 22nd to 28th, were :

1. General politics in Egypt and the Sudan.
2. Administrative questions, which include also the Ministries of the Interior and Public Works, and agricultural questions.
3. Financial questions connected with the finances of the Government, and economic questions in general. " Here," it is explained, " we must show the sources of our natural wealth, the state of the market, and all that which is of a nature to give confidence to European financiers to con-

tinue to work with us without lending ear to the calumnies with which we have been charged. It will also be well to enlighten the Government upon the means which should be employed to augment the resources of the country.

4. Private and public education.

The languages to be employed were Arabic, French, and English. As the only condition of membership was the payment of one "English sovereign," and no efforts were spared to beat up contributions from every source, it was anticipated that the congress would prove as triumphant a financial success as it was certain to be a political one. There were many complaints, it is true, that these ever-recurring appeals for money were becoming an intolerable nuisance, and the suggestion that, instead of sending telegrams, absent sympathisers should add the cost of such projected telegrams to the general funds did not add dignity to the appeals. Another effort of Extremist ingenuity, designed to cover a possible outcome of the congress, was to be found in the sensational discovery by *El Lewa* of an Occupationist plot. According to this imaginative journal, a sinister attempt had been made to bribe certain youths to attend the congress so as to create a disturbance, draw down the intervention of the police, and incur the displeasure of France. As no proofs—neither names nor other evidence—were published in substantiation of this announcement, we may take it for what it was worth.

On Thursday, September 15th, the little band of Egyptian Nationalists who were to attend the congress boarded the specially chartered steamer, amid enthu-

siastic cries of "Long live France" and other suitable sentiments. They were not very far on their voyage when the stupefying announcement was published that the French Government had prohibited the holding of the congress, not desiring that Paris should be the centre of an anti-British crusade nor approving the Panislamic tendencies of the Nationalists.

Naturally, English interference was suspected, and, as naturally, the cries of "Long live France!" gave place to others of a different savour. A country so perfidious must be made to suffer. It should be sued for substantial redress for moral and financial damage, which would serve the double purpose of salving wounded dignity and replenishing empty coffers. Its foreign policy, especially that in Morocco, should be given the publicity it deserved, etc.

The subsequent proceedings of the congress at Brussels—where it was permitted on the understanding that no violent anti-English language should be used—are too recent to need recapitulation.

The remainder of the summer of 1910 was remarkable for the promulgation of absurd and most contradictory rumours concerning the Khedive, his Ministry, the revival of the Suez Canal Convention, the increase of the British troops of occupation, and the intentions generally of the British Government. The long visit of the Khedive to Constantinople and his association there with Abaza Pasha, undoubtedly one of the most influential notables not belonging to the Ministry, gave rise to the most fantastic theories with regard to the future policy of Egypt. It was said that Abaza

Pasha was summoned to Constantinople by Khedivial command, and that his missions to Paris and London, and his determination to suppress his long-promised pamphlet of criticism of Sir Eldon Gorst's Report, were all portents pointing to some violent change in policy. On one hand we heard that the Khedive had quarrelled with England, being unable to bear her tyranny any longer, and was anxious to effect a definite *rapprochement* with the Nationalists, while, according to another insolent suggestion, he had been conspiring with the Ottoman reactionaries to overthrow the present Sultan. Then, again, we heard that his Highness had been the recipient of anonymous threatening letters supposed to have emanated from an Anarchist society formed because he had joined the cause of the British Occupation.

Perhaps the most absurd of these rumours and one that has persistently cropped up from time to time during the last few years is that the Khedive is seriously meditating the abdication of his throne, and that the visit of Abaza Pasha had as its double purpose "first an attempt to neutralise the unfavourable attitude shown towards him by England, which desires to replace him, and in the second place, in the case of failure, to make arrangements for his Highness to take up his residence in the Turkish capital." This report, which was forwarded to the *Paris Journal* by its Constantinople correspondent, is hardly more credible than that which appeared as a semi-official announcement in an English paper—that the Khedive suffers from fits of temporary insanity.

As for the present Ministry, the malcontent papers have been persistently circulating rumours as to its downfall. The wish is doubtless father to the thought, since Mohammed Pasha Said has not proved the ready tool in their hands which they had anticipated. According to Ghayatti, the Prime Minister is said to have stated that he did not wish to continue in office since the Ministerial policy was so distressful to the Nationalists. Mohammed Pasha Said has undoubtedly been the victim of much abuse from the Extremists, who have accused him of despotism and tyranny, and it has been openly stated that he is at variance with certain of his colleagues, more especially with Said Pasha Zaghoul.

Another subject which occupied the attention of the Extremists during the "silly season" of 1910 was the announcement that the Ministry of Education was to enlarge its English staff by twenty-two teachers—male and female. This, of course, gave rise to the usual anti-British campaign in the papers, which still cherish the conviction that no system of education in Egypt can be successful until Arabic and native teachers are the bases of instruction. Not only did *El Lewa* and *El Balag*—another paper of like tendency—enlarge on the subject, but even *La Bourse Egyptienne*, in an article by M. Kastner, found causes of dissatisfaction in the announcement:

I have no sympathy for or antipathy to the Adviser to the Ministry of Education, a creature of Lord Cromer, one of those articles of exportation of which England loves so much to rid herself, not knowing what to do with it at home.

Again, what is called professor in England only corresponds very imperfectly to what is understood by this term in France, Germany, and on the Continent generally. It is well known that England does not shine in the point of view of education. The culture of the English "professors" is rudimentary compared to that of their French or German colleagues. Generally they are self-made men, very estimable but entirely unprovided with the literary or scientific preparation necessary for "serious" teaching. It is as if in the construction of a building one were to substitute overseers for architects. There may be exceptions, and there certainly are; but the mass are like that. Let us add that England does not send her best to Egypt.

El Lewa took the lead in the Nationalist campaign, and deliberately incited its readers to prepare a rough reception for the new teachers, adding :

We want to know what are their qualifications and whether they have obtained creditable degrees. Or is their only certificate a certificate of English nationality? Is it enough for them to be Saxons without having also been students? This Ministry has often pretended to help the natives, but when the time comes always complains of their incompetence, whereas if it would only call them to an examination and test their ability it would find that they are much more efficient than the English.

El Balag took up the refrain :

We could point out many natives who are much better qualified than these twenty-two English. . . . Who is responsible for this: the Minister or the Adviser? If the former, he must be called upon to resign.

It is to be feared that these twenty-two young and enthusiastic teachers will find a poor welcome awaiting them.

Towards the end of the year *El Mokattam* added to the general feeling of uncertainty by publishing a series of statements which gave grounds for further rumours and further discussion. Among these statements were announcements that :

Sir E. Gorst will be promoted to some other post, and will be replaced in Egypt by Mr. L. V. Harcourt.

That the Said Ministry will resign, before Sir E. Gorst's departure, and will be replaced by one under the leadership of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi or Prince Hussein Kamel.

That Said Pasha, when he has retired, will undertake the formation of a new and moderate Nationalist party which shall entirely supersede the present noisy agitators of the Shawish-Farid group. His present tour in the provinces was specially arranged for the purpose of collecting his forces for the coming campaign.

It was also rumoured at this time that a meeting had been held in Downing Street, at which Sir Edward Grey, General Sir Ian Hamilton, Lord Cromer, and Sir Eldon Gorst were present, to discuss schemes for the reorganisation of the Egyptian Administration and the rendering of the Army of Occupation independent of the British Agency.

The state of Sir Eldon Gorst's health at the time this book goes to press has strengthened the belief, entertained in many quarters towards the end of 1910, that his resignation is impending. Whether the belief will prove to be well founded time will show, but speculation is rife as to his probable successor. The presence of Lord Kitchener in Egypt, in the early days of the winter, did not fail to cause comment, and, although his visit was declared definitely to have

no official bearing, it aroused hopes in some and fears in other sections of the community. Among the latter were the Extremists, whose cup of bitterness would be filled to the brim by the presence of the conqueror of the Sudan. Mr. Ronald Graham, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and Sir Matthew Nathan, Secretary to the Post Office, have also been mentioned as possible successors to Sir Eldon Gorst, and, indeed, the rumours as to the possibility of the latter's resignation, and surmises as to who will take his place, are the topics of the day in Egypt.

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